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Michael Robert Armstrong 
Lay Christian Views of Life After Death: A Qualitative Study and 
Theological Appraisal of the ‘Ordinary Eschatology’ of Some 
Congregational Christians 
ABSTRACT 
The thesis investigates the life after death (hereafter LAD) beliefs of 
members of my Congregational church via in-depth semi-structured interviews. 
Complementary criteria of critical reflection and visible effect on behaviour are 
used to identify these views as „ordinary theology‟. It is argued that the disclosed 
„ordinary eschatology‟ provides a valuable commentary on both the current 
theological norm of protestant Christian tradition and contemporary academic 
debate. Ordinary theologians can be considered as Spirit signal processors for the 
church: a claim based on a view of continuing revelation, the changing living 
tradition of the church, and the nature of doctrine as „regulative principle‟.  
Protestant doctrine and funeral liturgy is not entirely clear about LAD, so 
this is supplemented with a particular view of „life after LAD‟ to provide a 
comparative „norm‟. The present data shows a significant disjunction with this 
norm in several key areas. Ordinary eschatology does not envisage a physical 
afterlife or final re-embodiment of the dead: the afterlife is an immediate soul-
spirit existence. Jesus‟ resurrection is not regarded as directly relevant to the 
nature of human afterlife but rather was to confirm his person and message.  
These ordinary theologians are deeply sceptical of scholarly and ecclesial 
authority, and their attitudes suggest a failure on the part of church and academy 
to convey the results of academic scholarship. Ordinary eschatology challenges 
the contemporary theological trend of denying a substantial soul, and questions 
some interpretations of key biblical texts concerning LAD. These ordinary 
theologians also frequently report experiences of supernatural phenomena: 
continuing contact with the known dead is especially important.  
The listening process used to disclose this ordinary theology has great 
benefit and could be applied in other congregations and contexts. There is an 
identified desire among these ordinary theologians for LAD to become a more 
common and routine topic of church conversation.   
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1. WHY A STUDY OF THE AFTERLIFE BELIEFS OF 
ORDINARY CHRISTIAN PEOPLE?  
1.1 EXPERIENCE OF ORDINARY PASTORAL MINISTRY 
It is perhaps not immediately obvious why the views of members of an 
ordinary Congregational church concerning „life after death‟ (hereafter referred to 
as LAD) should be of interest and importance.  
A key pastoral and theological issue for me during twenty-five years of 
ministry has been the unrelenting presence in ordinary human lives of suffering 
and death. I have conducted numerous funerals over this period, usually involving 
members of my own congregation but often also involving people less familiar 
with church practice. In these I have talked of everlasting life, and have usually 
sought to outline a meaningful theodicy. These events are often the clearest 
examples of direct pastoral connection between minister and congregation. I have 
always felt that funerals require the most intense effort of pastoral empathy, the 
clearest expression of theology, and a comprehensive understanding of the human 
situation. Funerals are the church laid bare, the church dealing with the ultimate 
questions of human existence. They are also occasions of great pastoral 
opportunity for the church. In a very real sense, whenever Christians are 
confronted by the proximity of death, practical theology is paramount. The 
minister or priest stands between the Christian tradition and the immediate 
pastoral human situation. But this is never a one-way process of simply „applying‟ 
the tradition in an appropriate way to the situation. I have always felt, rather, that 
it is to seek to hold the two together in „creative conversation‟. In fact, this 
exercise of ministry is fundamentally hermeneutic in nature; each side being 
influenced by, and in turn influencing, the other. My understanding of the 
tradition has changed as well as my understanding of human need in Christian 
bereavement.
1
 
More eminent theologians express similar experiences. Jürgen Moltmann 
relates a „painfully embarrassing‟ memory. 
Ernst Bloch had just died. He was a neighbour of ours, and I went over at 
once to speak to his wife. She came toward me and simply asked, „Where 
is he now?‟ His body was still in the house. For the moment I was without 
                                                     
1
 A full account of my methodological approach is given below – see Chapter 2, and Appendix E.  
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an answer. But I have learned that this „where‟ question is important for 
the people left behind, because without an answer they cannot hold fast to 
fellowship with „the beloved person‟ (as Bloch‟s wife called her Ernst).2  
McDannell and Lang point to the personal correspondence of Karl Rahner which 
assures a female friend that LAD is a real social experience; and to Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer assuring a small boy that his dead dog is in heaven. The point 
McDannell and Lang make is that while theological professionals argue for 
theocentric views of heaven in public (from the tradition), in private they accept 
and recognise that anthropocentric views are also valid and important (in a 
pastoral context).  
Even those well acquainted with the New Testament tradition, who expect 
to participate (to the exclusion of all else) in God‟s spiritual perfection 
after death, cannot fully maintain this position. The most spiritually 
rigorous among Christian thinkers have not been able to deny all social 
contact with other creatures in heaven. ... It seems that the religious studies 
professionals have more in common with the congregation in the pews 
than they would like us to believe.
3
  
Another ever-present element of my ministry has been the attempt to 
understand suffering. An eschatological future of continuing personal existence is 
a necessary element of most Christian theological explanations of evil and 
suffering. In his classic collection on the theodicy debate, Stephen T. Davis says, 
„I do not believe that the problem of evil can be solved without crucial reference 
to the future.‟4 Two notable recent examples of theologians applying this view are 
John Polkinghorne
5
 (a re-formation of physical matter and re-embodied existence 
from our „information patterns‟), and Marilyn McCord Adams6 (a heaven which 
God must provide for all to redeem the horrors of human life). Adams approaches 
the issue from a classical philosophical perspective and claims that all human 
lives face the ultimate need for eschatological explanation because of the 
challenge of death itself; a view which reflects my own pastoral experience. Many 
                                                     
2
 Jürgen Moltmann, „Is There Life After Death?‟ in John Polkinghorne and Michael Welker (eds.), The 
End of The World and The Ends of God: Science and Theology on Eschatology (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity 
Press International, 2000), 246-7. 
3
 Colleen McDannell and Bernhard Lang, Heaven: A History (New Haven: Yale Nota Bene, 2
nd
 ed., 
2001), xiv. 
4
 Stephen T. Davis, (ed.) Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy (Louisville, KY: Westminster 
John Knox Press, New Edition, 2001), 133. 
5
 John C. Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2002). 
6
 Marilyn McCord Adams, Christ and Horrors: The Coherence of Christology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithica, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1999). 
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„ordinary‟ deaths of the elderly are neither good nor easy. It is not just the „tragic 
death of the young‟ that needs explanation and understanding.  
As a Christian minister I have a crucial responsibility with regard to helping 
people in situations of death and suffering, and I therefore need better to 
understand my task and opportunities. So, on the one hand, I will consider how 
the Christian tradition has been, can be, and should be understood in such 
contexts. On the other, I will investigate how the people I minister to perceive the 
death of loved ones in the context of their Christian faith. The questions I wish to 
pose are the following. In what ways do the people I minister to conceive of 
LAD? Where do their views come from, and how do they relate to the formal 
statements of church doctrine and funeral liturgies? How do they understand 
biblical teaching in this context? What has helped them understand and better 
cope with the death of loved ones? In what way, if any, has a theodicy been 
helpful?
 7
 Does what is said, done and taught by the „church at large‟ in relation to 
LAD have a positive effect on ordinary Christian believers: is it supportive and 
confirming of their beliefs and practices, or in contradiction of them?  
A key set of theological issues is therefore included in this discussion:  
 The nature of the human self. Is it physical, spiritual (soul), or mental?  
 Continuity between this life and the afterlife. Do we remember our 
earthly life? What is the purpose of the afterlife and how does it relate to 
our earthly experience? Do we continue to grow and develop in the 
afterlife?  
 The nature of the afterlife. Is it „social‟? Do we meet other human 
beings, ancestors and successors? If so, are our relationships with them the 
same? Are we aware of those still living earthly lives? If the new life is 
physical, what age and physical or mental state are we in? Does it last 
forever? What do we do? 
 The timing of the afterlife. Is it immediate post-mortem, or is there a 
staged process?  
 Does the afterlife in any way explain or compensate for suffering in this 
life? 
                                                     
7
 The notion of a meaningful theodicy in pastoral terms has recently been challenged strongly from the 
perspective of practical theology – see John Swinton, Raging with Compassion: Pastoral Responses to 
the Problem of Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007). 
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 What effect does, or should, a belief in the afterlife have on our earthly 
life? 
 Is the afterlife the same for all? Are there variations of the afterlife, 
related to some form of judgement?  
 What is our relationship with God in the afterlife? 
 Is there any other form of animal life in the afterlife? 
 What is the future of the physical universe we live in now? 
 How do we know anything about the afterlife? 
 What does, or should, the church teach about the afterlife? 
Such issues are important not just for academic theologians and members of 
the clergy, but also for all those who are simply members of churches and 
practitioners of faith. Such people lose loved ones to physical death, while trying 
to understand, believe, and put into practice the Christian gospel of LAD. I have 
stood beside such people in situations of bereavement for many years, and it is 
time I heard more clearly what they actually understand and believe in this 
context. However, my intention is not simply to check whether their reception of 
the tradition has been accurate. This would be to understand the matter in a 
unidirectional way; to consider only one side of the conversation. I want also to 
investigate whether and in what ways the views of such Christian people can 
actually comment critically on, or even change, the tradition itself. In other words, 
I wish to consider whether their views are of theological importance. In order to 
do this I will utilise the concept of „ordinary theology‟.  
 
1.2 ORDINARY THEOLOGY  
Jeff Astley defines „ordinary theology‟ as „the theological beliefs and 
processes of believing that find expression in the God-talk of those believers who 
have received no scholarly theological education.‟8 His thesis is that the theology 
of un-taught practitioners is not just worth listening to, but is actually essential for 
the church to hear. Why should this be so? 
Following Kierkegaard, Astley sees Christianity as a „method‟ or a „way‟. 
What we learn and how we learn are inextricably linked (theology as process, not 
                                                     
8
 Jeff Astley, Ordinary Theology: Looking, Listening and Learning in Theology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2002), 1. 
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just product). Emotions are also involved; the role of affect is important. Hence, „I 
cannot be said fully – or perhaps even remotely – to understand, say, the doctrine 
of creation that I purport to embrace, unless I experience the appropriate affective 
states: feelings of dependence, contingency, gratitude and awe.‟9 The implication 
for belief in LAD is clear; such belief must be accompanied by affective states 
such as feelings of secure hope, and lack of fear. Astley argues that religious truth 
claims are personal claims of ultimate importance, to us; claims that affect us 
directly and intimately. This is in contrast to a more traditional theological 
approach which would stress what the religious practitioner should know about 
how God acts in relation to the whole of humanity, rather than to me. For Astley, 
religion is emotional, not just cognitive; without the subjective appropriation of 
religion in practice, it does not actually exist. In this sense, religion is „tried and 
tested‟ by those who actually „do‟ it, not by those who merely „think‟ it. Astley 
claims that „belief-in‟ is „belief-that‟ with attitude (and relevant behaviour). Of 
course, this does not mean that religious truth is just a matter of personal opinion; 
there is an objective pole to religious truth. But something cannot be religiously 
true if not actually put into practice, in the „religious embrace‟ where the 
subjective and the objective meet.
10
  
To learn the faith, for Astley, is to move from „believing-that‟ to „believing-
in‟. Knowledge about God must be distinguished from knowledge of God. 
Context and process are very important; „theological truth‟ is  
received through, and only through, a process that is … personal and 
idiosyncratic. And it is this sort of theology that is much more important 
for most people. Our embracing of faith compels us to speak here of the 
truth of theology as an „encountered truth‟; it is the sort of truth that we do 
not just know, but are „in‟.11  
Real theological learning cannot be second-hand, but rather must be adopted and 
embraced with passion; not just accepting what others have said, but wrestling 
with this and making it our own. Theology is an activity which ultimately we 
must do ourselves, and cannot just be learned from how others have done it. The 
views of others are a valuable resource from which to learn, but as we adopt them, 
they become our views. We only believe what we believe.  
                                                     
9
 Astley, Ordinary Theology, 7. 
10
 Jeff Astley, „A Theological Reflection on the Nature of Religious Truth‟ unpublished paper presented 
at the 2008 session of the International Seminar on Religious Education and Values at Ankara 
University, Turkey.  
11
 Astley, Ordinary Theology, 36. 
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In a book written for protestant lay Christians (and preceding Astley‟s 
concept of „ordinary theology‟), the process theologian John Cobb argues that in 
order for church renewal to happen we first need to renew how lay people think 
within the church. Lay people need to recognise that they are already theologians 
in the sense that they have beliefs that affect their Christian lives. However, Cobb 
argues that lay people often get bogged down in their own uncertainties or what 
seem to them irrelevant traditional questions. Instead, they should discover and 
articulate the convictions that shape their lives, which „requires a quite different 
starting point‟ and „a kind of reflection to which most people are not 
accustomed‟.12 Using the ideas of others is not the way forward. „The only place 
that authentic theology can begin is with the real beliefs of real Christians. Much 
may be wrong with those, but that is not the question. We can grow theologically 
only if we discover for ourselves that our beliefs are not adequate or appropriate.‟ 
If we are simply told that our views are unorthodox then we will not change; but 
we „may change real beliefs on discovery of the reasons for the church‟s rejection 
of those beliefs in the past.‟13 Cobb argues that for the church to be vital, to be 
able to face current ethical and social issues, ordinary Christians need to become 
reflective believers, that is, to become „clear about what we believe and why we 
believe it‟.14 However, ultimately Cobb fails to carry his argument further than 
urging ordinary Christians to discover their own „authentic‟ theology in order 
better to understand the doctrines of the church and therefore adopt them, or not. 
There is little if any suggestion that this personal authentic theology can be of 
importance in a wider sense. 
So is there anything else to ordinary theology? It is clearly important to 
understand the way in which people actually learn and interiorise their faith, but 
does this make their views valuable in any way other than as their own views? 
Why should we take the views of ordinary Christians seriously as theology? 
Is it ‘Theological’? 
Astley accepts that even „ordinary‟ theology should have applied to it „a 
range of normative criteria of what Christian theological belief ought to be, 
including criteria representing norms of belief derived from Scripture, tradition 
                                                     
12
 John B. Cobb, Jr., Becoming a Thinking Christian (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1993), 18  
13
 Cobb, Becoming a Thinking Christian, 41. 
14
 Cobb, Becoming a Thinking Christian, 136. 
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and church order, as well as norms of rationality.‟ He argues that ordinary 
theology „connects with the prescribed norms of Scripture, creeds and councils‟, 
but only in the sense of the ongoing „critical conversation‟ between ordinary 
believer and tradition, which is actually how tradition is changed and continually 
re-formed. However, in this critical conversation with the norms, „the believer‟s 
beliefs will also challenge and may even, eventually and given a sharp enough bit 
of challenging, change what counts as the norm of belief.‟15 This is an important 
claim, and one which is directly relevant to this study. Are the views of members 
of my congregation, as ordinary theologians, so important as to be capable of 
challenging and even changing the accepted norms of Scripture, creeds, and 
councils with regard to LAD?  
Astley believes that „theology is process as well as content, and therefore 
includes the set of processes and practices of holding, developing, patterning and 
critiquing those beliefs, thoughts and discourse [emphasis added]‟. Ordinary 
theology is non-scholarly and non-academic, but – 
 Although the overwhelming majority of contemporary „God-talkers‟ have 
not studied theology formally at all, they are inevitably engaged in doing 
their own theology if and when they speak and think about God, or at all 
events when they do so with any seriousness [emphasis added]. This is an 
acceptable claim if theology is essentially the attempt to speak reflectively 
of the divine [author‟s emphasis], or more generically of what we 
worship.
16
  
From this I conclude that if the views and opinions of ordinary theologians are to 
be regarded as „theology‟ then there must be evidence of reflection on and 
evaluation of their own beliefs. In other words, what ordinary believers say about 
their faith is of value and potentially important for the wider faith community only 
if such talk about God is the result of critical reflection and not simply idle 
thoughts or unreflective opinion.  
Astley claims that the academic theologian always begins life as an ordinary 
theologian.
17
 He suggests that one reason we will find serious reflection among 
ordinary theologians is the way in which belief operates.  
At a deep level, ordinary beliefs are usually taken very seriously by the 
people who have them. They own their belief because it is significant to 
                                                     
15
 Astley, Ordinary Theology, 40. 
16
 Astley, Ordinary Theology, 56. 
17
 I can relate this to my own experience as a person who had no upbringing in the church. My first 
interests in Christianity were as a very interested and curious adult who certainly undertook ordinary 
theology. 
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them, and it is significant to them because they own it. Ordinary theology 
is, almost by definition, a significant theology – to the ordinary believers 
who profess it. Our own theology is always that sort of thing; that is how 
belief works.
18
  
Furthermore, ordinary theology is significant because it is forged in the face of 
real-life personal crises and challenges, rather than in detached academic contexts.  
Facing the death of others and facing our own death (which is always a 
part of facing the death of others) fires the crucible of ordinary 
theologising. The resulting theology can powerfully express spirituality‟s 
concern with meaning. It would be foolish, however, to assert that it 
always does [emphasis added]. Ordinary theology, like academic theology, 
may be either profound or superficial, either positive or despairing, 
reflecting the people who are engaged in it.
19
  
Astley accepts that religious beliefs  
should not be called „theology‟ unless they are to some extent articulated 
and reflected upon. But most believers engage in some measure of 
articulation and reflection; they do think about and „think through‟ their 
faith, in their own way. And most people do see the problems, especially 
the „intellectual‟ problems, in their faith; and they also care about having 
consistent beliefs and being able to justify them to themselves and others. 
Further, people can and do work out „theological solutions‟ for 
themselves. ... And academic theology is not as impressively superior as it 
sometimes thinks it is in coming up with acceptable responses, when 
compared with the more ordinary sort of God-talk.
20
  
Astley points to David Kelsey, who argues that congregations are 
„constituted by a practice that is inherently self-critical.‟ Kelsey believes that „the 
practice of worship of God inherently requires critical examination of whether 
and why we should engage ourselves in the Christian thing at all‟, and that 
congregations „are therefore committed as Christian congregations to a 
continuing self-critique in the light of Christian and other norms.‟21 Astley also 
appeals to Richard Osmer, Dietrich Ritschl, and Charles M. Wood for support and 
concludes that  
Actually it would be strange if ordinary theologians were not both 
reflective and critical. All human beings are concerned about the 
plausibility or „believability‟ of their beliefs. Our beliefs need to be 
believable to us. A critical („judging‟, „assessing‟, „evaluating‟) element is 
crucial if people are to own their faith. For most people, particularly in our 
culture, this will involve some reflective, rational examination of their 
                                                     
18
 Astley, Ordinary Theology, 66. 
19
 Astley, Ordinary Theology, 70. 
20
 Astley, Ordinary Theology, 139. 
21
 David Kelsey, To Understand God Truly: What‟s theological about a Theological School? 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox, 1992), 141, cf. 206-7. Quoted in Astley, Ordinary Theology, 
140.  
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religious beliefs. ... For most adults anyway, if not perhaps all, formation 
in the faith must go along with „Christian criticism‟.22  
Spirituality is also important for Astley; in fact beliefs and practices are 
secondary to it, but they influence our spirituality and are linked in a feedback 
loop. „Thus religious people should, and mostly they do, think for themselves for 
spiritual reasons; adults must engage in critical reflection if they are to hold to 
adult beliefs that can express and inform an adult spirituality. Hence, ordinary 
believers must also engage in a theology that involves, in Barth‟s phrase, “taking 
rational trouble” over the mystery of God.‟23  
 It seems, then, that Astley not only accepts that critical reflection is a 
necessary component of real ordinary theology, but that he expects it to be there. 
Ann Christie found this not to be the case with all the subjects she interviewed in 
her study of „Ordinary Christology‟. She found, „that a few of her sample are 
highly resistant to any kind of critical reflection and evaluation of their faith‟.24 
Christie utilises the affective dimension of ordinary theology in defence of the 
claim that her interviewees are „doing‟ Christology, but nevertheless recognises 
that „affective Christology that only entertains warm feelings is superficial.‟ So 
the subjective pole of ordinary theology of affective response (the necessary 
complement to the objective pole of formal theology and doctrine) must „lead to 
volitional action, or to transformation of the person in any other way‟.25 Voas and 
Crocket make a similar point in the context of seeking to assess what „believing 
without belonging‟ can actually mean. „Many people in Britain have beliefs about 
the rights and wrongs of fox hunting, but comparatively few are either participants or 
protestors. It is not enough to find that people accept one statement of belief or 
another; unless these beliefs make a substantial difference in their lives, religion 
may consist of little more than opinions to be gathered by pollsters.‟26  
I suggest that we have, then, two complementary criteria for confirming 
whether or not ordinary theology is actually being done. On the „objective-
cognitive‟ side, the ordinary theologian must demonstrate sufficient critical 
reflection. This does not mean that the evaluative (critical) element of reflection 
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must be up to the standards of the academy, but rather that the ordinary theologian 
must show a serious attempt to engage with the cognitive issues of her beliefs.
27
 
On the „subjective affective-volitional‟ side, the ordinary theologian must also 
demonstrate sufficient effect of the personal appropriation of her beliefs. In other 
words, there must be a clear indication of an effect on their spirituality, feelings 
and therefore their behaviour, as a result of the holding of this belief; for example, 
a commitment or action. There is no simple way to measure such things. 
However, accurate measurement is not necessary because the key thing to be 
identified is the complete or near absence of such criteria rather than an accurate 
measure of the extent to which they are present.  
This study saw some examples of views about LAD that failed to display any 
recognisable level of critical reflection, and also some examples of „warm 
feelings‟ about claimed beliefs without any recognisable personal effect. 
However, it is also clear that for the vast majority of the subjects of this study, 
both the affective (subjective) and cognitive (objective) requirements of ordinary 
theology were met (see „Ordinary Theology Being Done‟ on page 54, and „The 
Effect of Belief in LAD‟ on page 132). The majority of those interviewed had 
clearly given significant prior thought to the issue, and nearly all exhibited 
surprising focus and critical reflection within the interview itself. The vast 
majority of subjects also gave clear and moving testimony to the difference that 
their belief in LAD made to them. It was rarely simply a case of their belief that 
there is LAD. Christie concluded in her study that ordinary Christology is about 
the stories of Jesus rather than the doctrines about him; and about right practice 
rather than right belief. So people can be Christian „without having to give assent 
to (or even understand) the christological doctrines of the church.‟ So the 
important question to ask believers is not who is Jesus, but do you follow him?
28
 
Doctrine and biblical teaching concerning LAD are less clear than they are for 
Christology. I therefore encouraged interviewees to answer not only what their 
belief in LAD is, but also what, if anything, it means for them.  
There is one final point to consider with respect to our confidence that 
ordinary theology is being done. In this study there was little evidence of the use 
of Scripture by interviewees to explain or support their views of LAD. This could 
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be seen as a critical challenge to the claim that ordinary theology was being done. 
It could be argued that Astley fails to make explicit any essential role for the 
Bible for ordinary Christian theologians. Yet his requirement for critical reflection 
on the part of ordinary theologians, and his insistence on a truly theological 
evaluation of ordinary theology utilising the resources of the normative tradition, 
implies that the Bible should be central. However, while it is clear that the Bible 
must be at the centre of any theological critique (normative criticism) of ordinary 
theology, does this also mean it must be central to the process of ordinary 
theological reflection itself? In other words, can ordinary theologians be critical 
and reflective without a significant and recognisable use of Scripture? The answer 
to this is yes, for two reasons. First, ordinary theologians being critically 
reflective is very different from their applying normative criticism using Scripture 
as a norm. It means applying criteria such as quizzing oneself about whether one‟s 
beliefs are coherent, not contradictory; consistent with one‟s other beliefs, well-
grounded in evidence and argument. It could be argued that such rational criteria 
are also normative. Second, the role of the Bible in continuing revelation is not 
always primary. As I show below (see „Continuing Revelation‟ page 26ff.), new 
„natural knowledge‟ may be the key factor rather than (indeed often without) the 
application of biblical knowledge or expertise. The Bible ultimately has to be 
involved in the discernment of new revelation, but long-standing interpretation of 
particular passages may themselves be challenged and changed in this process.  
I am persuaded both that „ordinary theology‟ is a relevant and important 
concept, and that there are valid and workable criteria for deciding whether 
people are actually undertaking ordinary theology. This study is therefore 
properly described as an attempt to articulate the ordinary theology of LAD, the 
„ordinary eschatology‟, of members of my congregation. 
Both quantitative and qualitative approaches can be used to study ordinary 
theology, but „the techniques of participant observation and unstructured or semi-
structured interviewing that are so central to ethnographic research … may best 
provide us with the necessary full description and understanding for the study of 
ordinary theology.‟29 But we also need conceptual work; any study of ordinary 
theology must deal with the normative claims of the Christian tradition. It should 
not remain at the descriptive level. Such a theological study of ordinary theology  
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cannot be confined to philosophical theology. As well as employing the 
tools and standards of rationality of the philosopher, therefore, it must also 
embrace the evaluation of theological beliefs from the standpoint, and 
using the resources, of the normative theological criteria derived from 
Christian Scripture, doctrine and ethics. What I am advocating here, 
therefore, is a full theological study redirected to the belief systems of the 
everyday believer.
30
 
Description and analysis of the beliefs of ordinary theologians is not sufficient; 
we must critique as well as describe those beliefs, using the resources of the 
normative tradition. This approach is adopted within this project. However, as we 
shall see, the normative tradition is more problematic in relation to LAD than in 
many other areas of ordinary Christian believing.  
The Benefits of Ordinary Theology 
Astley claims both pragmatic and theological benefits for ordinary theology. 
The pragmatic benefits stem from the fact that in order for the church properly to 
exercise its various ministries, it should actually know something about those 
ministered to, especially what they think and believe. Ordinary theology can 
provide this. Furthermore, the actual process of doing so can itself be of great 
benefit to ordinary theologians. „Listening is a mark of respect; listening is a 
deeply pastoral, affirming act; listening tells people that they matter.‟31 We need 
to listen to what ordinary theologians are saying, both to respect and value them, 
and to better form a dialogue between the minister and those who are ministered 
to. This study confirms such benefits. 
Richard Pratt recognises that the accusation of „theology by focus group‟ can 
be levelled against a listening approach such as ordinary theology. How do we 
know they are not just expressing popular opinion rather than revealing the voice 
of God? Pratt‟s response to this is to say that ordinary theology can at least allow 
new voices to be heard, and asks whether ordinary theology can actually be 
leading the faith community, with the academic and ecclesial authorities being 
left behind in some contemporary areas. For example, homosexuality and 
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contraception are areas where the teaching of the church is perceived as „wrong‟ 
by many ordinary believers. „It is in the muddle and complexity of ordinary daily 
life that Christian ethics is really tested. It is in the experiences of ordinary daily 
life that we learn and relearn God – for each person and each generation has to 
recapitulate this learning.‟32 Pratt claims that the recent history of the Anglican 
Church with respect to the issues of women priests and bishops and same-sex 
relationships, and the Catholic Church with respect to contraception, are cases in 
point.  
Such considerations lead us to the core theological benefits of ordinary 
theology. For Astley, ordinary theology represents an enormous untapped 
resource within the church, a „huge living experiment of people struggling to find 
and make meaning in their lives‟, a „vast user-base‟ which allows us to check the 
latest releases of „theological code‟.33 Ordinary theologians have to live their 
theology; it has to work for them. It is their footwear which is tested against the 
pathways and weather of real life. In other words, it is in the experience of 
ordinary theologians that theology is put to the test. Religious beliefs are actually 
held by believers, hence „they are the people who decide what in fact will count as 
falsifying evidence for their own beliefs‟.34  
But it is not just the practical „workability‟ of theology which is tested in the 
lived experience of ordinary theologians; it is theology itself as the formal 
statement of church and tradition. In other words, in testing „if it works‟ Astley 
suggests that this also means that – at least to a degree - we test whether it is right, 
whether it is true. The views of ordinary theologians can (should) affect the 
normative tradition itself, and the reason for saying so involves continuing 
revelation and the nature of biblical interpretation. „Christianity‟s holy texts are 
always being re-read, re-assimilated, re-imagined and elaborated in the Christian 
tradition.‟ For Astley, this practice should not be limited to academic theologians. 
„In particularising the gospel in its own life and culture, the congregation 
continually reinterprets the normative beliefs and practices of the church in a 
manner that provides important innovations for the church as a whole. ... The 
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study of ordinary theology can make these innovations and elucidations available 
to theology in general‟ [emphasis added].35 
These reflections may be related to the ongoing „Action Research: Church 
and Society‟ (ARCS) project which has an interesting theological grounding. The 
value of Christian practice, in theological terms, is clear. „Our theological method 
is based on the assumption that the practices we are exploring ... are themselves 
already the bearers of theology; they express the contemporary living tradition of 
the Christian faith.‟36 The notion of a „living Christian tradition‟ is crucial for 
ARCS. The authors point to the Second Vatican Council (Dei Verbum 8) as an 
example of this idea, and claim that similar views can be seen within other 
„established theologies of tradition and revelation‟.37 The embodied („espoused‟ 
and „operant‟) theologies of Christians who practice their faith must be set in the 
context of the wider Christian tradition, hence the other two theological voices 
with which they are in conversation, the „formal‟ and „normative‟. The formal 
voice is that of academic theology and other relevant disciplines; the normative 
voice is that of scriptures, creeds, liturgies and official church teaching. 
„Conversation‟ between these four voices is the way to achieve practical-
theological insight. This is a hermeneutical approach in which the bottom-up 
theology of practitioners (articulated by grounded theory) is brought into 
conversation with a top-down application of pre-established theological criteria 
(the four themes of Christology, Grace, Church and World, and Sacraments and 
Sacramentality).
38
 The operant and espoused theologies of practitioners are not 
only challenged by formal and normative theologies, but they can also challenge 
and change „from the theological wisdom of practice‟ the normative and formal 
(which is how tradition actually develops). A central conviction of this model of 
„Theological Action Research‟ (TAR) is that „the forms of theology articulated by 
practices have a crucial role in informing and forming both formal and, 
ultimately, normative theologies.‟39 Tradition is seen as „more than a discrete 
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body of knowledge or a history which we seek to bring into contact with 
contemporary practice‟. It is also 
the living embodiment of faith unfolding in and through these faith 
practices. There is a complex relationship of continuity and change here 
which requires discernment as to what can be regarded as truly 
authoritative tradition. What characterises contemporary, or living, 
tradition is that it has yet to be discerned by the Church as a whole. It is 
tradition in tentative, growing mode, whose authority, whilst real, is 
different from that of the already discerned (and continually re-discerned) 
tradition of Christian history.
40
  
Translating this into Astley‟s terms, ordinary theology expresses the living 
tradition of the church, which is a key indicator in how far the normative tradition 
can and should change. Furthermore, the key driver in this is the work of the Holy 
Spirit. It is interesting to note that in the ARCS project the theme of „grace‟ which 
the project expected to find is not clearly present, but pneumatological questions 
have come to the fore. A key question for ARCS is the extent to which empirical 
data could indicate a valid (Spirit-led) challenge to existing normative theology. 
Astley argues that ordinary theology „can furnish us with a wider 
understanding of doctrinal norms, by providing a wider concept of what the 
church believes as a norm for doctrine.‟ He sees doctrine as those aspects of 
theology which have won acceptance, which have become the norm; but this 
raises the question, for whom has it become the norm? He points out that all 
doctrinal norms are themselves, in origin, the beliefs of others (Apostles, Fathers, 
Councils). „In other words they originate in the Christian tradition. They are 
themselves beliefs, accepted as “normal”.‟ 41 The problem is that at different times 
in church history the „community‟ has been variously defined and limited; and 
„the influential have had most influence and the winners have written the rule 
book‟.42 Who, and how many, need to accept a belief in order for it to become 
orthodox? Astley suggests that ordinary theology can help us regain the 
traditional idea of the „consensus of the faithful‟ (the consensus fidelium, 
reaffirmed by the Second Vatican Council - Lumen Gentium 12). He argues that 
„surely a strain, if not a paradox, is created when theology identifies as “Christian 
doctrine” or a “doctrine of the church” beliefs that many ordinary Christians do 
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not share.‟43 It is clear from various empirical studies that many churchgoers and 
church members are quite unorthodox (see Appendix A), but what does this really 
mean for normative theology?  
Astley praises Johannes van der Ven
44
 for being willing to say that the 
consensus fidelium can and should be mapped from empirical data and that such 
data is necessary to highlight discrepancies between ordinary faith and the 
teachings of the church. However, while empirical facts about what Christians 
believe need to be taken account of, „they are not necessarily to be read as 
definitive for Christian belief.‟ It is not as simple as that. At least, however, „we 
may argue that there is something unstable in any account of Christian doctrine 
that ignores substantial minority views (and in some areas majority views) within 
the laity‟.45  
It is possible, of course, to argue orthodoxy on the grounds of appeal to 
Scripture or tradition alone, but the voice of ordinary Christians (the consensus of 
the faithful) surely has a key role. The argument I present below is that this is 
particularly so with regard to continuing revelation, where ordinary theologians 
have a crucial role to play. Astley claims that 
even academic and official ecclesiastical theology are driven by changes 
that go on in mass society among the great unwashed. … Our values, 
assumptions, beliefs and ways of thinking change very markedly over 
time, and our churches and theologies ... must eventually catch up with 
many of these changes. In Christianity it is the lay people, the ordinary 
theologians, who often change first – despite the clergy‟s continual 
grumbling about their conservative nature.
46
  
I agree with this viewpoint, and would suggest that this is actually how it has 
always been; the Scriptures themselves being formed originally by such a process, 
and the normative tradition being always tested and re-formed by the community 
of faith. Astley is surely right that ordinary believers are most open to the 
influences of a changing world, because they live in it and reflect their faith in it, 
and are therefore the best placed theologians to judge and respond to such 
changes. Ordinary theology „is the church‟s front line. ... And whatever we make 
of it theologically, speaking statistically ordinary theology is the theology of 
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God‟s church.‟47 I wish to focus on a specific way in which ordinary theology 
may be of benefit to the church at large. 
 
1.3 ORDINARY THEOLOGIANS AS „SIGNAL PROCESSORS‟ OF 
THE SPIRIT 
I wish to extend Astley‟s arguments in order to suggest that a key role that 
ordinary theologians can play is in acting as signal processors of the Spirit. In 
other words, ordinary theology can be an important mechanism for discerning the 
continuing guidance of the Holy Spirit for the Christian community. Indeed, this 
could be seen as the central claim to importance of ordinary theology. Ordinary 
theologians are those best placed to notice when theology goes astray at a 
fundamental level, because they are the community of practice and belief where 
theology is accepted or rejected, tested and judged. This view is supported by a 
detailed consideration of continuing revelation (see below).  
This metaphor of signal processor is taken from the device used in electrical 
engineering for the extraction of information from complex signals in the 
presence of noise. Ordinary theologians, I would argue, act as aerials, or 
receivers, for the Spirit: as people seeking to put into practice their Christian faith. 
They are ideally placed to undertake this function. However, this is not sufficient. 
It implies that the Spirit-signal is clear and simple, requiring only its reception by 
someone. This is rarely if ever the case, for individual believers or church 
communities. God communicates with us in and through our complex, and often 
confusing, human condition and context. What we believe we understand as the 
prompting of the Spirit requires a degree of filtering and clarification. There is a 
great deal of theological noise in the „Spirit-ether‟, where complexity can 
sometimes be turned into clarity by appropriate signal processing. 
Of course, as a Congregationalist, this claim is somewhat easier to make than 
may be the case within other Christian denominations. The independence of local 
congregations is foundational to our understanding of how the Spirit operates. 
The church meeting is key. 
All members of a Congregational Church are allowed to attend the church 
meeting and take part in discussions and decisions. This is the governing 
body of the Church, which meets usually monthly under the guidance and 
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power of the Holy Spirit. This is one of the privileges and responsibilities 
of membership! It is here that the members should seek the mind of Christ, 
through His promise „That where two or three are gathered together in His 
name He is present!‟48  
As a Congregationalist, my basic assumption is that the community of believers is 
the place where God‟s guidance is sought and the promptings of the Spirit 
discerned. This should be done in a worshipful context.  
The aim of the Church Meeting is to discover the will of God for the future 
of the church: for this reason it is important that the business is conducted 
in an atmosphere of prayer. In taking decisions it is far better to seek the 
consensus of the meeting: in establishing the common mind of the 
meeting, one can best see the will of God for his people. Should a vote be 
necessary, a close division is a sure indication that the church is not yet of 
a common mind on that issue. In such circumstances a decision should 
usually be deferred.
49
 
However, I am fully aware from long experience that even this apparently 
simple mechanism for discernment of the Spirit is by no means straightforward or 
foolproof. I am also aware that in other denominations the equivalent mechanism 
can be a far more complicated process. Furthermore, claims to spiritual 
discernment can be closely associated with power and authority within any church 
(or sect) structure. David Martin, in a sociological analysis, argues that „from the 
point of view of ecclesiastical authority, “the Spirit” is an all-purpose 
legitimator‟.50 Douglas Davies suggests that the post-industrial cultural context is 
important in recent charismatic resurgence: the preferred doctrine of God is where 
the Holy Spirit features most prominently. „With the rise of models of man 
focused upon the self and its sensitivity in interpersonal relations there emerged 
the possibility of conceiving of the Spirit as a highly personal force dealing 
intimately with each individual believer.‟ Pentecost becomes more powerful than 
Good Friday in terms of personal salvation.
51
 The recent Pentecostal movement 
raises many interesting issues.
52
 However, detailed analysis of this phenomenon is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. I want only to indicate the basis upon which I 
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believe that ordinary theologians can be signal processors of the Spirit, 
particularly with regard to doctrine. 
Alister McGrath claims that „doctrine‟ and theology are very different: the 
former „implies reference to a tradition and a community‟, while the latter „more 
properly designates the views of individuals, not necessarily within the 
community or tradition, who seek to explore ideas without any necessary 
commitment to them‟. So, „one could suggest that doctrine is essentially the 
prevailing expression of faith of the Christian community with reference to the 
content of the Christian revelation‟. McGrath then argues that „the community is 
not committed to the ideas of the theologians: such commitment would restrict 
their freedom to speculate, to explore, to criticise.‟ The community can accept or 
reject the views of theologians. Furthermore, doctrinal development is not due 
entirely to the speculation of theologians; for instance, McGrath believes that the 
doctrine of original sin came from the sacramental life of the Christian 
community, and the assumption of Mary from popular piety.
53
 
„Doctrine entails a sense of commitment to a community, and a sense of 
obligation to speak on its behalf, where the corporate mind of the 
community exercises a restraint over the individual‟s perception of truth. 
Doctrine is an activity, a process of transmission of the collective wisdom 
of a community, rather than a passive set of deliverances. The views of 
theologians are doctrinally significant, in so far as they have won 
acceptance within the community. The concept of „reception‟ is of central 
importance to the concept of doctrine, in that a community is involved in 
the assessment of whether a decision, judgement or theological opinion is 
consonant with their corporate understanding of the Christian faith, as 
perceived within that community. Doctrine may thus be provisionally 
defined as communally authoritative teachings regarded as essential to the 
identity of the Christian community.‟54  
I wish to supplement McGrath‟s position by saying that the judgement of the 
community relies upon the correct discernment of the promptings of the Holy 
Spirit. In a remarkable essay written in 1859, Cardinal Newman argues for just 
such a key role for the ordinary faithful. The reason for this is clear: „because the 
body of the faithful is one of the witnesses to the fact of the tradition of revealed 
doctrine, and because their consensus through Christendom is the voice of the 
Infallible Church‟. Newman lays great stress on the consensus fidelium: the 
consensus of the faithful can be relied upon by the Pope as the judgement of the 
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infallible church. This does not mean „that infallibility is in the “consensus 
fidelium,” but that that “consensus” is an indicium or instrumentum to us of the 
judgement of that Church which is infallible‟. One of the ways the consensus of 
the faithful has been regarded by theologians of the church is „as a direction of the 
Holy Ghost‟. Newman then gives historical instances of where this consensus has 
been influential, including the Arian controversy of the fourth century. He argues 
that the Nicene dogma was maintained not by bishops, councils or Pope, but by 
the ordinary people of the church.
55
  
Continuing Revelation 
Ted Peters observes that with respect to difficult-to-believe concepts such as 
LAD „we have been victimized by divine revelation. Heaven has visited earth.‟56 
A key issue for this research project is whether such victimisation continues? If 
so, where and how does it happen, and how can we be sure it is revelation? Can 
such revelation be discerned by ordinary theologians; can they be the signal 
processors of the church for recognising Spirit-led revelation? 
David Brown‟s five volume series57 concerning revelation and experience 
provides a compelling view of continuing revelation and the value of a dynamic 
tradition informed by changing human experience. I believe it also provides an 
explanation of why the views of ordinary theologians have been and continue to 
be of great significance. Brown shows that tradition is not secondary to revelation, 
but is actually „the motor that sustains revelation both within Scripture and 
beyond.‟ In fact, this is so clear that it requires Christians to „disabuse themselves 
of the habit of contrasting biblical revelation and later tradition, and instead see 
the hand of God in a continuing process that encompasses both.‟ Brown further 
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argues that the incarnation itself „reveals a God who took with maximum 
seriousness the limitations of a specific cultural context.‟ We need to see how the 
story develops, how God has continued to be involved in the history of the 
community of faith.
58
 Tradition has been „the imaginative motor that has ensured 
the continuous adaptation of God‟s revelation to the world under new 
circumstances and conditions.‟ This has been a messy process because it involved 
people, and hence „a fallible Bible and a fallible Church interacting with a no less 
fallible world.‟59 Brown argues that God interacts with his people throughout 
history in a way which takes seriously their human context. Within Christianity 
the primary focus of reflection on that interaction must be the Bible, because at 
root Christianity rests on the specific historical claim of the incarnation. But the 
text is not unchanging, rather it „becomes part of a living tradition that is 
constantly subject to change, and that includes change in the perceived content of 
the biblical narratives: new insights are generated as different social conditions 
open up new possibilities and perspectives.‟60 
Brown also demonstrates how the visual and literary imagination can be an 
important part of this process. He is clear that in trying to tell the revelatory story, 
we need to recognise God at work everywhere in his world, helping us to shape 
our comprehension of his purposes. „The natural world, the layout of a town or 
garden, the structure of a specific building, a basketball shot can all induce 
religious feelings that ought not to be summarily dismissed as though necessarily 
inferior to a Christian‟s experience of response to prayer or of worship in a 
church.‟61 The objection that this could simply be a matter of human construction 
should be countered by the claim that this may be no less true of experiences in 
worship. Some may also object that everything must, finally, be measured against 
Scripture, otherwise chaos may result. Brown rejects this view at length in his 
first two volumes: the biblical deposit of revelation has remained the same only 
superficially.  
In practice it has been in constant process of change, as new contexts have 
thrown up fresh challenges that demanded that the text be read in new 
ways. This emphatically does not mean that the Church‟s understanding of 
revelation is simply reactive and culturally determined (the text has the 
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power to critique, as well as respond to, context), but it does entail that it 
does not exist as a self-contained unit.  
For example, it surely cannot be the case that the modern Christian view of 
the equality of the sexes has come from the biblical text itself. Of course, this 
means that criteria for judgement are contentious; but external (to Scripture) 
influences cannot be denied. „God has been addressing humanity at large 
throughout human history both in its experience of the natural world and in the 
various ways in which it has expanded upon that experience in its own creativity.‟ 
The „scandal of particularity‟ is usually misunderstood, because if we recognise 
that for God to be incarnate at all he had to be so at a particular time and place. 
The scandal is simply to ignore all the other contexts in which God addresses us.
62
 
Jon Levenson points out that the very fact of a canon  
challenges the most basic presupposition of historical criticism, that a book 
must be understood only within the context in which it was produced. The 
very existence of a canon testifies to the reality of recontextualisation; an 
artefact may survive the circumstances that brought it into being. … For 
were the meaning of the text only a function of the particular historical 
circumstances of its composition, recontextualisation would never have 
occurred, and no Bible would have come into existence.
63
 
But this does not mean, of course, that God is at work equally everywhere. 
At the end of his first two volumes, Brown specifies the criteria which he has 
been applying in determining revelatory truth.
64
 Usually more than one is applied 
at the same time, but no hierarchy or essential combinations are proposed. For the 
purposes of this project, his empirical and conceptual criteria are most relevant. 
Brown argues that we no longer believe in any real difference between the sexes 
because of empirical discoveries that have actually demonstrated women to be no 
less effective in leadership, education, and so forth. The fundamental New 
Testament principle of equality of regard could then be invoked to require 
equality of status, but with no pretence that this view was always hidden in the 
scriptural text. Homosexuality is now undergoing a similar process. This, I 
suggest, translates directly into the context of ordinary theology. Some empirical 
data may best be perceived by ordinary theologians: for example, whether certain 
doctrinal expressions remain meaningful for people. Brown demonstrates that 
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new information from human experience, what he calls new „natural knowledge‟, 
can influence how existing doctrine is perceived, or can facilitate new revelation.  
By his conceptual criteria Brown means questions of coherence and 
intelligibility, such as, does continuing personal identity after death require a 
physical body? He argues that the dominant New Testament picture of our 
resurrection having to wait to the end of all things, with no one except Christ now 
fully alive and conscious in heaven, is wrong because it does not make sense in 
relation to what we know about social human being. So the doctrine of Christ's 
exaltation and ascension makes no sense unless we also accept that heaven is not 
empty. „The tendency of much modern theology to return to the primary biblical 
image is thus, so far from being illuminating, actually a perversion of what it is to 
be human: Christ‟s human nature living in complete isolation from all others.‟ 
Brown therefore suggests that „the Church should follow the minority New 
Testament witness, and envisage a community of saints already with Christ in 
heaven.‟65 He also argues (like Cullmann) that we cannot degrade Christ‟s 
conquest of death by saying that his victory actually does nothing for us until a 
final resurrection. In the context of the ordinary theology of this project, the 
application of this conceptual criterion can be seen clearly in the argument that 
experience of a loving God is simply incompatible with judgement and hell (see 
below page 87 „Judgement or Not?‟).  
Brown‟s ecclesial criteria is also worthy of attention.  
The vagaries of church history both within the canon and beyond convince 
me that no official pronouncements of the Church, however conceived, 
can of themselves be said to carry an automatic seal of truth, any more 
than does Scripture itself. Even the universal belief of centuries may fail.  
The recent and rapid demise of Hell as a place of eternal punishment is an 
example of this. Brown believes that, „the presumption must always be that truth 
is to be found somewhere within Christ's Church, for the Spirit is ever searching 
to correct the Church‟s inadequacies‟.66 Furthermore, the history of the church 
shows that „heresy is indispensable to the growth of orthodoxy‟, and although 
unity is a good goal, we should never suppose any issue to be completely resolved 
and closed. „That might seem to make all religious truth provisional, and in one 
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sense it clearly does, but no more so, I think, than what happens with scientific or 
historical truth.‟67  
 In concluding his final volume, Brown accepts that while his general list of 
criteria is helpful, there are no simple answers. Every instance will be unique,  
So the best way of proceeding is to examine each contested case in some 
detail. If one believes in divine providence at all, the fact that the 
community of faith in general has changed its mind creates at least a basic 
presupposition of a move in the right direction. But it offers no absolute 
guarantee. [In] such conflicts, it may take centuries before a proper 
balance is achieved.
68
 
A degree of imaginative engagement should always be one of the relevant criteria 
because „what I am above all concerned to ensure is that Christianity be seen as a 
religion to be practised and not just a doctrinal system that may or may not be 
internally coherent.‟69 
Brown argues against any „discovery‟ view that says all revelation has 
already been „captured‟ within the canon, and that what we do subsequently is 
simply to discover what is already hidden there. Such a view confuses the closure 
of the canon with the closure of revelation, and draws too clear a distinction 
between revelation and tradition. Biblical scholarship values the historical far 
more than did the New Testament writers. „For what we repeatedly discover is the 
subordination of historical accuracy to something deemed much more important, 
some interpretation of how the story of Moses or Jesus was supposed to apply in 
new circumstances, in the life of the author‟s contemporaries.‟70 This was the 
norm for that time and culture, especially when the intention of these documents 
was clearly evangelical. Brown also points out that if we say (correctly) that truth 
claims are intelligible only against the backdrop of existing cultural assumptions, 
we must be careful not to misunderstand the implication of this. It is not that 
history is unimportant, but rather that there is an indifference to historical detail. 
„So, whether we consider the original revelatory event or the original revelatory 
text, it is just not the case that their meaning was seen as fixed in stone. Rather, 
both were treated as a medium towards further disclosures.‟71 The same thing 
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happened with post-biblical exegesis, except that when the canon was closed it 
was no longer felt appropriate to alter previous versions of the text.
72
  
Brown believes that the key factor needed to understand such development is 
„creative insight‟ that enables the original events or words to be read in a new 
way. It is here where we can see how the divine revealer can still be at work. The 
important causative factor is a „change in our natural knowledge‟; for example, an 
awareness of the cultural conditioning of male-female relationships, which allows 
us to read a text with creative insight and facilitate further revelation. So Brown 
proposes that  
God at each stage of the development of the canon and beyond has been 
interacting with the recipients of his revelation, and how they read it is a 
function not just of the divine will or of historical circumstances but of 
what God can get the individual to see on the basis of his reflection both 
upon his context and upon the biblical text. In other words, there is an 
inspired imposition of meaning rather than its discovery, and so the crucial 
dependence is not upon a meaning already inherent in the text but upon a 
datable individual(s) being inspired to propose that meaning.  
God accommodates himself to the historical circumstances of the individuals 
concerned and advances their perceptions through whatever means are available, 
even misunderstandings of the text or implausible exegesis. The sharp contrast 
between revelation and tradition is no longer tenable. The biblical text has 
become fixed, but not how it is interpreted; and even within the biblical text itself 
there is a history of interpretation and reinterpretation. The interaction between a 
community of faith and God has continued to yield fresh reinterpretations.
73
  
Brown provides a compelling example. He accepts that the dominant image 
in the New Testament is final resurrection, but asks what if the conditioning 
factors (cultural, historical) which produced this dominant view no longer apply? 
Could we be justified in demoting or correcting the dominant biblical 
perspective? Brown argues, „God would then still have revealed our ultimate 
destiny to be with him, but the details of how this is to be conceived awaited 
further adjustments and corrections in the process of his continuing dialogue with 
his Church.‟ The specific cultural factor Brown has in mind is belief in an 
imminent end of the world, which „would inevitably preclude much interest in the 
interim state of the dead, since all believers would soon be reunited anyway.‟ So it 
is hardly surprising that Paul left us very little detail of the state of the dead, who 
                                                     
72
 Cf. Brown, Tradition and Imagination, 121ff.  
73
 Brown, „Did Revelation Cease?‟, 140-1. 
 32 
 
would only be in that state for a very short time. Brown argues that what God was 
revealing was his desire to share his life eternally with us, which was originally 
perceived through the (distorting) lens of the imminent parousia. We now know 
this expectation to be mistaken, so the expression of this original revelation 
requires a new form.
74
  
This example is directly relevant to my argument (see below page 224) that 
changing conceptions of the physical cosmos must affect how we interpret Paul‟s 
view of LAD. It also links to the Lindbeck view of doctrine discussed below, 
which suggests an underlying revelatory consistency leading to differing doctrinal 
expressions over time. Brown is absolutely clear that understanding biblical 
revelation is critically dependent on developments in the wider culture, and so 
recommends a „listening process‟. This happens to some extent anyway, even if 
the church doesn‟t recognise it, for example with regard to equality of the sexes. 
However, Brown wants „the entire process more explicitly acknowledged by my 
fellow Christians.‟75 Part of this required listening must surely be to hear the 
voices of ordinary theologians.  
Ordinary theologians, then, can have a vital role to play in the community of 
faith discerning continuing revelation. Brown shows us that God communicates 
through all elements of human experience and that new „natural knowledge‟ (that 
is, new insights into the human condition from cultural, scientific, sociological, 
and artistic development, often via „imaginative‟ insight) can enable us to receive 
new revelation from a reinterpretation of biblical texts. Not everything from 
contemporary culture is capable of doing this, of course, and any claim to a 
revelation of God‟s purpose or truth must finally be brought to Scripture: not to 
see if it is already hidden there, or that it agrees with what we already understand 
from Scripture, but rather that it is not contrary to agreed general scriptural 
principles. If God is the continuing creator of the world, then the actions and 
purposes of God may be seen in our ongoing experience of that creation. We must 
therefore listen to what ordinary theologians are telling us. Current interpretation 
of Scripture can and should be, and as Brown suggests probably always has been, 
challenged by ordinary theology: that is, by the views of ordinary believers who 
are acting as the Spirit signal processors of the church.  
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Doctrine Tested in the Ordinary 
If a doctrine of the church (or indeed a position of academic theology which 
claims to be normative) says one thing, but ordinary theologians say something 
quite different, then there is reason to re-examine the former. This study finds just 
such a dislocation with respect to Christian views of LAD. I am not claiming any 
simple relationship between the views of ordinary theologians and any new 
doctrinal claim; one cannot just „read off‟ from ordinary theology a new doctrine 
or correction to existing doctrine. To push the analogy to near breaking point: the 
„signal processing‟ may be incomplete or distorted by too much interference, or 
the signal may simply be too complex to process. However, if the expected signal 
cannot be processed with the expected degree of clarity, then that in itself is 
worthy of attention.  
The „rule‟ concept of doctrine from George Lindbeck (and others) provides a 
more nuanced understanding of the relationship between normative 
doctrine/theology and ordinary theologians. The argument of Lindbeck for a 
cultural-linguistic alternative understanding of religion is well known.
 76
 He views 
religions as „comprehensive interpretive schemes, usually embodied in myths or 
narratives and heavily ritualised, which structure human experience and 
understanding of self and world.‟ Religions can be viewed „as a kind of cultural 
and/or linguistic framework or medium that shapes the entirety of life and 
thought.‟ To become a Christian is to know the „story‟ well enough so as to be 
able to interpret one‟s experience by it. However, although the story is important, 
this is not to say that belief in propositions is vital; hence Lindbeck‟s criticism of 
the „propositionalist‟ or „cognitivist‟ theory of religions.77 „A comprehensive 
scheme or story used to structure all dimensions of existence is not primarily a set 
of propositions to be believed, but is rather the medium in which one moves, a set 
of skills that one employs in living one‟s life.‟ Religion is thus not about choosing 
to believe certain propositions; but rather to become religious is „to interiorise a 
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set of skills by practice and training. ... The primary knowledge is not about the 
religion, nor that the religion teaches such and such, but rather how to be religious 
in such and such ways.‟ This interiorised skill, according to Lindbeck, manifests 
itself in an ability to make intuitive judgements about authenticity within the 
religion, which is quite unlike the reflective and theological knowledge of the 
trained theologian.
 78
  
For Lindbeck, personal experience is derivative, so  
religious change or innovation must be understood, not as proceeding from 
new experiences, but as resulting from the interactions of a cultural-
linguistic system with changing situations. Religious traditions are not 
transformed, abandoned, or replaced because of an upwelling of new or 
different ways of feeling about the self, world, or God, but because a 
religious interpretive scheme (embodied, as it always is, in religious 
practice and belief) develops anomalies in its application in new contexts.  
This is very similar to Brown‟s idea of the role of new natural knowledge in 
continuing revelation. Lindbeck believes „prophetic figures‟ re-configure the 
inherited patterns and discover the new concepts that remove the anomalies. 
„Religious experiences, in the sense of feelings, sentiments, or emotions, then 
result from the new conceptual patterns instead of being their source.‟79  
Lindbeck proposes a regulative or „rule‟ theory of doctrine, in which 
doctrines are seen as „communally authoritative rules of discourse, attitude, and 
action‟, rather than as „expressive symbols or truth claims‟.80 Propositional truths 
do not reside in doctrine, because doctrines are actually the grammatical rules of 
the language of the religion. „Just as grammar by itself affirms nothing either true 
or false regarding the world in which language is used, but only about language, 
so theology and doctrine, to the extent that they are second-order activities, assert 
nothing either true or false about God and his relation to creatures, but only speak 
about such assertions.‟ Such assertions can only be made when speaking 
religiously, that is, when practising religion. So, „propositional truth and falsity 
characterise ordinary religious language when it is used to mould lives through 
prayer, praise, preaching, and exhortation.‟81 Lindbeck recognises that this means 
that these „rules‟ can remain as the unchanging core of the doctrine, while the 
propositions which follow from them can and do change in different historical and 
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cultural situations. For example with Trinitarian doctrine, Lindbeck claims that it 
is not the creeds themselves which are doctrinal, but rather the three „regulative 
principles‟ which he detects as underlying the emergence of the various 
propositional statements about the Trinity.
82
 Nicaea and Chalcedon were about 
setting limits on how we could speak about Jesus and God, not about unchanging 
first-order propositions. These creeds „were among the few, and perhaps the only, 
possible outcomes of the process of adjusting Christian discourse to the world of 
late classical antiquity in a manner conformable to regulative principles that were 
already at work in the earliest strata of the tradition.‟ 83  
Lindbeck is not alone in seeing doctrine this way. Gerard Loughlin claims 
that doctrine „resists closure‟, it is both complete and yet never complete; it is 
always possible to supplement what has already been said. The story of Jesus 
Christ (his person) „is the non-doctrinal basis upon which doctrine rests‟. 
Knowledge of this person and story comes only through practice, and doctrine „is 
simply the rule and discipline of the practice. ... We can thus think of doctrine as 
the grammar of Christian discourse; the stage directions for the church‟s 
performance of the gospel.‟ Loughlin stresses, therefore, that „doctrine is always 
secondary to that which it informs – the church‟s performance of the gospel – 
which alone is its basis or foundation. ... There is thus no legitimation of doctrine, 
in history or experience, outside of Christian practice itself.‟84  
Lindbeck wants to make it clear that we cannot just abandon all truth and 
certainty to the winds of historical change; but neither can we just repeat what 
was said in the past. The key question is, how do we know which changed form 
of doctrinal expression is faithful to the religious roots? „Those who are best able 
to judge in these matters ... are those who have effectively interiorised a 
religion.‟85 He points out that applying a rule theory of doctrine gives infallibility 
a partly empirical meaning. „It suggests explanations ... for how the Holy Spirit 
operates in preserving the church from error.‟ The most nearly infallible „is what 
the theological tradition calls the consensus fidelium or consensus ecclesiae.‟ Just 
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as a linguist would test grammar by seeing if it makes sense to competent 
speakers of the language, „so the student of religion submits the consequences of 
doctrinal formulations to the judgement of competent practitioners of that 
religion.‟ 86 But who are the competent practitioners and how do we recognise 
them? Are they the mass of ordinary theologians? 
Here, Lindbeck takes a more robust view than Astley; Christian membership 
does not guarantee religious competence. Indeed, „most Christians through most 
of Christian history have spoken their own official tongue very poorly‟. Such lack 
of competence means „they cannot, from the cultural-linguistic perspective, be 
part of that consensus fidelium against which doctrinal proposals are tested‟. 
Religious competence „is the empirical equivalent of insisting on the Spirit as one 
of the tests of doctrine‟. The competent must be mainstream and orthodox, and 
even without formal theological training, „are likely to be saturated with the 
language of Scripture and/or liturgy‟. They are „flexibly devout‟, for, „they have 
so interiorised the grammar of their religion that they are reliable judges, not 
directly of the doctrinal formulations (for these may be too technical for them to 
understand), but of the acceptability or unacceptability of the consequences of 
these formulations in ordinary religious life and language‟. The agreement of such 
people, Lindbeck suggests, can be described as infallible. A very high level of 
certitude is possible with regard to religious doctrines because, given a cultural-
linguistic approach, they „are matters of empirical knowledge‟ (although this 
means they are „Christian‟ rather than that they are ontologically true).87  
However, in the context of later work concerning reform of clerical training, 
Lindbeck seems to soften this view somewhat. He identifies a kind of „passive 
[theological] competence in which the saintly excel‟, which does not need 
theological expertise. Such spiritually mature people „may have only the most 
meagre ability to articulate and describe their patterns of belief and practice, but 
they can recognise misdescriptions. They may have no talent in assessing 
differences between the second-order accounts which theologians formulate, but 
they can sense ... when the usages authorised by these accounts violate the deep 
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grammar of the faith.‟88 The potential importance and ordinariness of ordinary 
theologians is thus recognised by Lindbeck, albeit in a more restricted way than 
Astley suggests.
89
 
Lindbeck defines doctrine as „communally authoritative teachings regarding 
beliefs and practices that are considered essential to the identity or welfare of the 
group in question. They may be formally stated or informally operative, but in 
any case they indicate what constitutes faithful adherence to a community.‟ 
Operative doctrines are essential for any religious body; Lindbeck believes there 
is no such thing as completely „creedless Christianity‟. However, official 
doctrines can cease to be operational, and doctrines can remain operational 
without ever becoming official. This can be because they just seem self-evident 
(„God is love‟), or that they are implicit but unrecognised (opposition to slavery). 
The usual way in which implicit doctrine becomes explicit is by controversy. 
Dispute about what can or cannot be said forces the community to make up its 
collective mind. This means that most doctrines are understood in terms of what 
they oppose. It is also possible that official doctrines do not reflect the most 
important beliefs (which are simply assumed and have never been challenged).
90
  
Lindbeck also claims that a rule view of doctrine can accommodate beliefs 
as conditional and temporary. For example, with regard to the doctrine of 
immortality of the soul: „It could be argued that this belief is necessary to the 
integrity of Christian faith only when believers think in terms of classical mind-
body dualism, but not when their anthropology is Hebraic or modern.‟91 
Theological evaluation of doctrine is not about ontology (what is actually the 
case) but rather about „how well it organises the data of Scripture and tradition 
with a view to their use in Christian worship and life.‟ Ontological questions are 
„unanswerable this side of the Eschaton‟.92 A propositional approach to doctrine is 
about interpreting a truth, but the regulative approach is about obeying a rule.
93
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Thus, with the doctrine of an immortal soul, if this is a first-order proposition then 
those who believe it to be a doctrine have to try to find a way to reinterpret this 
truth in the light of objections to mind-body dualism; but they can do so only by 
forcing a reinterpretation which was far from the world view of the original 
formulators. „They are virtually forced into that endless process of speculative 
reinterpretation which is the main stock-in-trade of much contemporary theology.‟ 
However, if the doctrine is seen as a rule, „attention is focused on the concrete life 
and language of the community. Because the doctrine is to be followed rather than 
interpreted, the theologian‟s task is to specify the circumstances, whether 
temporary or enduring, in which it applies. ... the gears mesh with reality and 
theological reflection on doctrine becomes directly relevant to the praxis of the 
church.‟94 Lindbeck emphasises that the ultimate test of any new theological 
method is in its practice. If a new approach proves in actual employment „to be 
conceptually powerful and practically useful to relevant communities, it will in 
time become standard‟. This was how the theological outlooks of Augustine, 
Aquinas, Luther, and Schleiermacher became established. „There is no way of 
testing the merits and demerits of a theological method apart from performance.‟95  
In his attempt to reduce the theological importance of experience, Lindbeck 
places great stress on the „prophet‟ figures and therefore seems to downgrade the 
importance of the general mass of ordinary theologians. However, an important 
role for ordinary theologians can still be recognised in making the anomaly (in the 
religious interpretive scheme) visible in the first place, so that the „prophets‟ can 
then do something with it. But Lindbeck is concerned to ensure that adequate 
theological and spiritual discipline and expertise is maintained by those 
responsible for the grammar of faith, a view which ultimately conflicts with 
Astley‟s view of ordinary theologians. Nonetheless, Lindbeck‟s concept of 
underlying „regulative principles‟ of doctrine is still highly relevant to ordinary 
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theology, and I suggest the following aspects are particularly relevant to this 
study: 
a) With regard to LAD, we can expect that the outward propositional 
(doctrinal) expressions of this will change significantly over time, but that 
certain underlying regulative principles may nevertheless remain constant. 
In other words, the fact that expressions about heaven may change 
significantly over time does not mean that there is no „substance‟ to the 
Christian afterlife.  
b) It is in the practice of faith that the articulation of underlying regulative 
principles of doctrine, as propositional statements, is tested. Ordinary 
theology is the expression by ordinary theologians of their practice of faith. 
The views of ordinary theologians are well placed to indicate when current 
propositional doctrinal or academic expressions of LAD are at odds with 
the underlying regulative principles.
96
 In other words, ordinary theology 
may challenge current expressions of LAD doctrine.  
c) Recognising that doctrine can remain constant „underneath‟, while 
changing quite markedly in its outward expression, suggests there is no 
final definitive form of biblical interpretation. This is an important issue 
for ordinary eschatology, because the current „norm‟ rests on specific 
interpretations of key texts.  
 
1.4 ASSESSING THE THEOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION OF 
ORDINARY THEOLOGIANS  
Having provided a defence of why and how the views of ordinary 
theologians can be critically important for the normative tradition of the church, I 
must now clarify how we might assess the theological contribution of this 
particular group of Congregational ordinary theologians. There are two related 
problems here (discussed in detail in Appendix B). The first is the peculiar 
situation of Congregationalists with respect to doctrine as such. This 
denomination traditionally does not adhere to the practice of requiring 
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subscription to creeds and is suspicious of anything which could undermine local 
authority. Liturgical resources are not compulsory within Congregational 
churches. The second is the problem of defining the normative tradition with 
respect to LAD. To be more specific, there is a noticeable lack of clarity with 
regard to Protestant doctrine in general in the UK, although not in the Catholic 
Church. The same situation exists with respect to funeral liturgies (see Appendix 
C). This, I believe, is very different from certain other doctrinal areas, such as 
Christology. A straightforward comparison with existing doctrine is therefore 
problematic. It would thus be useful to have a further source against which to 
compare the ordinary eschatology of this project.  
At an early stage of this project I realised that it was important to review my 
own theology and practice concerning LAD. I therefore undertook a systematic 
review of my funeral practice (Appendix C) and began to explore the relevant 
literature. Tom Wright is remarkable in providing an unequivocally clear 
statement of what we should believe concerning „life after LAD‟, and why we 
should believe it.
97
 His views may therefore provide a useful additional source of 
comparison for the ordinary theology of LAD found within my congregation, and 
I therefore set out his position in detail in Appendix D. Wright‟s claim as to why 
his position should be accepted also raises wider issues concerning how we might 
assess the contribution of ordinary theology in general. How far his „correct‟ 
biblical view is actually reflected in the beliefs of ordinary Christians is an 
important question for this project. One response to this can be given from 
existing empirical data concerning belief in LAD, which I set out in Appendix A. 
From this it is clear that his views are at odds with the expressed opinions of 
many clergy and lay members of his own church, and others. The findings of this 
project confirm major points of difference with the views of ordinary theologians. 
His primary claim, however, is that his view is completely in line with biblical 
teaching, and therefore should be accepted by ordinary and extraordinary 
theologians alike. This claim must also face the challenge of the findings of this 
project: these ordinary theologians demonstrate remarkable scepticism about 
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academic and church authority with regard to biblical interpretation (see 3.6 Little 
Trust in Academy and Church‟ page 98).  
I had a growing sense from my experience of taking funerals that the general 
understanding of people (including my own congregation) concerning LAD was 
quite varied; a feeling reinforced by a request received in 2005 to perform an 
exorcism. In responding to this request it became clear that members of my 
congregation held a wide variety of views regarding the presence of the dead, 
ghosts, spirits, and other supernatural phenomena.
98
 I also realised when 
beginning this project that I had never dealt specifically with the topic of LAD 
within themed services or Bible study groups, although I obviously had in more 
general terms at Easter and in funeral services. I therefore delivered two linked 
services in July 2008 which looked specifically at how we might understand LAD 
from a Christian perspective. Having decided that Wright could usefully provide a 
source for comparison, I decided to focus on his (biblical) view in the first of 
these services, and to focus on the (philosophical) views of Marilyn McCord 
Adams in the second.
99
 In the first service I was trying to suggest that there were 
key biblical issues to look at when considering LAD, and that Wright, as both a 
renowned biblical scholar and local bishop, was a notable voice in this area. 
Within the interviews I did not ask specifically about his views, nor did I in the 
services convey his views as the only or the obvious way of perceiving LAD.
100
 
However, I thought it important to at least introduce his ideas, alongside those of 
others, to my congregation.  
Wright is obviously polemical in approach, and presents a condensed but 
cumulative case for his position. However, there was a sense in which I felt that in 
conveying his views I had been overwhelming my congregation with a huge array 
of „corrections‟ of popular misunderstandings and „correct‟ interpretations of 
passages of Scripture. Indeed, across his related publications on LAD Wright 
conveys the strong impression that it all just has to fit, and should not be 
contradicted; his views will sort out all possible doubts, quell all possible dispute 
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or counter-claim, and refute scholars who disagree. I noted, however, that 
immediately following the first service some people informed me very clearly 
that, in effect, „it doesn‟t matter what he says, I still believe in a soul!‟ Wright, 
then, seems to provide an appropriate and interesting comparison to these 
ordinary theologians.  
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2. PROCESS AND METHOD 
An appropriate methodology was developed and has previously been 
assessed at earlier stages of this degree.
101
 It is summarised in Appendix E. Set 
out below are the subsequent stages of application of this methodology. 
Questions for the interview developed over time from the basis of ongoing 
engagement with relevant literature plus feedback from supervisors, the Ethics 
Committee, other doctoral students during the Summer Schools, and members of 
my congregation. Areas of inquiry not originally envisaged were included as a 
result of this process; for example, communication with the dead. I paid particular 
attention to the phrasing and order of the questions, and to the interview technique 
and style, so that questions would not be „leading‟ to the participant. It was 
important to allow time and space for the participant to develop her own approach 
to and understanding of the issues.  
Two pilot interviews were conducted in June: one with a person in the 
church whom I know very well (to test out my dual role), and one with a person 
who attends another church (to test the intelligibility of questions). These pilot 
interviews generally confirmed the process and questions, but showed that I 
needed to be flexible with regard to the order of the interview schedule. The final 
version of the interview schedule is provided in Appendix F. It should be noted 
that this was not a rigid template: the order of questions varied significantly 
depending on the „flow‟ of the conversation, and not all questions were covered in 
every interview. Each interview was unique in this sense, which is partly why I 
have not adopted a quantitative approach when reporting the data. The small 
sample size is also a factor in this decision. 
In May 2009 I spoke in a Sunday service on why the opinions of „ordinary‟ 
believers are important, and research participant information sheets and consent 
forms were given out in services at the beginning of June 2009 (see Appendix F). 
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From June to October 2009 a total of 25 interviews were conducted
102
, and a 
group meeting was held on 17 February 2010. One further interview was 
conducted with a member of my previous Oxford congregation in February 2011, 
which provided an opportunity to check (to some extent) whether the findings of 
the Whitley Bay interviews were unusual. The Oxford interview suggested that 
they were not; the same major themes were present. The interviews ranged in 
length from 40 minutes to 1 hour 46 minutes. Most lasted well over an hour, and 
most were conducted in the homes of the subjects. The interviewees were given 
full information regarding the research objectives and method, and had a real 
opportunity to question anything before agreeing to participate. The sample was 
self-selecting. I invited all members of my present congregation to participate in 
the research (by e-mail, and personal/general invitation); 26 out of a possible 37 
people took part (70% response). Of the eleven who did not take part, three were 
spouses of those who did; two were ill at the time (including one who was a 
spouse); four had very strong or recent bereavement experiences; and the other 
three were possibly suspicious of the „academic‟ nature of the exercise.  
Of the total of 26 completed interviews, eight were with male interviewees. 
Two interviewees were aged 19 years (one male and one female); two were over 
19 but under 40 years (one male and one female); one was between 41 and 49 
years (female); eight were between 50 and 59 years (all female); three were 
between 60 and 69 years (two female and one male); and ten were 70 years or 
over (six female and four male). Family connections between participants were 
noted, and there was some evidence of commonality of views within one family 
but not in others. There was no evidence of family or friend collusion, although 
there was general interest in the views of others.  
In the invitations to participate, and before every interview, I particularly 
stressed that it was the participant‟s views which were sought. I did not give out 
the detailed interview schedule in advance, but rather indicated only broad general 
areas for discussion prior to the interview. I believed that detailed prior 
information might stifle discussion and spontaneity. My approach seems justified 
in so far as the interviews were fully wide-ranging and rarely followed the order 
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of the schedule. There were several instances of people who had prepared an 
account of their views in advance, and a few interviews started with the subject 
reading out pre-prepared statements concerning their experiences of bereavement. 
This suggests that if more detailed information had been given in advance there 
may have been less spontaneous discussion.  
Several interviewees said they would like the opportunity to talk further and 
hear the views of others, so I arranged an open meeting at my house on 17 
February 2010 which 12 interviewees (i.e. 48% of participants) attended. This 
meeting was recorded with their permission and provides a rich source of 
additional but related data. There seemed to have been little, if any, informal 
discussion by church members concerning these matters in the past, and the 
interviewees showed a general reluctance to talk about death and afterlife even to 
friends and family. I was curious, therefore, about what would be shared, and 
whether key themes from the interviews would be discussed openly. I invited 
them to talk about anything they wished in relation to the interviews, but I also 
asked if they would consider three particular areas: their thoughts on the interview 
experience itself; whether it had made them think about these things subsequently, 
or had changed their views at all; and whether the interview process had changed 
their relationship with me (as their minister). A key reason for this meeting was 
their curiosity about the views of others, and apparent in the group meeting was a 
need on the part of some to check their views against those of others. Two issues 
were „checked‟ in this way: judgement (any form of punishment or hell), and 
experience of the Spiritualist Church. The checking, as one would expect, came 
from those with a strongly held view, or doubt, concerning these areas. 
There was a very positive response to both the interview process itself and 
the continuing effect of this process. I gave considerable prior attention to 
reflexive and ethical issues concerning the dual role of the interviewer-minister 
(see Appendix E). In practice, this dual role proved not to be a problem, and 
actually had real advantages. It was said by several people that they would not 
have talked so openly to someone they did not know well. The interviews were 
manageable in a pastoral sense; some necessary follow-ups were easily identified 
within the interviews, with no conflict of „role‟.103 I am confident that no harm 
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had been done by these interviews, and in fact, quite the reverse. The following 
evidence from the group discussion is unequivocal. 
 
2.1 A REAL LEARNING EXPERIENCE LEADING TO FURTHER 
REFLECTION 
Laura
104
 began the discussion by saying,  
Well it was an interesting process I thought. I had certainly thought about 
it for quite a long time before, ... But I don‟t think I‟d ever tried to 
articulate it. And that was actually quite difficult. ... But it was quite a 
good exercise actually, just trying to do that, to see just whether what you 
were saying actually made sense to you when you heard it out loud.  
Felicity commented,  
I thought it was very useful having structured questions, I wasn‟t 
expecting that. I thought you were going to say, „right, just tell me what 
you think‟. So that was really useful, ... And then of course you would say, 
„why do you think that?‟, which you‟re good at aren‟t you [laughter]... so 
you‟ve got to qualify what you said, and so it really made you think. It‟s 
certainly made me think about it more before, during, and after and talk 
about it to other people, ... friends in other churches, and ... they were 
interested. 
 I asked at the group meeting if the interview had helped people think about 
these things, or had they always thought about these issues in this kind of detail? 
Imogen replied, „I‟ve always believed in an afterlife, but I can‟t say that I ever 
thought about what form it would particularly take. And the interview certainly 
made me start thinking about it, and I‟ve thought about it since.‟  
Within the interviews themselves there was also evidence of a positive 
learning experience. For example, Joselyn concluded her interview by saying, „I 
think I maybe would like to say that I appreciated being made to think about these 
things. ... I‟ll probably go away and maybe think a little bit more about it 
Michael.‟ Katie commented, „I think it‟s been a very good exercise this, in 
making you think. And I think maybe more should be done to make people 
question, or make me question, and to think about things more thoughtfully.‟  
Ursula said at the end of her interview, „I think it‟s interesting and it makes 
you [pause] clarify your own thoughts to some extent. But it also makes you 
realise that you could change and learn, and if you asked me again in ten years 
                                                                                                                                                         
been said by certain individuals which relied on privileged personal knowledge that I hold, or which 
could otherwise identify and potentially embarrass those concerned. 
104
 All data has been anonymised by the use of pseudonyms. All names are fictitious. 
 47 
 
time I might have different answers.‟ Vera said she had never done an interview 
before without being given set questions on paper, but thought this approach was 
good because the interviewer was able to explain things and make the questions 
clear. She also felt that there was lots of time to say everything, and commented 
that „you don‟t think about half the things yourself, until somebody asks you. ... 
You know, because it‟s not something that you actually really know about, just 
ideas that you‟ve got in your head about how you think it would be. ... It‟s a 
learning process.‟ 
There were many examples of views being clarified and refined within the 
interview. This, I suggest, is evidence of the significant difference between a 
person answering a defined set of questions in a highly structured interview or 
completing a questionnaire, and undertaking a semi-structured conversation such 
as this. The ability to reflect as part of the process is important in providing real 
„depth‟ to the answers and beliefs expounded. Responses even to the earliest 
questions of the interview schedule show how the interviewees were already 
exploring, within their own thinking, wider related issues. Nearly every interview 
„flowed‟ easily, with the interviewees often surprising themselves (and the 
interviewer) with the range and depth of their responses. Remarkable „schemes‟ 
of afterlife were described, ranging from a dream-world where individual heavens 
are custom-made, to an afterlife of complete serenity where no recollection of this 
world was needed, and one where continued learning and development are the 
key characteristics. These afterlife schemes were usually inconsistent and 
unsystematic (by the standards of academic theology), but were nonetheless 
remarkable, and obviously of real importance for those relaying them. 
 
2.2 AN EMPOWERING AND POSITIVE EXPERIENCE 
Patricia asked if anyone wished they hadn‟t taken part. Claire replied, „I very 
much enjoyed, it‟s not the right word, but I found it very interesting.‟ She had 
moved „from a kind of blissful ignorance where I went “yeah, that‟s fine”, to 
actually having to stop and think about it. And I think I‟ve got more questions 
now than ever before.‟ 
Imogen said that the interview process had not changed her relationship with 
the minister at all. Patricia disagreed, „I think because I felt very precious.‟ She 
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commented that „I enjoyed having you to myself.‟ The key factor for Patricia was 
being truly listened to. „I could have a one-to-one, and you weren‟t in “tell” mode 
like, you know, when you are doing a sermon. ... so I really, really enjoyed it. ... 
your questions made me think of elements I hadn‟t.‟ She added that it was like the 
old fashioned way of a minster coming to see you at home, „and you did want to 
hear what I said, and you didn‟t laugh. And you were totally non-judgemental, 
and I didn‟t get any wry look from you. So yes, it did change [our relationship], 
but very much for the better.‟  
Felicity added, „it‟s nice to have somebody listening to your opinions, for an 
hour or more, and not say anything.‟ Patricia commented that in groups or with 
family you still get interrupted, but this was different, a one-to-one. Felicity 
likened it to counselling, „“Cathartic”, is it called?‟  
 
2.3 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
All interviews were recorded and, where relevant, brief hand-written notes 
were also made. The recording was listened to shortly after or immediately 
following the interview, both to ensure that it was correctly recorded and securely 
stored, and to make brief notes as an immediate reaction to the interview. This 
was important in identifying particular issues which were emerging so that 
clarification or confirmation of such areas might be sought in subsequent 
interviews. For example, how the physical resurrection of Jesus was seen was 
both surprising and consistent in the early interviews, and so was specifically 
„tested‟ in later interviews.  
The question then arose as to how best to further process this data so that 
analysis could be undertaken in a meaningful and efficient way. Should full 
verbatim transcripts of all interviews be undertaken? Is this the necessary or the 
most effective approach for a project of this nature? There are several generally 
assumed benefits of a full verbatim transcript, some of which depend on the 
transcription being undertaken by the interviewer herself. Full transcription helps 
ensure that important data is not missed, and develops a clear audit trail of data 
analysis (for supervisors and others). When undertaken by the interviewer herself, 
it can bring the interviewer closer to the data, and can help the interviewer better 
interpret and validate the data by a process of recall (of non-verbal signals or 
 49 
 
emotions, for example) and reflection on the recorded material. However, it is 
also claimed by some that the case for reliability, validity and veracity of data via 
full verbatim transcription is not proven, and that given the potential for error in 
verbal transcription, a data trail is better situated in the original recordings 
themselves.
105
 Furthermore, most if not all of the advantages of the interviewer 
undertaking transcription can still be realised with partial rather than full verbatim 
transcription. The benefit of iterative case notes and repeated listening to and 
reflection on the recordings, which are the original full record of the nuanced and 
complex interactions of the interviewer and interviewee, should not be 
underestimated. It is impossible to capture everything in a written transcript, the 
production of which, even in full verbatim form, is a selective and interpretive 
process.
106
 „Considering that the process of transcription should be more about 
interpretation and generation of meaning from the data rather than being a simple 
clerical task, the need for verbatim transcription in every research project that 
generates verbal interview data must be questioned.‟107  
The guiding principles should be to transcribe only as much as is needed, 
and that the actual transcribing should be selective – based on the needs and 
character of the research project. „The bottom line is that the theory should guide 
not only what you look for and where you go to find it in the field, but also what 
you look for in your data. ... In the end, it is you who must decide ... just how 
much of your interviews and field notes to transcribe.‟108 „For some analyses, it 
may not be necessary to transcribe an entire interview. Selected sentences, 
passages, paragraphs, or stories relevant to the research question or theory may be 
all that are needed.‟ Key factors are that „the text selected for transcription should 
take into account the analytical contribution it will provide to the overall study‟, 
and that „the level of transcription should complement the level of the analysis.‟109 
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The question of available resource is also relevant. To transcribe 
approximately 30 hours of taped interviews would take between 180 and 240 
hours of work, so the effectiveness of this effort must be assured. If the work were 
to be undertaken by a professional transcribing service, the cost would be of the 
order of £2,600, and would raise issues of reliability of the transcript.
110
 But even 
when transcription is undertaken by the interviewer herself, the transcript is an 
evolving flexible object which continually evolves and changes depending on the 
specific needs and context of a printed presentation.
111
 The transcription process 
itself is also, of course, theory laden. Choices made by the researcher reflect the 
theories they hold and the limit of their interpretation.
112
  
Swinton and Mowat demonstrate that data analysis is not a simple single 
event in the research process but can in practice be „a cycle of tentative 
construction, deconstruction, and reformulation which occurred as an ongoing 
conversation between the researcher and the congregation, the researcher and 
outside texts and the researcher and the accounts given by the congregation.‟113 
The methodology of this research project makes it clear that ongoing conversation 
with theological and social scientific texts and ideas, as well as with people 
outside the research context, is an essential element of data interpretation. This is 
another reason why full verbal transcription of interview data may not be 
appropriate, if it were to solidify the data in a form which constrains this ongoing 
process. Data management needs to retain a flexibility which facilitates this, and 
therefore the original interview recordings play a crucial role.  
A full transcript was produced for a pilot interview, which confirmed that 
this was neither necessary nor the best use of limited resources. In the context of 
this research project a hermeneutical process of data analysis is considered both 
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effective and appropriate, and full verbatim transcription unnecessary. There is no 
single reality captured in the recording, and meaning is progressively refined and 
revealed through a reflexive and iterative analysis. The stages of data analysis are 
as follows: 
a) Recording of the interview and group meeting, with concurrent note taking as 
appropriate. 
b) Review of the recording soon after the interview, with reflexive addition or 
amendment of notes. Key issues of interviewer practice and interviewee 
response identified for future interviews. 
c) After interviews completed, all recordings listened to again in original order 
and detailed but partial transcription undertaken based on the interview 
schedule itself as a theme proforma.
114
  
d) Producing partial transcripts in thematic form is itself an iterative and reflexive 
process which highlights, refines and links issues across interviews.  
e) A more complete transcript of the February group meeting (a more free-ranging 
discussion of 76 minutes duration) was produced and cross-linked as 
appropriate with interview themes. 
f)  A final review of key themes and supporting transcription, referring back to 
original recordings as appropriate.  
All of this took place against a background of continuing reflection on and 
interaction with theological and social science texts and themes, and with people 
„outside‟ the project. This hermeneutic process continued with the production of 
the thesis, where further refining of arguments led to further reflection on (and 
listening to) the data, and so on. At no point was the data considered in isolation.  
The key findings of „ordinary eschatology‟ are summarised in the following 
chapter, together with relevant theological and other comment. Such comment can 
sometimes fall naturally within the discussion, but at other times lengthy 
footnotes are used to provide a sub-text of comment rather than interrupting the 
natural flow of the discussion.  
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3. ORDINARY ESCHATOLOGY DISCOVERED 
3.1 THERE IS A LIFE AFTER DEATH  
In response to the first substantial question of the interview, all participants 
expressed belief in some form of afterlife. This is an interesting finding in itself. 
However, there were significant differences in the level of clarity and the degree 
of certainty with which this belief was expressed. For some this meant belief 
without a clear understanding of how, or where. For others, it was as much about 
hope as about knowledge. 
Yes, well, yes I believe so. I don‟t know how, I don‟t understand how, but 
I do believe yes. [Olive] 
I believe it, but I mean [pause] nobody knows do they, that there is life 
after death. You just hope, but we don‟t know. [Dawn] 
Maurice Wiles believes that there is a „fundamental inconsistency in the idea 
of a God whose purpose in creation includes as so prominent a feature the 
emergence of personal life capable of response to him, but whose purpose also 
allows for the utter extinction of those relationships of love, developed so 
gradually, so profoundly and yet with such tantalising incompleteness.‟115 In 
similar vein, Paul and Linda Badham claim that the Christian hope of LAD relies 
on „the sense of entering a living relationship with God and trusting in the reality 
of that fellowship against the force of death. Throughout history it is probable that 
this has been the decisive element in the case for belief in a future life.‟116 John 
Hick argues that if belief in God is accepted (that is, a theistic position is adopted) 
then LAD is very probable. „For if we are the creatures of a loving God it is 
reasonably to be expected that God should make it possible for us to fulfil the 
potentialities of our human nature, potentialities which are not fulfilled for most 
people within the circumstances of this present world.‟117 The ordinary 
theologians of this study took it as axiomatic that a loving God would create a 
fulfilled future for his human children.  
Many were clearer and more certain in their articulation of what happens 
after death, but there was a general view that complete clarity is probably both 
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impossible and unnecessary. I received comments from ordinary theologians 
about their „ordinariness‟. Olive expressed her concern within the context of 
talking about the soul, which she struggled to describe.  
I‟m not clever enough to understand what [the soul is], you know. And 
that worries me sometimes ...That I don‟t understand, that I‟m not clever 
enough to understand, ... I mean I believe totally, I always have done. ... I 
do believe that there‟s something other than this; and I do believe that 
we‟ll meet again somehow, somewhere. But I don‟t understand how, I 
can‟t fathom how.  
I asked her if she would like to understand it more. „I don‟t know if I would 
Michael. No I don‟t think I would, because I can accept it, you know.‟ We then 
went on to consider how souls might recognise one another. Olive said she 
believed that she would meet her parents and husband again in the afterlife. „And 
that‟s when I start and think, well, I don‟t really understand it but I do believe it, 
and, you know, do I really need to understand?‟118 
Gregory also had trouble in clarifying the idea of soul.  
We use these words to explain something we don‟t understand. I still don‟t 
understand it but we still use the words because we‟ve nothing else to use. 
... You don‟t actually know what happens when we die. We believe things, 
... We‟ve got to describe it as something, something lives on, so we use 
those words. That‟s the best I can do. 
Jacob expressed something similar.  
I mean I don‟t know how, but like my mother, I just have a simple belief; I 
just believe that that there is something. I don‟t know why I believe it. I 
couldn‟t argue the case with anybody. But I would keep my stance that I 
just believe it, and to me it‟s real.  
The point here is not that these views are self-confessedly „ordinary‟, but rather 
that they are genuine expressions of real belief which clearly have an effect on 
these people. Ordinary theologians are expressing ordinary theology in the only 
way they can. Perhaps less-ordinary theologians (who themselves were once 
much more „ordinary‟) might do well to remember this sort of humility about 
what we know, and this sort of commitment to what we believe.  
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Ordinary Theology Being Done 
These are only a few examples of clear and honest statements from ordinary 
theologians doing ordinary theology: they are statements of belief in things which 
are important to how that person lives a life of faith. They are both reflective and 
affective; that is, they involve emotional commitment. They are not fully 
explained, or systematically presented, but are nonetheless fundamentally 
theological. I would claim this of at least 23 of the 26 interviewees. The vast 
majority of interviewees displayed both a sufficient level of critical reflection and 
personal affect to be considered as ordinary theologians. It was in doubt only with 
three interviewees: which is not a negative judgement, but merely an observation 
that not all conversation about LAD is theologically significant. This, of course, is 
not to say that all the other interviewees were in a high „academic‟ state of 
cerebral contemplation concerning LAD. It is clear that for many people the 
interview itself caused them to think and reflect beyond their normal boundaries, 
surely a key educational benefit of this kind of theological listening. Jacob 
confessed that his lack of clarity is „terrible isn‟t it. I‟m 63 and I haven‟t given 
this a huge amount of thought.‟  
Another indication that ordinary theology was being done was awareness of 
the force with which their desires might be linked to their beliefs. Early in the 
group discussion, Patricia recognised that „we all want different things don‟t we? 
We‟re all perhaps hoping for different things.‟ Towards the end of the meeting 
Joselyn asked, „Are we being very cosy with ourselves? Are we telling ourselves 
that it‟s going to be fine?‟ Joselyn was airing the worry that perhaps their beliefs 
could be a self-fulfilling wish.
119
 Did she believe nice, comfortable things about 
the afterlife because this is what she wanted to find there? However, there was a 
clear response to this. Alice said, „Why believe in God if there isn‟t going to be 
something perfect at the end? ... I don‟t see any point in believing if heaven isn‟t 
going to be perfect.‟ Laura reminded people that „One of the key points is actually 
that we gain eternal life.‟ Dawn was sure that Jesus wouldn‟t have said that „in my 
house there are many mansions‟ if he didn‟t mean it.  
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Individual Heavens – A Remarkable Solution 
Perhaps the most remarkable overall scheme of LAD, which is worth setting 
out in some detail to illustrate the level of ordinary theology being articulated, 
came from Allan. There were two obvious and major issues for him concerning 
the afterlife: how can we meet people in the afterlife and resume a previous 
relationship; and how can we not meet the people we don‟t want to? In order to 
overcome these two issues, Allan explained a complete scheme of individual 
dream-like heavens, which bears a striking resemblance to some of the ideas of 
H.H. Price.
120
 Allan does not know of this scholar; the main inspiration for his 
afterlife scheme is reflection on his life experience. The purpose of an afterlife is 
to provide the fulfilment and happiness which have not been obtained in this 
earthly life. Allan said he had adapted some of his ideas from a Tom Cruise 
movie,
121
 but I was surprised he didn‟t mention the now well-documented, 
immersive experience of computer gaming.  
So the afterlife for Allan is an individual mental construct of the deceased, a 
world specific to them which is populated only by those they want to be there. 
This dream-like world is experienced as entirely real and physical. Those who 
populate your afterlife world can be either still living or dead, the point being that 
it is not actually them, but rather „your kind of expectation‟ of them. They „would 
be there, but only as how you want [them] to be there‟. Furthermore, you can 
choose to be whatever age you want and in whatever physical state you want in 
your afterlife, and can even set the geographical location. The key thing is that 
those you bring into your afterlife world will be at the appropriate age and 
physical state in relation to you. So your grandparents, children, siblings, partner, 
friends, will all be at the „correct‟ age; the relationship will therefore be 
maintained.  
There would be no real contact between individual afterlife worlds, which 
could be heavens or hells. One can choose to ask God for help in making your 
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world, which would therefore be heavenly; or you can try to create your own, 
which may lead to a personal hell. If you ask God to help, then this will be 
ongoing in that he will continue to guide your world so that it does not distort 
itself in damaging ways (cf. Price‟s concern about solipsism). This all happens 
very quickly after death, but not at the point of death. Rather, there are a few days 
of unconscious rest; the personal world comes into existence at the point of your 
being „properly laid to rest‟ by either burial or cremation. God will assist those 
who have, for example, suffered from a mental handicap in this life to be fully 
restored to mental capacity so that they could choose any sort of personal afterlife. 
This would imply a view of „soul‟ as the untouched inner person, but Allan said 
he had no conception of what the word soul meant. In your personal afterlife you 
would only remember the good bits of your earthly life, and you would have no 
awareness of what continues to happen on earth. There are no ghosts or spirits 
roaming the earth, or NDEs: the only supernatural thing that could happen is that 
people on earth could dream of a deceased person, which is a sort of precursor of 
the individual afterlife.  
Disembodied Existence 
The famous thought experiment of H.H. Price
122
 provides Paul Badham with 
a solution to how disembodied existence could actually work. He agrees with 
Price that when we dream we have real experiences, and therefore the „image 
world‟ could be a heavenly space. The problem, though, which Price recognised, 
is that it can suggest the creation of a separate subjective private world for each 
person. Price argues that a form of telepathy could facilitate real communication 
between discarnate souls to produce shared worlds, a different one for „each 
group of like-minded personalities‟ (although Price confesses that he is not clear 
exactly what would define such a group). The key addition to (extension of) the 
Price dream-world which Badham provides is the role that God can play. A virtue 
of Price‟s theory „is that it can do justice to the Christian conviction that in the 
next world God will be much more real to us than He is in our present 
existence.‟123 Badham suggests that „God would become the most vital subject of 
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our awareness. This would exactly tie in with the belief that the “beatific vision” 
is to be the most significant element in the life of heaven.‟124 Badham suggests a 
temporary initial solipsistic stage for the dead as they create an image world 
largely of those still living, which would provide valuable time for reflection and 
self judgement on our earthly lives, a necessary first step in continuing 
development. But God can then provide clear and direct guidance to us in our 
disembodied state, and will open up an infinite and exciting horizon of 
possibilities for learning and growth: in effect, an amalgamation of the 
anthropomorphic and theocentric views of heaven.  
The Price view of disembodied existence also solves for Badham (as for 
Allan) the big practical problem of heaven concerning reunion with people, a 
problem that several of my interviewees recognised. If there were a common 
afterlife world, then how could generations be bridged? „A young mother who 
had lost a child of ten might long to see her loved one again, but how could the 
child recognise as his mother the woman of eighty who had just arrived in the 
resurrection world.‟ The Price hypothesis offers a way out of this: 
For in a private world with telepathic interactions we could each imagine 
the people known to us as we had known them, and thus I could 
communicate with my grandfather and image him as a man of eighty, 
while my great-great-grandfather could image him as a child of ten, 
though perhaps in process of time telepathic interaction would enable us 
both to move toward a common image.
 125
 
 As I have shown above, Allan related a view of the afterlife remarkably 
similar to many aspects of the Price-Badham hypothesis, without any awareness 
whatsoever of the academic philosophical debate outlined above. Philosophical 
speculation, like biblical interpretation, is not simply the province of scholars.  
 
3.2 AN IMMEDIATE AND NON-PHYSICAL AFTERLIFE  
These ordinary theologians are clear that the afterlife is immediate. One 
argument in support of this is the very common sense approach of Gregory. „I 
don‟t think there‟s any point in having a gap of nothingness. If you‟ve got a spirit 
it‟s there, it can‟t sort of suddenly go into oblivion or come back into existence a 
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fortnight later sort of thing. So it‟s immediate, no gap.‟ Gregory, of course, sees 
the spirit as something which cannot die, unlike the body.  
There was a common misunderstanding, or perhaps reinterpretation, of the 
question asked at the beginning of the interview, „Are people whom you have 
known and who have died in any way still alive?‟ On a number of occasions the 
response was to provide stories of their experience of the continuing earthly 
presence of the dead. This is interesting not just in providing evidence that this is 
a common phenomenon (see „The Presence of the Dead‟ page 122), but also 
because it clearly illustrates that a key reason for believing in an immediate post-
mortem afterlife is experience of the continuing life of the dead. Jacob can 
sometimes see their faces.  
I don‟t know how it happens but their face will appear and you feel them 
close to you. ... I just have these lovely thoughts, and it‟s quite comforting 
really [laughter]. And I actually end up talking to them, which is strange, I 
mean is that nuts?  
Claire is clear that her father is still in some sense present with his family. She 
feels this when things remind her of him, but, „it‟s a bit more than a reminder, 
[pause] it‟s almost like dad saying “I‟m still here”.‟ Dawn feels her deceased 
mum is sometimes with her in the house, and Nora believes the familiar dead are 
all around her, and that heaven „exists all over in a very wide and unending 
place‟. Joselyn talks to her dead husband, and Imogen to her dead father. Others 
expressed a clear sense in which they still feel guided by their deceased relatives.  
A specific question about NDEs was asked in the interview, but two people 
raised the issue before the question was put, and again in connection with the 
issue of an immediate afterlife. Janet related a story from her mother that her 
grandfather, minutes before his death and in a very weak state, sat bolt upright 
and „said my Gran‟s name and said she‟s waiting on me‟. Shortly after her 
grandfather‟s death, Janet also had a very clear and influential experience 
 I‟d gone to bed one night and I woke up, and I swear I‟m not mad, I will 
swear to anybody, my granddad was sitting by my bedside, and I opened 
my eyes and he had his hand on me. ... and I closed my eyes and opened 
them again and he‟d gone. And I think that was his way of saying goodbye 
to me and just kind of saying I‟m OK now. [Laughter/emotion]  
Charles had a very influential out of body experience which confirmed his 
view of an immediate post-mortem spiritual existence. He had been taken into 
hospital in an emergency and, while lying in bed on a ward,  
 59 
 
can remember to this day being up above it looking down on my body 
presumably, in that bed, as clear as I‟m seeing you. I was just very gently 
going upwards and I thought to myself I don‟t want to be up here I want to 
be back down there, and eventually woke up. And that experience has 
lived with me ever since. 
Charles clarified that the spirit „leaves the body and goes‟. For him, the spirit is an 
„inner being‟, because he could see the „outer being‟, the body, down on the bed. 
„So it had to be some inner being which had [pause] a form, or some form of 
intelligence, because I was awake or recognised what was happening. I knew that 
something was going on which wasn‟t right and I was determined to do 
something about it.‟ Charles explained that the body was down there, but that he 
was somewhere else. He doesn‟t think anyone else in the ward even noticed. The 
word „spirit‟ is, for Charles, another way of saying soul.  
Laura had been interested to hear from me recently (within the July 2008 
services) about the idea held by some that there is an unconscious intermediate 
state post-mortem, in which we await final resurrection. But she had always felt 
that „people do continue [immediately] in some form or another.‟ Only one 
interviewee thought there was a temporary unconscious state post-mortem. 
Hermione had received this view from her mother, and it was strongly linked by 
Hermione to a rejection of the supernatural. In other words, an unconscious 
interim state means that there cannot be any disturbed souls (ghosts): all are 
unconscious. Patricia talked of a conscious interim period of recuperation and 
healing, which is necessary not only for those who had endured difficult deaths, 
but for all of us who will at least be surprised by death. „I think for a period of 
time everybody will be in like a suspension or [pause] just peace and quiet, 
perhaps coming to terms with what happened to you. ... But [pause] that doesn‟t 
last forever.‟ It should be noted that even those who pointed to a two-stage LAD 
did not see the second stage as physical resurrection, but rather as a non-physical 
existence. Hermione believes that after the unconscious „soul sleep‟ all souls enter 
a final, non-physical state of afterlife.
126
  
Alice does not believe in an interim period because she thinks it is associated 
with the now outdated view of the second coming of Jesus.  
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I think that had a meaning at the time that it was said, that Jesus would 
come again because he‟d been there and they‟d seen him and, emm, knew 
about him; and they did honestly think he was going to come and 
everything would be right. And ... I can see that. [pause] But we‟re not 
going to wait for a second coming, because we know that, emm, 2000 
years have gone by. ... So yes, I think that when we die we do [go straight 
to the afterlife]. 
This is actually an example of biblical reinterpretation due to a changing world 
view and historical experience (see Appendix H, „Authorial World Views and 
Contemporary Science‟ page 224.).  
Strong Belief in a Soul/Spirit 
One of the clearest findings from this project is that there is a natural and 
deep belief in soul/spirit among ordinary theologians. Gregory is typical in 
thinking that „the spirit or the soul lives on‟. Patricia thinks the soul is „us‟, and 
„and it is just encompassed in this body that wears out and, ... goes and 
disappears.‟ Grace believes that when your body dies, „you have a spirit and it‟s 
your spirit that goes wherever it goes, ... You‟ve got a spirit; your body is nothing, 
it rots, it goes, it disappears. But your spirit is you.‟ Joselyn thinks that „when 
you‟re dead your body is just a shell. That your soul or your spirit has been 
removed from it.‟  
There was an almost unanimous substance dualist view of the human person. 
For the subjects of this study, an obvious element of human experience is that 
they are composed of both a physical body and a spiritual self. Some were clear 
that the Bible talked of „body and soul‟, and by the latter they meant a spiritual 
inner self. Felicity believes that „it is mentioned a lot isn‟t it [in the Bible], that 
your soul survives‟. Most people used the words „soul‟ and „spirit‟ almost 
interchangeably. Interviewees often used the word „spirit‟ to start with; but when 
asked about what, if anything, they understood by „soul‟, they usually responded 
that it was the same thing. Duncan said, „I see a soul as being a sort of spiritual 
existence, I‟m not quite sure that I could even begin to define it anymore. ... I sort 
of see it as the life and the spirit within a person.‟ Claire said soul was „probably 
what I mean by spiritual, yes, so that part of you that is “you”. ... That bit that you 
can‟t really describe because it just makes you, “you”, and me, “me”. That to me 
is your soul, is your spirit.‟ It is this which survives bodily death. 
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Existing empirical data shows a strong popular leaning toward a non-
physical afterlife based on a surviving soul (see Appendix A). For instance, the 
„Rural Church Project‟ found that the view of a soul passing on to another world 
was more than twice as popular as the idea of a bodily resurrection. Even more 
interesting is the fact that amongst the church sample (taken from the church 
electoral rolls) this difference was in fact more pronounced than with the general 
public sample: 68% of the church group accepted the soul idea, whereas only 24% 
affirmed bodily resurrection. „This raises some intriguing questions about recent 
church debates concerning the Resurrection of Jesus, on the assumption that it is 
not impossible for beliefs about self to be unrelated to beliefs about Jesus as far as 
Christians are concerned.‟127 A key finding of this project is that just such a 
separation is possible (see 3.5 What Jesus‟ Resurrection Tells Us‟, page 95).  
Despite the creedal statements of a final bodily resurrection, there has also 
been for the vast majority of Christian history, and probably for the vast majority 
of Christian believers, a strong belief in survival of the „soul‟, the „essential me‟, 
following bodily death. Indeed, this is still part of official Roman Catholic 
teaching, albeit that the soul reunites with a body at the final resurrection.
128
 The 
recent shift in protestant academic circles against any dualist conception of the 
human person is very significant in that it is actually a huge change, which 
apparently is at odds with popular protestant Christian understanding. An 
illustration of this is the reaction which Oscar Cullmann received to the 
publication of his argument against the immortal soul: „No other publication of 
mine has provoked such enthusiasm or such violent hostility.‟129 This disjunction 
is clearly evidenced in this interview data. Ordinary theologians are saying 
something very different from the recent protestant view, which is based largely 
on two contentious areas: the supposed distorting influence of Greek philosophy, 
and recent scientific discoveries regarding the physical understanding of the brain. 
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A convincing defence of the substantial soul is still possible, however: I set this 
out in Appendix G.  
Paul Badham argues that belief in God, in the soul, and in an afterlife are 
three interdependent beliefs; each relies on implicit assumptions about the validity 
of the others. The key thing about all religious faith, according to Badham, is a 
personal relationship of love and trust with God, and this is critical for afterlife 
belief. Each individual matters to God, so death will not break that relationship or 
destroy the loved individual. In fact the doctrine of God becomes irrelevant 
without belief in a future hope – „unless a Christian is willing to postulate a future 
life, any claim to believe in the fatherly care of an omnipotent God is without 
content.‟130 Badham claims that in trying to avoid the term „soul‟, Christian 
writers use phrases such as „the essential part of what we are‟, „the vital principle 
of our being‟, „the pattern of what we are‟, or „our moral and intellectual 
qualities‟. But surely this is what soul has traditionally meant? „Hence, though 
many today deny the word, they find themselves wishing to affirm much that the 
word signifies.‟ I believe Wright stands open to this accusation.131 Badham points 
to a key „ordinary‟ argument:  
in the absence of any physical continuity, „I‟ can still be „I‟, only if it is 
possible to identify my self-hood with some non-physical principle of 
continuity. The word „soul‟ is the historic term for this notion, and I think 
it can help to clarify discussion to use the expression, provided that it is 
understood that a modern exposition of the concept is not necessarily tied 
to all the ramifications associated with notions of soul in earlier 
worldviews.
132
  
Ordinary Reasons for Belief in Soul/Spirit  
God is not physical 
Maurice Wiles also reminds us (in connection with claims that a „soul‟ 
existence cannot be complete) that God is bodiless and inconceivable; but this is 
not, in Christian eyes, ground for denying his existence or regretting its form. 
Charles Taliaferro points out that if one assumes a theist position then many of 
the objections to dualism lose their force because one is already accepting that an 
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immaterial God created and interacts with this material world.
133
 Duncan made 
this same point about the nature of God in his interview. „If you feel that God 
exists and Jesus exists and [pause] can influence you and you can communicate 
with them, ... And if that happens with us here because we are living in these 
bodies, then it seems to me it can also happen after physical death. I think that‟s 
sort of, I think that‟s the basis of my rationale.‟ Wiles points out that when a 
Christian speaks about LAD, it is eternal life in relation to a disembodied God: 
embodiment may not be the easiest way to ensure relationship. He suggests that to 
talk of bodily resurrection is to try to convince ourselves that we can envisage 
what the afterlife would be like, and so give meaning to the concept of LAD. But 
he adds that this is not how we believe in God, where we have some pointers in 
our experience which allows us to commit ourselves to this belief but also to 
acknowledge that we cannot visualise it. Wiles suggests it should be the same 
with LAD; we should not be too concerned about „our inability to envisage that 
which we are led to affirm‟. He believes that theologians should not be afraid to 
admit they don‟t know the details.134 Gooch also emphasises the point that God is 
non-bodily, so our promise of meeting God „face to face‟ (1 Cor. 13) cannot 
involve a physical queuing up, but rather that God makes us more like him to 
enable this.
135
  
Awareness of Self 
Wiles believes we have to ask, „are there features of the human situation as 
such which point towards a belief in immortality for man?‟ In answer to this he 
points to the remarkable nature of our personal existence and the mysterious 
character of personal being. We can stand back and reflect on our self („the 
recessiveness of I‟), and we are self-transcendent in the way we make free moral 
decisions. While such observations do not establish LAD, they at least provide 
restraint in ruling it out altogether. For us to know the truth of God‟s plan of LAD 
there must be „at least some indications of its plausibility in human experience as 
such‟.136 Keith Ward argues that the human soul is known to itself in a quite 
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unique way, not by sense organs but by introspection. He further claims that „we 
are more certain of the distinctive existence of our own rational consciousness 
than we are of the truth of any wide-ranging theories of biology. The soul is 
known directly by each one of us.‟ We see in contemporary culture a „battle for 
the soul‟, for the idea of the soul. „But it is not a battle between science and 
religion. It is a battle between those who seek to extend proper biological and 
scientific methods and conclusions beyond their proper sphere, and those who are 
concerned to affirm the dignity and purpose of human life.‟137 
I suspect that one of the key factors underlying the views of these ordinary 
theologians with respect to soul/spirit is their sense of the experience of the inner 
self, the „I-perspective‟. For Imogen, spirit or soul represent the „inner me.‟ She 
clarified that „My inner me as far as I‟m concerned is my spirit, what makes me. 
What makes me do what I do in the way that I do it.‟ It is this which survives 
bodily death. Jacob defined the soul as „not my physical being, but basically what 
else I am, and what other people are; their emotions and whatever, and the things 
that make us tick, the things that make me, “me”. ... My other being if you like.‟ 
At death it is this that survives and separates from the body.  
The Identity Issue – How am I the Same „Me‟? 
How do I remain „me‟ in the afterlife? What is it that ensures my continuing 
personal identity? Hywel Lewis is not greatly worried by the problem of 
individuation here (how we could be individuals without bodies). „It has always 
seemed evident to me that everyone knows himself to be the being that he is in 
just being so. We identify ourselves to ourselves in that way, and not in the last 
resort on the basis of what we know about ourselves.‟138 Richard Swinburne 
counters that the answer to how we could distinguish between disembodied souls 
„is that the difference between souls is ultimate. They just differ solo numero. ... 
Some individuals, that is, have thisness, haecceitas, something which makes them 
different from other individuals of the same kind otherwise indistinguishable from 
them.‟139 Nancey Murphy argues that it is not the body „qua material object that 
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constitutes our identities, but rather the higher capacities that it enables: 
consciousness and memory, moral character, interpersonal relations, and, 
especially, relationship with God.‟140 Consequently, „a replica or transformed 
version of my body with all my memories intact would not be I unless she 
possessed my virtues (or vices), affections, and moral perceptions.‟ But physical 
and character criteria are inseparable. „Virtues are acquired by practice; practice 
makes stable changes in the strength of neural pathways.‟ Certain interpersonal 
relationships are key for personal identity, so the afterlife must contain the same 
relationships. The most important is our relationship with Christ, so Murphy 
agrees „with those who emphasise that God‟s remembering, recognising, and 
relating to me are essential to my post resurrection identity.‟ 141  
The key problem of personal identity is the diachronic one; how is a person 
at one time identical to a person at another time? People change over time. At the 
age of 54 I am completely unlike I was at the age of 10. Not only is my body (and 
its molecular composition) vastly different, but I also have different memories, 
attitudes and personality. Lynne Rudder Baker makes it clear that the required 
answer is not an epistemological one, but a metaphysical one; in other words, it is 
about what makes it true that I am the same person irrespective of whether anyone 
recognises the identity or not. The same is true of identity in the afterlife. 
Continuity via an immaterial substance (soul/mind), or physical substance (body), 
or psychological continuity (memory) is unfeasible for Baker. Her view „is that 
personal identity depends on a mental property – an essential property in virtue of 
which a person is a person (having a first-person perspective) and in virtue of 
which a person is the person she is (having that very first-person perspective).‟142 
She proposes that a human person is constituted by a human body, but is not 
identical to that body: as a river is constituted by a large number of water 
molecules, but they are not the same over time and so the river is not identical 
with the water. Baker explains that „A first-person perspective is the ability to 
conceive of oneself as a person.‟ The „stuff‟ a person is made of is irrelevant. 
„Person is an ontological kind whose defining characteristic is a capacity for a 
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first-person perspective.‟ 143 Constitution is not identity: a person is not identical 
to her body. A human body is not a person without a first-person perspective.
144
 
So, Baker argues, with respect to resurrection, the same human person can exist 
without the same body (although for Baker they need some sort of body to 
support a first-person perspective). The constitution view means that in the 
interim period there is either an interim body, or there is a temporal gap in 
existence (because we must have a body for first-person perspective). But then 
what „continues‟ in the gap? How does God retain my first-person perspective? 
She elsewhere makes the remarkable claim that an intermediate state is 
compatible with her constitution view because „there is no reason to think that the 
intermediate state must be a disembodied state. For all we know, persons in the 
intermediate state are constituted by intermediate-state bodies.‟145  
Overall I find that Baker adds little clarity by her „first person perspective‟. 
The ordinary theologians of this project see it more clearly and simply: it is 
obviously „me‟ that survives physical death (see „Strong Belief in a Soul/Spirit‟ 
page 60). The substantial soul is an obvious conception for these ordinary 
believers because it explains how the same person continues beyond death, to an 
immediate non-physical afterlife. This is far more understandable than the monist 
position which says that at death you really do die, but that God somehow 
remembers „you‟ for re-creation (re-embodiment) at some future point. It is also 
far more acceptable than the notion of unconscious interim existence (a 
substantial soul without mental capacity, because without body, survives and 
waits for re-embodiment).  
The Dementia Problem – Where Has She Gone? 
A specific contemporary and earthly context reinforces this ordinary 
eschatology. The increase in various forms of dementia asks the question of 
continuing identity in an acute way, and the substantial soul provides an obvious 
explanation. The real person (soul/mind) is intact, hidden behind the distorted 
outward expression which is the result of a diseased brain. This is the best way in 
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which the „loss‟ of the still-living person can be understood. So paradoxically, the 
increase in frequency of this terrible disease may actually reinforce the popular 
notion of soul.  
Duncan is clear that such things as physical defects of the brain will not 
affect the soul in the afterlife; we will be free of any such physical impediments 
and memory/mental faculty will be restored. Katie also believes that dementia 
will be dealt with. „I would like to think that they have regenerated.‟ In the 
afterlife „they‟re not going to be suffering in any way at all‟, because „it‟s their 
inner being that‟s up there‟. Patricia believes that memory fades because of our 
brain, but the soul will be able to recall everything. Bernard believes that one‟s 
memory would be replenished in the afterlife, so that all the important things 
could be remembered. „As you are getting older it‟s the body that fails. And the 
mind may fail as well, but it‟s an organ isn‟t it? So I believe that ... once you‟re 
free of that decaying organ then, yeah, I believe you‟ll be ... [fine, with restored 
memory].‟ For Bernard, it‟s the same as with cancer; you wouldn‟t take that with 
you into the afterlife.  
These opinions about mental illness and dementia imply a traditional view of 
substance dualism. There is no evidence among these ordinary theologians of a 
physicalist or monist understanding of the human person.
146
 To them, it is obvious 
that the essential „me‟ cannot be irredeemably affected by physical illness of the 
brain. In the afterlife, the real „me‟ will, of course, be there: fully restored and 
whole. Indeed, in my pastoral experience with this same group of people, this is 
how the „loss‟ of a living person suffering from dementia is understood.  
When subjects were asked if the dead would remember their earthly lives, 
the responses reflected on the issue of memory as an essential component of 
personal identity and continuity. Vera thought you would remember your earthly 
life, „because what you‟ve done in your life is partly who you are. So if you‟re 
going to exist at all, I think you must have some of that with you, and it would be 
pretty sad if you didn‟t really, in a way.‟ Ursula thought we would remember 
„parts of it, but not in every detail I don‟t think.‟ We would probably remember 
important and significant things, but not everything from childhood. Ursula 
pointed out that we don‟t have complete memory now, so we probably won‟t in 
the afterlife either.  
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John Hick believes that the idea that the human self could exist endlessly is 
itself problematic, partly because of memory. He asks if personal identity depends 
on memory, then how could we remember across the timescales of the afterlife? 
Remembering what we did 30 years ago is difficult; how would we remember 
over millions of (afterlife) years? „Is there no limit to the memory capacity of a 
finite being?‟ So perhaps it is better to see ourselves as „a series of persons 
merging successively into one another, so that we can speak of our former selves 
and our future selves.‟ 147 Such conjecture leads Hick to borrow from Buddhist 
conceptions of the universal atman to explain how successive lives have 
continuity without memory, but ultimately he fails to convince that this is not a 
matter of successive reincarnation leading to personal dissolution.
148
 I am sure 
Hick is right in questioning the capacity of the present human physical 
mechanism of memory; but if, as Swinburne suggests, the soul itself somehow 
contains memory, perhaps an entirely different scale of operation can be 
envisaged.  
 
Reincarnation and Resurrection Confused 
Several interviewees mentioned reincarnation at an early stage, but became 
less certain or changed their views as they responded to the full range of 
questions. Bernard was clear at first that, „it would be such a waste of spirit or 
somebody‟s soul if it were not used again and again and again in some way shape 
or form‟. But after reflecting on later questions he came to realise that the 
afterlife, for him, must involve being able to relate to his family, so he still had to 
be „him‟. Bernard was clear that with reincarnation, „obviously you cease to be; 
your soul continues but you have no conscious memory or knowledge of that.‟ So 
he reasoned that the afterlife must be such that he would remain himself in a non-
physical existence of souls, where he could be with his family. Charles explained 
how his view of reincarnation had changed since being a young person. „Years 
ago I had a feeling that when you died you are born again onto this earth as 
something else. An animal, an insect, another human being or [pause] it was 
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immaterial what it was. It was just the fact that you were born again.‟ But his 
views had changed because he realised that being born again would mean he 
would know nothing about his previous existence. „If I am born again what‟s 
going to happen to me at the end? ... Reading more recently I think that‟s an 
outlook of Buddhism.‟  
Reincarnation was also raised by others in a different way. Patricia thought 
that reincarnation might be a possibility for some, and even for Jesus if he felt the 
need to appear in a particular historical context again. But it was clear that it 
would be Jesus who would return: that is, he would not be somebody else. Martin, 
the only person with a view of the afterlife as physical (see below), nevertheless 
had a remarkable „recycling‟ view of judgement, which operated via 
reincarnation. „I think there may well be some form of recycling goes on until you 
attain that quality that‟s required before you are allowed to go on to the afterlife.‟ 
When asked to explain further, Martin said, „Well, does your spirit, if you haven‟t 
been up to scratch or up to standard in this life, is it recycled into another human 
being, another baby, to carry on to try and prove yourself before you are allowed 
to go into the afterlife?‟149 He clarified that in such cases the slate would be wiped 
clean, the old life would cease to exist and you would become a new person in 
your „recycled‟ life. So people would be „missing‟, as it were, in heaven. Those 
who didn‟t make it the first time would go back and become someone else, for 
another try. The original person(s) would therefore be absent from heaven.
150
 
Several people clearly implied that a rejection of reincarnation was the 
reason for denying bodily resurrection. In other words, reincarnation was 
understood as being alive in another body, not your original earthly body (which 
has been irrevocably destroyed by death). When asked if the post-mortem soul 
ever returns to a physical body, James replied, „that‟s some other religion, and is 
reincarnation.‟ Katie stated that „I don‟t believe I come back as another person as 
some people think‟, which seems to have meant for her that we are not 
resurrected. Also, one of those who initially proposed a form of reincarnation 
(Bernard) seemed to misunderstand this, equating it with the Christian position of 
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resurrection. Hermione stated that if the afterlife is the same as it is now, by 
which she meant physical, „then what‟s the difference in something like 
Buddhism, you know when you‟re just coming back on another level, being re-
born again? It would just be the same as that, surely, if it‟s a physical form?‟  
This confusion is due, I suggest, to an almost complete emphasis on a non-
physical afterlife and the apparent absurdity of a final physical state. Talk of 
„becoming physical again‟ has moved so far from traditional Christian ideas (in 
their minds) that it has become associated with the non-Christian idea of 
reincarnation. Resurrection is a nonsensical idea for them. Calvin faced the same 
problem of people seeing corpses as things of temporary significance. He argued 
that the obvious facts of physical decomposition must not sway people away from 
the idea of a resurrection of this body, this flesh, which will be reunited with our 
soul. 
The volatile spirits with whom I now dispute adduce the fiction of their 
own brain, that in the resurrection there will be a creation of new bodies. 
Their only reason for thinking so is, that it seems to them incredible that a 
dead body, long wasted by corruption, should return to its former state. 
Therefore, mere unbelief is the parent of their opinion. The Spirit of God, 
on the contrary, uniformly exhorts us in Scripture to hope for the 
resurrection of our flesh.
151
 
 
3.3 ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF NON-PHYSICALITY 
A range of arguments were put forward by these ordinary theologians to 
explain why the afterlife cannot be physical. 
Dead People are ‘Empty’ 
When her mother died, Yvonne felt „she wasn‟t actually still there in the 
body if you see what I mean; it was just a body. ... wherever she had gone, she‟d 
already gone.‟ Felicity is clear that, „they‟re not there anymore. The person‟s not 
there. It‟s just like a shell, ... the person has gone.‟ Charles once saw an elderly 
neighbour who had just died, and his face was relaxed and at peace, with no 
worry lines like he had in life. „Something had left his body, ... the spirit had 
gone, floated away somewhere.‟ Nora believes that „when you bury or cremate 
someone it is the shell, ... and the essence of the person has already gone into the 
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afterlife.‟ Martin believes that a corpse is „just something that is left‟, and that „in 
a funeral we bury something not someone‟. For James, the difference between 
cremation and burial does not matter. „It‟s a way of getting rid of the body which, 
once you‟ve died, is surplus.‟ Katie said it makes little difference whether we are 
buried or cremated because „it‟s just bones in a box.‟  
The Physical is the Problem 
James believes that the body and the soul are totally separate, and the body is 
actually what causes all our earthly problems.  
Our soul doesn‟t need the body. So, our soul can exist quite separately, 
and from that point of view it has no, emm, grudges or disputes with other 
souls, because it doesn‟t need anything to keep it going, not like the body. 
So as I see it, all of our problems come because of the body. Because we 
need food we worry about whether the person down the road is getting 
more than we are. And all these sort of things affect directly our body. But 
once we‟ve lost our body we don‟t need to think about it.  
Hermione believes our physicality is a temptation to sin.  
I know that there‟s a lot [in the Bible] that says that it is a physical form, 
but, there‟s a part of me can‟t really believe it is a physical form because 
there is too much about a physical form that creates sin in the first place. 
So to me [laughter], to me you have to not have that bit you know, ... I 
don‟t believe that when you‟re resurrected all of a sudden ... you will be 
perfect, ... I don‟t believe that. So to me it can‟t be physical in this sense of 
physical.  
Katie also saw the physical as having this (sexual) propensity. When asked if 
there would be any wrongdoing in the afterlife she replied, „I hope so [laughter]. 
... But I don‟t know how that would be, because your body is not there, so I don‟t 
know how that would happen.‟ 
In a quite different and unusual sense, Alice believes that this earthly life is 
so problematic for many people that they may not actually have any personal 
continuity in the afterlife. Being „at peace‟ is the key goal of heaven, and people 
would therefore not look back to their earthly life as this could be distressing. „I 
don‟t think that what they have been matters anymore.‟ I asked Alice what would 
then make you „you‟ in heaven? „I don‟t know that I need to be Alice. I just think 
that this contentment and peace doesn‟t involve ... what I have been, what I‟ve 
done or who I am.‟152 She would know somehow that her human family were 
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there, but wouldn‟t remember the disputes and problems. It would just be a 
„spiritual home‟. 
Physicality and Death 
One of the questions I asked was „why do we all have to die?‟ The answers 
to this usually indicated a very clear association between physicality and death; 
that death was a necessary part of physical existence. Duncan said it is „simply 
because of the physicality of things. Just as there is a growth, life and death cycle 
to everything [pause], animals, plants, the earth. That‟s just the way it is.‟ He then 
went on to relate, in humorous fashion, that if none of us died then families would 
be huge and horrendous; just imagine all that emotional baggage, and all those 
people telling you what to do. A very common response to this question was to 
say that we must die to make room for subsequent generations. In other words, 
the birth of new people was of overriding importance compared to the extension 
of our own lives. For Ursula, death is necessary „because we‟re not perfect and 
life isn‟t perfect. But also perhaps [pause], because there should always be room 
for something new or different, or things to change and evolve; and if nobody 
ever died perhaps that would never happen.‟ Vera commented that „we have to 
have a beginning and an end.‟ 
There was also identification of necessary experience. Hermione suggested 
that ageing and dying are important in some way; that we need to go through it. 
Laura said we all die, „because we wear out or have accidents, and perhaps that is 
part of the development and learning process: that you‟re not a static person 
throughout your life.‟ Nora said that if we went on forever then there would never 
be any sense of maturity. Our whole earthly life is based on it coming to an end, 
and „we know that the next part of our life will be the afterlife‟. This is our 
physical time on earth, our bodily time, and „after we die then heaven will be the 
place that our soul will go to. ... That is the next stage of our life.‟ Alice believes 
we need to be able to go to heaven because our final fulfilment can‟t happen on 
earth.  
 Physical Suffering will Cease 
One of the clearest benefits of the afterlife is that the sufferings of this 
physical world will cease. Gregory thinks that „sometimes death is a physical 
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release to some people.‟ This does not mean that a new kind of non-suffering 
physicality will be created; rather it means that physicality, which is so clearly 
linked with suffering, will cease. Vera stresses that the afterlife provides a rest 
from the physical problems of this world. She associates this especially with the 
later stages of human life, and death. „They‟ve had a struggle, ... a struggle to live, 
and they can relax when they‟ve died, because the body is gone now.‟ When 
asked if there will be any suffering in the afterlife, Hermione replied: 
Well that‟s the whole point of it. I mean, again, if all you‟re doing is being 
reborn into the same sort of existence then you will go through exactly the 
same kind of pain and suffering [pause] because of that physical form. 
And then to me, I don‟t see the point of putting people through that 
again.
153
  
Practical Issues For a Physical Afterlife 
Space and Other Resources 
James thought that because souls „need no sustenance, many trillions of 
souls can all exist in heaven.‟ For Katie, this would be problematic for any 
physical afterlife.  
Because if you think about it physically, you would be thinking, well, who 
does the cooking, you know. So that‟s why it cannot be, not for all the 
millions and trillions and billions of people that have died. I mean I know 
it‟s a marvellous picture [laughter] but I mean physically, in a physical 
form, that cannot be, I don‟t believe. 
Imogen pointed out that death in this life is necessary so that we don‟t run out of 
space, so any physical afterlife would have this same problem.
154
 Jacob was very 
sceptical of any physical afterlife, because where would all those generations of 
people live? He commented that it was bad enough in his house already! Bernard 
also saw physical space as a key issue; we could not simply have more and more 
physical beings living forever. By contrast, he thought souls would have no 
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spatial location or extension, so the non-physical afterlife has no problem in this 
respect.  
Martin, the only one who had some real sympathy with the idea of a physical 
afterlife (because of activities he enjoys in this life), nevertheless had real 
concerns about resources and organisation.  
I don‟t quite take this idea that at the last trump all shall be raised. ... I just 
can‟t imagine that happening. To me that‟s, [pause] way out of this world. 
It‟s something my mind won‟t take in. When you think of the millions and 
millions of people who would be raised in that event.  
Furthermore, if Jesus eating fish with his disciples after his resurrection means 
that in the afterlife we all need to eat, then „you‟ve got to have quite a big 
organisation to provide food and clothing for all these millions who are going to 
be raised just like that [snapped fingers]. My mind won‟t encompass that 
happening.‟  
Relationships and Meeting Others 
James thinks that because you have no body in the afterlife, then 
relationships would be different. The relationship with one‟s wife, for example, 
could not be the same without a physical aspect. But, there would be no need in 
the afterlife to rely on one person in particular. For James, a soul existence allows 
us to meet many other people, free of the limits of physicality. „You could meet 
anybody, ... you would be without a body so you could mix with any number of 
millions of people, and pick out someone you wanted to meet.‟ This in fact allows 
us to have a more fulfilling afterlife, because we can meet so many people.  
A common issue was the question of how one could return to a relationship 
after a significant amount of time had passed. Surely one would have become a 
different person to the one known by those who are now in the afterlife? This is 
the issue which Allan focused on, and resolved, in his individual afterlife solution 
(see „Individual Heavens – A Remarkable Solution‟ page 55). Felicity wondered 
how relationships could be the same. „It would be different, we would be different 
ages wouldn‟t we?‟ In the group meeting Martin raised some of the logical 
problems that emerge if we believe we will meet people we knew and loved in the 
afterlife; for example, what age will they be when we meet them in heaven? 
Ursula added, how would a baby who died recognise her mother in the afterlife 
who had later died as a 90-year-old? Claire said, „I don‟t picture it like that 
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because that‟s almost like an extension of earth.‟ Felicity then asked if that was 
what most people felt, that they would meet up with loved ones? Olive replied 
„That‟s what keeps me going.‟  
Decay and Ageing 
There is, I believe, a very clear and common experience of ageing which 
directly influences how the afterlife is conceived by these ordinary theologians. 
My congregation, like most others, contains many elderly people. The caring 
professions are also well represented, with a significant number who have seen 
the physical reality of death and dying at first hand. Their experience of the 
physical is that age brings problems as health deteriorates. To underestimate this 
common experience is to overlook a key reason why a vision of the afterlife as a 
return to a form of physical existence (resurrection) is entirely counter-intuitive 
for many people. I would suggest this perspective is actually increasing in a 
society which is getting older. The Department of Work and Pensions recently 
published figures which show the rate of ageing of our society. More than 10 
million people in the UK (17% of the UK‟s 62 million residents), are expected to 
live to be more than 100. The DWP projects that by 2080, there could be 626,900 
people in the UK aged 100 or more; 21,000 of those would be at least 110. This is 
more than 53 times greater than the current number of centenarians (11,800). At 
present there are fewer than 100 people who are older than 110. The number of 
people aged over 100 is expected to nearly double between 2030 and 2035, when 
it is projected there will be 97,300 centenarians in the UK.
155
 
Many news media presented this as an unequivocally good news story, but it 
is my experience that the elderly feel differently, wondering how many of their 
final years will be blighted by ill-health and significant decline. Surprisingly little 
is actually known about the health of the elderly in the final years of their lives. 
An innovative study currently being undertaken by the Institute for Ageing and 
Health at Newcastle University is seeking to address this, by studying in detail the 
health trajectories of a large cohort of 85-year-olds. Initial baseline findings are 
salutary. These elderly people think of themselves as being generally in better 
health than others of their age, although this is perhaps more to do with how they 
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felt they should respond to the question rather than the actual state of their health. 
The alternative would be to admit that you are succumbing to old age, becoming 
weak, failing. Who would want to say that? In any case, the actual baseline 
findings show „significant levels of disease and impairment‟, and „hypertension, 
ischemic heart disease, atrial fibrillation, depression, and dementia may be under 
diagnosed.‟ High levels of hypertension (57%), osteoarthritis (52%), and hearing 
impairment (60%) were found. Also 21% had severe or profound urinary 
incontinence, 12% had cognitive impairment, 7% had dementia, and 7% were 
depressed. This suggests that the majority of these 85 year olds are actually 
coping with significant and long-term health problems.
156
 The issue for older 
people is not which wonderful activities they will be able to enjoy in their extra 
retirement time, but rather whether they will be physically capable of enjoying 
much in the way of activity at all. They do not want to escape the physical 
because they are Platonists, but because they are human; because they have 
already lived a physical life and know what that entails. 
Which Physical Afterlife World?  
One further matter which needs to be raised is to consider what a future 
physical „new earth‟ could be like. I hope that it would strongly resemble 
Wensleydale: I have never felt attracted to other physical environments such as 
that of a desert or a tropical rain forest. I do not like being hot, and I certainly do 
not like being hot in a humid climate. No doubt those who do think of the rain 
forest as a beautiful physical environment would have their doubts about the 
rolling dales of Yorkshire. The fell-walking legend, Alfred Wainwright, 
commented in a Radio 4 documentary on his life that „I hope, if I do go to heaven, 
that it‟s like the Lake District. Somehow this world‟s been created, and I think it‟s 
a wonderful world.‟ He then went on to express a further personal preference, that 
„it would be even more wonderful without a lot of the people who are in it.‟157 
Many, including myself, could not easily conceive of an afterlife without large 
open spaces, and the possibility of solitude. The issue is not just a human one. If 
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all physical creatures were to be resurrected, as some think,
158
 then what physical 
earthly environment would be replicated: one that suited dinosaurs, or trilobites, 
or us? 
The question of what sort of world it would be is even more of an issue when 
one considers the vast cultural and social differences over time. I am really very 
different indeed from a ninth-century man who lived in what is now County 
Durham. Such a person would have lived a staggeringly different life to mine, and 
one that was probably much shorter. His life would have been filled with 
concerns, discomforts, and problems that I could not comprehend; and he would 
struggle to begin to understand the luxury, technology, and wealth at my disposal. 
Who would be the most surprised, I wonder, at a general resurrection into the 
same physical world? How far do we go back in terms of our biological 
predecessors? Are there Neanderthals in the physical afterlife? If so, surely their 
physical heaven must be different from mine? What about our successors: surely 
if the human species survives long enough then our future progeny could be very 
different indeed to what we currently understand as „human‟?159 
The more one stresses the role of the physical for our human being, the more 
one faces practical difficulties with a renewed physical existence. The point is that 
it is hard to see what a „new earth‟ would actually be like. In fact, it is as difficult 
to envisage a renewed physical environment which would be „heavenly‟ for all, as 
it is to imagine a more spiritual concept of the afterlife. The point is further 
emphasised when one considers that the new physical world of N.T.Wright, the 
„life after LAD‟ (see Appendix D), will also apparently be one where the second 
law of thermodynamics (entropy) no longer applies; where illness, tiredness, 
earthquake and famine will vanish; where evolution will stop and competition, 
predation, and greed will be a thing of the past.
160
 Such a world is so far from our 
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experience of this world, that it is as fantastic as a spiritual-soul world. The same 
point may be made if we consider the impossibly complicated social and political 
problems of this world, where war, environmental destruction, and injustice in all 
its forms, are endemic. How will this all suddenly change in another physical 
world? As Gregory forthrightly argued,  
If we‟re all physically resurrected and meet each other, physically, ... it 
would be chaos, it would be awful in some cases. You know, this is not 
paradise; it would almost be a form of hell in a way. So no, that doesn‟t fit 
in with a Christian belief in life after death at all to me. ... I could think of 
families that have split up, or people that hate each other, or somebody 
who had done murder, or anything, and suddenly you‟re all here again. 
And ... what age are you? If this is going to happen, what age do you come 
back as, and what age are your grandparents then? It‟s all, [pause] it‟s a 
ridiculous notion to put all together, I can‟t conceive it happening. I mean 
is the world going to sort of come back as it is now, or 50 years ago? Are 
we all going to be separated by the same number of years from parents and 
children? The whole thing is just chaotic, the idea bears no sense. I can‟t 
see it. It doesn‟t sound like paradise. 
Wright and others do emphasise that the new physical existence will be a 
transformed existence; they cannot be accused of suggesting simply more of the 
same. Thus, in discussing the question of „marriage and resurrection‟ in Mark‟s 
gospel (12:18-27), Wright says that we will be like angels in heaven only in the 
sense of being unmarried, and not in the sense of being disembodied beings in 
heaven (as popular, mistaken imagination implies). But he goes on to say that the 
second important point Jesus makes in this parable is that  
Resurrection ... will not simply reproduce every aspect of our present 
humanity. It will be a recognisable and re-embodied human existence; but 
a great change will have taken place as well, whose precise nature we can 
at present only guess at.
161
 
                                                                                                                                                         
flaw which requires God miraculously to change the „replica‟ so that it does not immediately die again 
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The question is, how great a change will it actually be? At what point does the 
degree of transformation actually move us away from any meaningful sense of a 
renewed physical existence, a new earth?  
Physical Characteristics in the Non-Physical 
Only one person saw some benefit in a physical afterlife (Martin); while one 
other suggested that, although it would be essentially spiritual, it must also be 
physical to some extent (Ursula). For everyone else, there was an absolutely clear 
and consistent conviction that the afterlife was, and could only be, a spiritual or 
soul existence.  
The one „physical‟ afterlife view, from Martin, was based on the hope that 
we will be able to repeat the enjoyable experiences of this life, such as sport. He 
thought of such physical earthly experience as an essential constituent part of 
what made him „him‟. „I think the afterlife must have a large measure of what 
you‟ve had on this earth.‟ However, he was aware of the apparent difficulty that 
the disciples had in recognising the resurrected Jesus (he pointed to the Emmaus 
Road story and the resurrection stories in Mark‟s gospel). So he argued that we 
would be physical but not exactly the same, and not at the age we were when we 
died. The new body that we are given is not this earthly body. This is clear, for 
example, with First World War soldiers who were quite literally blown to pieces. 
Martin also went on to say that he agreed with „the Platonic view that the 
body is a shell which the immortal soul happens to inhabit‟. It is remarkable that 
the only person interviewed who favoured a form of physical afterlife, also 
believes in an immortal soul that inhabits bodies (both the earthly body, which is 
discarded as the empty shell at death, and, presumably, a second physical body 
which is given at some point after death). What this shows, together with the 
practical issues which Martin raised, is that the most physical view of the afterlife 
recorded in this project actually incorporates many non-physical characteristics. 
However, the same is also true of the non-physical views held by the vast 
majority of interviewees, which actually show significant physical characteristics. 
Many of the benefits of the earthly physical life were still seen as both 
desirable and possible in a non-physical afterlife. James would expect to talk to 
Beethoven, for example, about his music, and to listen to music. He was fully 
aware of the paradox that a soul presumably does not have ears, but it was quite 
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clear to him that this was possible. „I do feel that the soul could experience a 
lovely piece of music, a lovely painting. Yes. It‟s difficult but I do feel that. I 
don‟t know exactly how because it doesn‟t have ears.‟ This is an important issue. 
It is not a logical argument but is sincerely felt: there is a clear sense in which it 
doesn‟t all have to fit together, it can be partial and non-systematic. In fact, for a 
number of interviewees there were points where the logic of their spiritual-soul 
view seemed to be contradicted by a clear element of physical expression in 
heaven. But this was no real problem for them; they just accepted, or chose 
simply to ignore, the apparent contradiction. Yvonne, for example, did not want to 
be bored in heaven, and so hoped she would have something to do; by which she 
meant in a physical way looking after things or people. I pointed this out to her, 
and she recognised the point. But this only led her to think of the spiritual life as 
somehow needing a kind of bodily expression. Duncan puts the paradox in these 
terms. 
I tend to think of it [the afterlife] as more of a spiritual existence. ... I often 
sort of think of them ... as physical beings, and in that sense you sort of 
give them [pause] that gives it some sort of physical credence. But [pause] 
I can‟t really believe that people exist in a physical existence as we would 
know it. ... But obviously when you think of people you think of them 
physically, [pause] but that‟s a construct of your own mind isn‟t it?  
In answering a question about whether relationships will be maintained, 
Joselyn expects „to meet up with people who have left before me at some point‟. 
When asked how her grandmother would recognise her (never having seen 
Joselyn as anything other than a child), she answered that „She‟ll just see me as 
me. She‟ll know that I‟m Joselyn, and I‟ll know she‟s my Gran.‟ Another 
example of how all things cannot, and need not be explained. Jacob argued that 
with people he had been close enough to on earth, „emotionally and spiritually‟, in 
the afterlife he would „be able to recognise [them] even if, you know, the physical 
presence wasn‟t there‟. 
Katie realised the tension between spiritual and physical existence when 
considering how people would meet in the afterlife. She had seen reunion in 
heaven as the film Titanic showed it: when the old lady (a Titanic survivor) dies, 
she ends up back in the ship ballroom as the young woman, with her lost love 
(and Titanic victim). „But they‟re all there physically aren‟t they? You can see all 
the bodies. And yet I said to you before that I didn‟t believe that people would ... 
recognise them physically. And yet when I watched that film I did.‟ Laura said,  
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I suppose I tend to think of it more as a spiritual existence with possibly 
some kind of physical manifestation but not necessarily looking or having 
a solid body as we do now. Because what age would you be? Would you 
revert to youth, or would you look like when you died? So I think of some 
kind of physical form but it‟s a bit insubstantial, and not terribly well 
defined.  
But she was clear that individuals would be recognisable, not least because the 
soul is „a separate entity from the physical body we have now, but in some kind of 
recognisable shape (laughter) [pause]. As opposed to a kind of, you know, bit of 
cloud or vapour, or ectoplasm.‟ So for Laura, the soul would be recognisable as 
„you‟. 
Claire realised that in the afterlife people would want to continue to be able 
to enjoy some of the things they had in this life, which led her at least partially 
down the line of Allan‟s individual heavens. „I picture sort of people‟s heavens 
being different in a way, because what‟s heaven for you, didn‟t somebody say, 
could be hell for me.‟ She pictures initially „being at peace and very joyous‟, but 
then „being able to do things that I want to do, that I love doing. So ... you see, 
yes, I think ... heaven is going to be different for different people. Quite how that 
all connects I don‟t know. ... is that a very earthly impression of me doing my 
knitting and sewing in heaven [laughter]?‟ I asked her how she would enjoy 
sewing in heaven if she was not in a physical form. „That‟s easy, I couldn‟t could 
I? Hmmm. These are hard questions [laughter].‟ But again, there was no real 
problem in realising the contradiction. Patricia was clear that in the afterlife we 
obviously won‟t have physical eyes and ears, but the soul must have these 
abilities incorporated somehow, so that we can „see‟ and „hear‟ others and meet 
with them: a bit like heightened perceptions. 
 Non-systematic and Practical Faith 
It is important to recognise that systematic theology is not an organising 
principle for ordinary theologians. Faith can, should, and in fact does have a very 
significant non-cerebral component: non-propositional theology is important and 
valid. D. J. Davies contrasts „scholarly systematization of belief with what 
ordinary people experience in clustered bits and pieces‟.162 He also emphasises 
the importance of context: „if we listed the beliefs held by individuals we might 
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well find that they form an odd collection when viewed critically, but within the 
context of that person‟s own life history and contemporary life-circumstance they 
find their natural home and work well.‟163 It is certainly my experience that 
ordinary Christians can hold together quite happily views on various aspects of 
theology which in systematic terms would appear contradictory. Duncan Forrester 
claims that „Theology ... is not some great theory of everything to which believers 
are expected to give their consent.‟ Rather, „we live with and by fragments of 
truth and insight, making a variety of patterns, and offering important, disturbing 
and challenging glimpses of illumination, guidance, encouragement and hope.‟164 
Astley claims that the important thing for a Christian believer is to „produce a 
theology that they can believe in and live by, in their own context and their own 
times. No one can do that sort of theology for you.‟165  
Nearly all of these ordinary theologians have a non-physical view of the 
afterlife, but this is not a „pure‟ concept. There is also a clear desire to have 
certain elements of continuity with this life that can only be expressed in physical 
ways. Thus, we will be able to „see‟ other people, to „hear‟ music, to sew and 
read. Of course, in one sense this means simply that it is impossible to conjecture 
an absolutely different form of existence without using our present concepts, 
experience and knowledge. However, it also suggests that the contrast between 
the physical afterlife proposed by Tom Wright, and the non-physical afterlife 
expounded by these (and, according to survey data, many other
166
) ordinary 
theologians, is not as complete as it may at first appear. Continuity and 
discontinuity between this life and the next means, inevitably, a spectrum of 
physicality within the non-physical. Or, from Wright‟s perspective, a spectrum of 
non-physicality within the physical. It is not simply one or the other.  
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3.4 FURTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AFTERLIFE 
In their social and cultural history of heaven, McDannell and Lang show that 
two major images have dominated: the theocentric (solitary beatific experience of 
God) and the anthropocentric (a social world of reunion with others). These two 
views are present throughout Christian history, becoming stronger and weaker as 
cultural and social factors determine. They exist together, but one never totally 
dominates or eliminates the other. Both are necessary within the tradition; the 
pendulum swings back if one is over-emphasised at the expense of the other. „A 
basic tension occurs at the heart of Christian mentality – a tension foreshadowed 
in its founder‟s injunction to love both God and neighbour.‟ 167 It is clear that 
these ordinary theologians are primarily anthropocentric in their views of the 
afterlife.  
A Social Afterlife – The Anthropocentric View  
Nearly everyone interviewed conceived of the afterlife as a social 
environment, with the majority seeing this as re-union of family and friends. 
Imogen, for example, said, „I would hope very much that I would meet up with 
my father and most of my relatives again. Not necessarily all of them, but I would 
certainly like to meet up with a number of friends who have been helpful, if for no 
other reason than just to say thank you.‟  
However, two people gave an alternative view. Gregory had „never thought 
about a collective existence. ... I‟ve just thought about individuals in their 
compartments and not really coming together with anybody else.‟ Hermione can‟t 
see how a social but spiritual afterlife can work. „I mean if you‟re not in a 
physical form I can‟t sort of envisage that you‟ve got little blobs floating around, 
you know, recognising each other in the same way.‟ She would like to think that 
you would meet up with people in the afterlife, but is not totally convinced that 
you‟d be able to recognise other non-physical beings.  
The majority social view itself had two variations. Most thought that you 
would meet the same people in the afterlife that you had known on earth, and that 
those earthly relationships would be resumed. However, some thought that one‟s 
earthly relationships would not necessarily obtain. Patricia suggested that perhaps 
one could choose whether or not to maintain a particular relationship. Ursula and 
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Laura believe that the nature of relationships in the afterlife would be so much 
better than on earth that special one-to-one relationships such as husband and wife 
would no longer be necessary; the same quality of relationship would be available 
to all. In the group meeting, Martin introduced the matter of his grandfather who 
had had three wives and who certainly did not want to look after them all in the 
afterlife. Ursula commented that „I don‟t think you‟ll be married in heaven.‟ She 
continued that, if in heaven, „I meet Martin and I meet [husband] I will love them 
equally, and ... they will love me equally.‟ 
Both these views (and the idea of family reunion in general) appear to be 
based on the same premise: that high quality human relationships, which are most 
especially glimpsed on earth in good family relationships, will be continued in the 
afterlife. One viewpoint sees these relationships as being so important that they 
will be replicated with the same people in the afterlife; the other viewpoint sees 
them as being so important that all relationships in heaven will be like this. Also, 
of course, a person adopting the second viewpoint might be inclined to do so 
either because they want a less than satisfactory earthly relationship to be 
replaced, or because they want a wonderful earthly relationship to be expanded. 
This view of relationships is also a reasonable interpretation of Mark 12:8-27 and 
parallels, the question about marriage and the afterlife.  
Perhaps not with Everybody  
Several people raised the relationships problem that Allan resolved with his 
individual heavens. Hermione asked, „what if you met somebody [in heaven] you 
didn‟t like, who had done something wrong to you in the previous existence?‟ 
Even if this person had repented, Hermione still doubted she would like to resume 
such a relationship. Yvonne wondered how you could possibly want to meet a 
murderer, for example. Katie also was sure that you couldn‟t just meet everybody 
in the afterlife. „No, in my mind, just the people I would want to meet.‟ Patricia 
thought she „will be able to know who the loved ones I want to be with are, and I 
won‟t be with those that don‟t want to be with me and I don‟t want to be with 
them.‟ 
This was actually the key issue for Alice in eventually arriving at her overall 
view of the afterlife.  
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You think, well, how can heaven be so fantastic if people are going to be 
arguing with one another, and husbands and ex-wives meeting up. ... It 
can‟t be like that, it must be peaceful, and somewhere where you really 
want to go. I‟m sure people must think, „Oh, I don‟t want to go to heaven 
if I have to see him again‟. So it can‟t be like that, because if you think of 
abused children and abusive parents, there‟s no way that heaven can be 
like that at all.
168
  
 
Vaguely Theocentric – The Possible Presence of God 
The interviewees were asked whether they would meet God and/or Jesus in 
the afterlife. A few were clear that they would. Nora saw this view as an essential 
part of being a Christian; God has to be part of the afterlife, „overlooking‟ it. 
Imogen and Ursula were also sure of meeting God in the afterlife, and Jacob said, 
„It would be nice to think that either or both would be there.‟ In the group 
meeting, Ursula commented that „surely as Christians it [the afterlife] must be 
about meeting God?‟  
However, some people doubted that God or Jesus would, or even should, be 
present. Allan gave a logical, if extraordinary, reason for thinking this.  
If we did ever meet them there wouldn‟t be anybody to believe in 
anymore, because we would already know them in a personal sense. And 
if we did meet them there wouldn‟t be any more ultimate questions; there 
wouldn‟t be anything to search for. 
For Allan, the afterlife would become boring if we found God there. He sees a 
continuing need, beyond death, to seek and strive to understand. Meeting God 
would actually be a bit of a let-down really, leaving us with nothing else to do or 
believe in. „The ultimate being wouldn‟t be ultimate anymore.‟ 
Janet does not believe God or Jesus will be in the afterlife, because „I think 
of them as somewhere else again. ... I‟ve never sort of put the two of them in the 
same place.‟ What she seems to mean by this is that the afterlife is actually a 
human place, and that God would be somewhere else, or perhaps everywhere in a 
more general sense. Others also thought that God and Jesus would be there, but 
that, rather than a direct meeting, there would simply be a general awareness of 
God. Gregory believes that God must be present, „otherwise the whole thing‟s a 
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bit pointless I think‟; but he was unsure about any direct meeting. Irene „would 
say God‟s presence is there‟ and that people will be aware of this. Alice also 
believes that we will feel their presence spiritually, but wouldn‟t meet them face 
to face. Claire imagines it, „more as ... sort of a being at oneness rather than ... as 
sort of me meeting you‟.  
Duncan presents a very interesting argument against the theocentric view. 
„The older I get the more I feel that God is here now, and it‟s more of a 
continuum.‟ He then made it very clear that, in his opinion, this life must not be 
seen simply as waiting to meet with God in the afterlife. In other words, the future 
promise of beatific vision must not distract us from the value and wonder of this 
present life, which is also lived in the presence of God.  
Several people raised practical issues in relation to the idea of meeting God, 
many of them physical in nature despite their non-physical conception of the 
afterlife. Yvonne stated that God „must be a very busy person. I mean, there‟s 
millions of people, so how does he see them all at once. Do you have to queue 
up? [laughter]‟ Martin said, „I think it is unlikely that we‟ll meet Jesus in that 
form, in the form of Jesus, because there is such a vast area and large number of 
people to look after or see to.‟ He would be there, but we wouldn‟t meet him; he 
would be too busy, like the Queen. 
For others, the problem was how we could be important enough to warrant 
an actual meeting. Joselyn thought „they might be there but, ... I‟m just a real 
speck of dust, ... I don‟t think I‟ve done anything so spectacular in my life that 
they would want to meet me.‟ In similar vein, Katie asks „why would he [Jesus] 
just want to meet me, you know, when there are so many other deserving souls?‟  
In the preface to the second edition, McDannell and Lang report that a key 
reaction of readers to their book, which many have shared with the authors, has 
been an expectation that they will meet their loved ones again. They contrast this 
with what they see as a continued public scepticism of theologians on this matter. 
They believe theologians generally criticise the anthropological heaven and 
maintain a more abstract theocentric heaven.  
We, however, believe it is the theologians that are naïve. It is the 
anthropocentric view of heaven that has been the most widely articulated 
perspective. The expectation of being reunited with family and friends in 
heaven is so prevalent throughout Christian history that it is not surprising 
that contemporaries see it as the “natural” notion of life everlasting. 
…That one meets family and friends after death requires, for most people, 
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no explanation. What does need to be accounted for, what needs argument 
and explanation, is precisely the “professional‟s heaven,” the theocentric 
notion. It is the heaven of the eternal contemplation of God that requires 
more ink to be spilled, more biblical passages to be cited, and more 
elaborate descriptions to be drawn.
169
  
The ordinary eschatology disclosed in this project is primarily 
anthropocentric. There was remarkably little expectation of the beatific vision.  
Judgement or Not? 
The interviewees were asked whether they thought everyone experiences the 
same afterlife, and whether there is any form of judgement or punishment in the 
afterlife. A wide range of responses were received, ranging from the majority 
universalist view (all will be „saved‟ because God loves us too much for it to be 
otherwise),
 170
 to a minority view of a real objective judgement for the worst of 
earthly actions (because God could not allow such people to taint the wonderful 
afterlife).
 171
 
The most popular response was that there is no judgement: the same afterlife 
is the destiny of all, irrespective of moral or religious background (universalism). 
The usual reasoning for this was the idea of God as essentially loving.
172
 For 
example, Nora said, „I do believe he‟s a kind God, he‟s a loving God. And I do 
believe that‟s the difference maybe between the New Testament and the Old 
Testament. The afterlife is for everybody. There is no judgement, no.‟ Gregory 
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said, „if it happens [the afterlife] to one, it happens to all.‟ Grace is sure that all 
will be in heaven, the good and the bad, „because the Bible says God forgives all 
the wrongs that people have done.‟ Alice was clear that hell and „limbo‟ were 
impossible, even though these were ideas that she was brought up with. „I just 
don‟t believe a loving God would do that to you. ... I just don‟t think it‟s 
possible.‟173  
James does not think that someone would be deprived of their soul because 
they haven‟t had a Christian upbringing. The benefit for James of having lived a 
faithful or good life is that in heaven you will enjoy better the attitude of other 
souls toward you. Yvonne also was clear that heaven is for all. „Seems a bit of a 
lottery, [if] only certain people are introduced to Christianity and it‟s only them 
that can go and meet God.‟174 However, the inevitable tension of a universalist 
position was highlighted by Hermione, who thought there must be some kind of 
judgement, because, if not, „then what real difference does it make whether you 
believe in God or you don‟t believe in God?‟ But Hermione is not at all certain 
how it could work, „because there are too many people in this world who never 
had the same opportunities to know God, in times gone by. You can‟t just wipe 
them out just for that reason. ... But, to think that absolutely everybody gets [to 
the afterlife], then I don‟t actually see what the point of it all was.‟175 
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 Lindsey Hall, Swinburne‟s Hell and Hick‟s Universalism: Are We Free To Reject God? (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2003) concludes that universalism is ultimately necessary because God has to make the best 
possible world, and this is one in which all are saved. Rather than rely on universalist passages of 
Scripture, or on universalist interpretations of separatist passages, Hall argues that „What is more 
important, and I suggest gives greater strength to the universalist position, is the overall message of the 
Bible‟ (p. 203). She bases this on her perception of an ongoing process of salvation by God, showing 
divine patience and determination; her view that God is a God of love; and her belief that the advent of 
Jesus is good news for the whole world. 
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 It is clear to these ordinary theologians that specific and conscious knowledge of Christ is essential 
neither for living a good life nor for final salvation. The extent to which such people might be 
unconsciously influenced by Christ was unclear. See C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (Glasgow: Collins, 
1987); cf. Karl Rahner, Later Writings, Theological Investigations 5, trans. Karl-H. Kruger ( London: 
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966) for his views of „anonymous Christianity‟. 
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 A non-universalist argument is that there must be some point to moral action, and that right action by 
a Christian is necessary for a favourable final judgement (Mt. 25:31-46). The universalist may argue that 
moral action in this world is a reward in itself: it both proclaims the Gospel and makes it visible in 
human society. Newbigin, Gospel in a Pluralist Society, argues that we have a responsibility to show 
God‟s love in this world, and not simply for reasons of final judgement. The issue of epistemic distance 
from God in this life is also relevant here: that is, the „hiddenness‟ of God to human lives. For Hick, 
(Evil and the God of Love), this is a necessary condition of having free-will so that we can truly develop 
as moral creatures. See also his „An Irenaean Theodicy‟, in Davis (ed.), Encountering Evil; cf. C. Robert 
Mesle, John Hick‟s Theodicy: A Process Humanist Critique (New York: St. Martins Press, 1991). 
Lindsey Hall agrees that epistemic distance is necessary for free will, but that this is simply to allow us 
to develop as persons so that a real choice can be made when we meet God face to face at death. She 
rejects Hick‟s notion that a prolonged period of successive soul-preparing lives are necessary – 
Swinburne‟s Hell, 211-12.  
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A number of people put forward a view of self-judgement, or at least a 
necessary self-awareness of earthly failings. Imogen said that religion is certainly 
not a basis for judgement. „I think the ones that have no religion whatsoever have 
the chance of knowing something different in the afterlife. I can‟t see God saying 
“sorry, you weren‟t one of us on earth so you don‟t come here.”‟ However, there 
would be a kind of self-judgement. „I think a number of things that I‟ve done, 
said, or not done [pause] I would rather like to have a chance to put them right. 
Having learned from experience that I could have handled that better, if I‟d 
thought a bit more about it.‟ Joselyn doesn‟t really worry about it, but just wants 
„to make it. You know, I don‟t want to not make it.‟ She believes the only thing 
that could prevent her from making it to heaven is herself. „I am expecting a 
judgement, and yet God‟s grace, he wouldn‟t do that [said with emotion].‟ There 
is no hell; it is heaven or not heaven. Not being inside heaven would be a kind of 
hell (looking in from the outside), but maybe, she wonders, even then one could 
come back in at some point? Perhaps there will be a form of judgement, but „I 
don‟t think they‟re going to boil in hell or burn forever. I just think they‟ll know 
that they haven‟t made it, and there cannot be anything worse than that.‟ She 
thinks this judgement is not from God, but from oneself. „I don‟t think God would 
chuck you out. I think you would prevent yourself from going in; you would be 
aware. And that worries me occasionally.‟ So for Joselyn, self-exclusion is the 
worst outcome of self-judgement.
 176
  
Vera thought there may well be suffering in the afterlife due to memories of 
bad actions. When you die, „maybe you would suddenly see what you‟d been like. 
And maybe that would be punishment in itself wouldn‟t it?‟ Ursula was clear that 
people can come to God at any point, and would not be denied. She was also clear 
that judgment should not be part of what the church teaches about LAD. 
However, „I think for some people, when they die, they will have to understand 
what they did, and maybe feel sorry about it, but [pause] I think they‟ll be able to 
see a much bigger picture and to realise that ... [it] can be put right and won‟t 
matter anymore.‟ Laura would  
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 Tom Wright (Surprised by Hope, 190-6) argues that the theological worm has now turned against the 
liberal theology of universalism, due to the recent general failure of liberal optimism in human society. 
A form of divine judgement is essential as the only alternative to human chaos. However, Wright argues 
for a new concept rather than the traditional eternal hell, or the liberal universalism, or the midway 
„conditional immortality‟. This new concept is effectively self-destruction, self de-humanisation to the 
point where one can simply exclude oneself from the God-centred future of a new heavens and earth.  
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prefer to believe that, ... when I die that‟s it. Because if I carry on, I may 
have some explaining to do, or justification for the things that I have done, 
and knowingly done wrong, and have repeatedly done wrong. ... The 
punishment I think is in recognising what you have done wrong, and 
actually your own feelings about that, ... your own self-recrimination. No 
it‟s not a very comfortable thought actually, thinking that you will carry on 
and have to explain yourself.  
Laura thinks there might be a separate place where people go who have been 
judged, but this would be a place where a second chance was always available.  
I don‟t think I believe in a kind of traditional and eternal hell [pause]; it 
doesn‟t really gel with a sort of God of love. I mean there may be some 
kind of reformatory that you go to for a while, until you‟ve kind of caught 
up, or come to acknowledge what you perhaps were unwilling to 
beforehand. But I would hope or expect that there would always be the 
opportunity for you to, I suppose, repent, in effect and move on, even if it 
took a long time to do it.
177
  
A few thought a more objective form of judgement would apply. Charles 
thought there was relevant evidence from ghosts: „Somewhere their soul or spirit 
is being maltreated until such time as the problem gets sorted out.‟ Jacob thought 
a real judgement would apply, but only to a very specific group of people. His 
father was not a churchgoer, but he was a good man, so he would be all right. 
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 The notion of a post-mortem preparatory period, or purgatory, is still a contentious issue. Jerry L. 
Walls, Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) chpt. 2, argues for the 
benefits of an interim period of preparation for entry to the full presence of God, a period that would not 
deny human will and responsibility, and which could transform even wasted lives. Purgatory is not set 
forth explicitly in Scripture, but this does not mean it can be totally dismissed if it is a reasonable 
inference from important truths that are clearly found there. John Polkinghorne, The God of Hope, 111, 
argues that during the (presumably very long) time in which the souls of the dead (information patterns) 
are held in the mind of God, „God‟s love will be at work, through the respectful but powerful operation 
of divine grace, purifying and transforming the souls awaiting resurrection in ways that respect their 
integrity. Ultimately, what has been lost will be restored and what of good was never gained will be 
bestowed.‟ David Brown, „No Heaven Without Purgatory‟, Religious Studies 21 (1985), 447-456, 
argues that if moral perfection (necessary for life in the presence of God) were achieved by 
instantaneous transformation post-mortem then we would not be the same person; so a lengthy period of 
transformation is required. However, Hall (Swinburne‟s Hell, 208-9) argues that we do not need moral 
perfection but only the desire to do God‟s will. The face-to-face meeting with God following death is 
the key transformative process, although it may necessarily be more gradual for some than others. This 
is directly contrary to Hick‟s view of a necessary pareschaton comprising a succession of many lives to 
facilitate continuing spiritual preparation. „If we were faced with a limitlessly open future .... what we 
now know as human nature would be transformed out of existence‟ (Death and Eternal Life, 413). 
Wright (Surprised by Hope, 178-83) sees purgatory as a non-biblical mistake: there is no category 
distinction of Christians in heaven/paradise awaiting resurrection. Bodily death is a destruction of all 
that is sinful, and Paul means this present life to function as a purgatory. However, Carlos Eire, A Very 
Brief History of Eternity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 110, argues that „What 
Luther rejected as a medieval invention was actually an ancient practice.‟ Eire claims the idea of post-
mortem purgation was widespread in the 4
th
 century and that Augustine accepted it and promoted it. 
Jacques Le Goff, The Birth of Purgatory, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1984), dates the origin of purgatory to the twelfth century; but Eire claims that Le Goff means a 
locus, a distinct place in the cosmos and that Le Goff accepts that the idea of purgation or the practice of 
praying for the dead can be found among early Christians (Brief History of Eternity, 119). 
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Also, there is no problem from Jacob‟s point of view in having a different 
religion; Christianity does not have the monopoly on good people. However, he 
draws the line very clearly at rapists or people who hurt children. The key reason 
for this involves his very family-centred view; he definitely would not like such 
people to be near his family in the afterlife. In other words, the family concern 
and paternal protectiveness that he displays in this life, Jacob continues into the 
next. He was conscious of feeling a tension about this; he thought, on the one 
hand, that even people like this should perhaps be given a second chance; but, on 
the other, he doubted that they could change and so would not want to risk them 
being in the afterlife. Janet echoed this perspective even more clearly, and 
expanded the criteria for those who would be judged. Those who have done 
wrong in this life will not enjoy as nice an afterlife as the rest. „If you‟re a good 
member of society and you do the right things, you‟re looked after.‟ But if you‟re 
a bad person, „they certainly don‟t go to the [nice] place I‟m thinking of.‟ There 
will be something else for them, „because if they‟re like that in this world then, 
you know, they would be like that in the afterlife - and they‟re not where I‟m 
thinking of.‟ So undesirable people would not be allowed to spoil Janet‟s family-
centred, wonderful afterlife.
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From the group meeting a different overall impression was gained. It was 
clear that this was a key question for some, but it seemed to relate more to their 
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 The key point here is that, unlike classical theological defences of judgement (separatism), it is not 
the justice of God which is the issue, but rather the exclusive nature of a pleasant social afterlife. Tony 
Walter, The Eclipse of Eternity – Religion and Death in the Modern Era (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1995), 127, is clear that „the romantic concept of bereavement has legitimated a particular idea of 
heaven as reunion.‟ The key development took place before secularisation; the Victorian age, the 1930‟s 
depression, and the Second World War are key. „The more people expected to find love and health and 
happiness, and the more they were disappointed by the unequal distribution of health and wealth to meet 
such expectations, the more heaven became the happy life they did not have on earth. This is not so 
much a secularisation as a de-Christianisation of heaven and hell.‟ Walter suggests the early demise of 
hell in protestant churches can be explained by this. In Roman Catholic churches the whole family 
usually attended, but to be a protestant is to make a choice and leave others „outside‟. Hell therefore has 
to go, a move accelerated by the range and number of protestant denominations and the protestant denial 
of purgatory (which provided a redeeming intermediate phase of the afterlife). Hell lasted to the 1960s 
in Roman Catholic churches, but in protest churches it was finished off by the First World War; millions 
of British men could not have died for their country only to go to eternal punishment, and Anglican 
priests conducting the vast numbers of funerals did not suggest this. Roger Grainger, „To be dead is not 
enough‟, in Peter Jupp and Tony Rogers (eds.), Interpreting Death: Christian Theology and Pastoral 
Practice (London: Cassell, 1997), 35, argues that heaven is socially necessary. „Somehow it has to exist. 
No-one likes the idea of simply “dropping into nothingness”.‟ We want to protect our loved ones, „to 
hand them over to a greater love than they have known until now.‟ Alister McGrath, A Brief History of 
Heaven (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), ch. 5, agrees with others that the key way in which heaven has been 
seen is as a consolation, and in particular as a reunion with family. But he suggests that this goes back to 
classical times, especially Cicero‟s Scipio‟s Dream and the idea of crossing the river Styx to the 
underworld.  
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concern for loved ones who had died rather than for their own destiny. The 
majority at the group meeting strongly affirmed that there would be no judgement 
or punishment; how could there be from a loving God? However, I suspect doubts 
persist for some, and that people were less willing to express these doubts in the 
open meeting.  
Active, or Not? 
What would we do in the afterlife? Responses to this question reflected not 
only the non-physical view of the afterlife, but also the wish of some to retain 
physical elements, without apparent contradiction. The key distinction was 
between those who wanted an active afterlife; and those who saw the afterlife as 
completely different to this life, and therefore wholly inactive. Nora questioned 
whether we would need to do anything, because we would be non-physical.  
I think it‟s a spiritual being in the afterlife and I don‟t think they actually 
have to do anything. ... I don‟t see them living a life the way that we live 
on earth, no. And I don‟t see them changing or growing or developing 
because what would they then grow into? Would they then grow up again, 
or grow even older? That‟s not how I picture it at all.  
Alice was perhaps the clearest in seeing a completely non-active, but entirely 
peaceful afterlife. We won‟t do anything except enjoy peace and serenity.179 
Interestingly, though, the analogy she gave for this was a time in the Lake District 
when she felt complete peace and contentment in beautiful surroundings: in other 
words, in a physical environment. Bernard thought that a physical being was 
obviously required before one could do things like rugby; so in the (non-physical) 
afterlife, such things couldn‟t happen. The only kinds of activity would be things 
like listening to music, which would be possible in the afterlife because musicians 
will be there and „You would hope that all that talent doesn‟t die with the physical 
being.‟ How this would actually happen in a non-physical existence was not an 
issue for Bernard. An eternal afterlife for Bernard would not be boring; it would 
be happy and fulfilled, mentally and spiritually. Patricia had a view similar in 
some ways to the „individual heavens‟ of Allan. For her, the afterlife will present 
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 Paul and Linda Badham (Immortality or Extinction?, 61) point out that „“eternal rest” is by far the 
most common description of the life of heaven, followed closely by allusions to endless services of 
Christian worship‟, which leads to the issue of boredom. They argue that the beatific vision is not very 
appropriate to most of us who are not practised in contemplation. So the traditional heaven „is only 
intelligible as an ultimate goal, rather than as a life that follows on from our present existence. Hence the 
Christian vision of heaven has to be supplemented by speculation about what other kind of life after 
death might be possible.‟  
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the opportunity to do anything one wanted, any of the things we enjoyed doing on 
earth. This will be achieved by our ability to recall them, not by our physical state. 
We won‟t actually have bodies, ears, and eyes; and there won‟t be concert halls or 
sports stadiums. But, we will have them in memory; so we (our soul) can „think‟ a 
rugby match, although not actually play it. 
Several others could only envisage an afterlife in which they were active, yet 
still apparently entirely non-physical. Imogen sees personal development as 
necessary in the afterlife, because this is such a key characteristic of this life (and 
so would be continued to the next). In the afterlife, we will live „another totally 
different existence but in the same sort of way, as a journey, like this [life] is a 
journey.‟ For Imogen, this earthly life „is the learning part for something that we 
can do better, or different.‟ She then suggested a remarkable connection with 
continuing earthly life: God may want us, in the afterlife, to be useful to 
somebody who needs help in this life, in the same way that she has been helped 
(in this life) by her dead father. Sadly, lots of mothers and fathers would be 
incapable in the afterlife of giving much help to their earthly offspring, „because 
they weren‟t in this life‟. So others will be needed to fulfil this role, and this is the 
activity that Imogen expects. She later clarified that this could also involve 
helping those in the afterlife with her. „I can‟t imagine God allowing anybody to 
just stagnate. ... he doesn‟t allow us to stagnate in this one. I can‟t imagine him in 
the next one allowing us to just float around doing nothing. I would hope not 
anyway, I would be extremely bored.‟ Claire also saw the afterlife as a 
„furtherance of the journey‟, „another phase.‟ She hopes to have lots of answers 
there, and supposes that people will develop.
180
  
Jacob cannot envisage an afterlife without productive work; how could we 
just sit about all day? We need to have some work and there has to be some kind 
of order; we have to be doing things and helping each other and building 
relationships. „There has to be a reason, I mean there‟s no sense in existing with 
no purpose.‟ Of course, the physical/non-physical tension always arises in 
thinking of activity in the afterlife. Jacob resolved this in a way similar to the 
individual afterlife idea of Allan.  
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 This strong emphasis by some on continuing moral and spiritual development in the afterlife suggests 
echoes with Hick‟s pareschatological many-lives idea. However, for these ordinary theologians, such 
development is desirable and possible in a single continuous existence post mortem.  
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I think you can think about things; you can think, if this doesn‟t sound too 
daft, you can think about things which become quite real. ... I mean there‟s 
loads of days when I think I could do this and do that and I realise how I‟m 
going to do it. 
Jacob was clear about the purpose of the afterlife. „To give meaning to the life 
we‟ve already had on earth I think. I mean if there just wasn‟t anything, this part 
of our life is quite meaningless as well, isn‟t it?‟  
Dawn, however, could think of nothing worse than a working life being 
continued in heaven. „Well I‟m not blooming well working I tell you that, ... but I 
don‟t want to be sitting in a green patch of grass either all the time ... because I‟d 
get bored with that. ... I‟ll have a pile of books and catch up with reading or 
something like that (laughter).‟ Similarly, Vera is absolutely sure that she is not 
going to be doing any washing up. Life in the afterlife would be more like 
„floating; a sort of being there, but not there. It would be lovely just to have 
conversations with people wouldn‟t it? I don‟t actually see you doing anything. I 
don‟t think it‟s a replica of the earth, of what we do in this world.‟ However, Vera 
also assumed (contra her non-physical view) that „it‟s going to be a kind of sunny 
place and bright colours. But I don‟t really ever imagine doing anything like 
going to the theatre or going to do my shopping, because it‟s not a worldly place. 
But I imagine it to be a nice place.‟ There could be work of a kind. „Maybe you 
have to help people. Well obviously if somebody is coming to collect you [at the 
point of death], there must be some kind of process there. Maybe you have to be 
involved with people in a different way. But not like “go to the office” kind of 
work.‟ 
The experience of time was at least implied by those who saw an active 
afterlife. For some, this posed a problem. Gregory argued that „we‟re not going to 
be in a dimension where time means the same as it does here‟. Jacob also thought 
time might be different in heaven; a million years could be like a week, so 
„forever is just like another lifetime.‟ Ursula believes that time wouldn‟t matter in 
the afterlife because there would no longer be earthly pressures such as money 
and careers, „so inevitably people would become less anxious, calmer; but have 
more time to think and discover things‟, and to reflect on their earthly life.  
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3.5 WHAT JESUS‟ RESURRECTION TELLS US 
So strong is the belief in a non-physical afterlife among the subjects of this 
study that the resurrection of Jesus is seen in a most surprising way. Only a 
minority of people believed that Jesus was not resurrected physically – that it was 
his spirit which came back and was perceived by the disciples. The majority view 
was that Jesus was physically resurrected. However, the remarkable thing about 
both positions is the belief that he came back for a brief period simply to prove 
that he had been right, to show that what he had said was true and to demonstrate 
that death was not the end of human life. In other words, his physical resurrection 
has nothing to do with the nature of the afterlife we will experience. He came 
back physically only because this was the most convincing proof for us, to show 
us emphatically that he was to be believed and that what he had taught was true. 
But after this short period of physical resurrection, he returned to a spiritual 
heaven, where we will go as souls or spirits after death for an eternal existence.  
The minority response that Jesus was not physically resurrected was to be 
expected, in that it is implied by the soul-spirit afterlife postulated by the majority 
of interviewees. For example, James thought the resurrection of Jesus was the 
basis of our belief in an afterlife, but it was not physical. He was absolutely clear 
that the disciples saw „his [Jesus‟] soul‟, and that „this is how his appearance 
would be as a spirit or a ghost.‟ James does not think that the issue of an empty 
tomb is „too relevant really. If the body is no longer necessary then it doesn‟t 
really matter.‟ Even Martin, the one person who favoured physical aspects of the 
afterlife, did not draw any physical implications from Jesus‟ resurrection. When 
asked what it meant he said only, „It‟s really that he survived death, and went on 
into the next life, so he could help us and guide us.‟ 
A large majority of respondents did see Jesus‟ resurrection in physical terms, 
but then very clearly expressed that remarkable explanation of why this was so. 
Alice believes „that Jesus did appear in bodily form to [pause] show his disciples 
and followers that he was the living God and that things that he had said and done 
were right. I think if he had just died people would‟ve thought, well he could be 
anybody. ... He came back and he is the only one who has.‟ I queried why he 
came back in a bodily, rather than a spiritual form. „Because they could have just 
said, “oh he was just any prophet”. But to come back from death was truly 
remarkable.‟ I asked Alice if Jesus‟ resurrection might also mean that physical 
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resurrection would happen to all of us. „No, [pause] because there is no way we 
are going to come back like that. That was just him, and [pause] to finish off what 
he had been trying to teach as well.‟  
Claire said, „I think if he [Jesus] had just died, the disciples at the time, the 
people at the time, would have thought, well, he‟s just died, that‟s it, he‟s gone. 
So he almost came back to underline what he‟d been saying, you know, that he 
hadn‟t died, but he‟d gone on to live with his Father in heaven.‟ Claire was sure 
that the tomb was empty; it had been a physical resurrection. She also suggested 
that this was so unbelievable that it was hard to accept, and maybe this is why the 
disciples seemed not to recognise him.  
Nora thinks that the physical resurrection of Jesus has to be seen in a broader 
sense. When he said „I am the resurrection‟, this pointed to the afterlife, „to the 
fact that as a physical body you can only be in one place at one time. But as a 
soul, ... and certainly as a spirit, Jesus was able to be dispersed, ... and able to be 
spread much, much wider and for infinity.‟ Nora believes the tomb was empty 
and that he appeared „in a physical form for a short time before he went to 
heaven. To illustrate to those, to his followers, and to Christians throughout the 
world now, that physical death is not the end, that there is life beyond that.‟  
Laura thought that Jesus  
did rise as, [pause] well, both soul and physical body; because the body 
did actually disappear and there were people who touched him. So in that 
sense, that is different from us going into an afterlife of soul because he 
was resurrected in toto. ... I think it was to demonstrate to the disciples and 
people he met at that time that it had happened. Because I think if you 
hadn‟t had his physical body – if he sort of came and went like some kind 
of ghost – the proof, that demonstration, is much less conclusive. And 
afterward it could be written off as that people just saw visions, just 
hallucinated.  
I asked Laura what happened to Jesus‟ body after this proof was exhibited? „Well, 
[pause] it seems to me that he was actually almost able to make it kind of 
disappear again.‟ Laura suggested that this is what happened in the Emmaus Road 
story, Jesus could „substantiate and de-substantiate himself‟. Jesus is now in a 
spirit afterlife. 
Hermione thought that the tomb was empty, but that the same body had not 
been used because, if it had, he would have been more easily recognised. The 
physical body, „if it is used then it has to be taken and transformed totally. ... but 
not into the same kind of physical form ... I just can‟t hold with that belief‟. 
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Hermione thinks Jesus was resurrected „to help people at that time to believe in 
something more ... I think it was done to inspire people, to [pause] maybe to 
prove that God was greater than man and could do these things, that there was 
something beyond that.‟ This happened „just to Jesus because he was the son of 
God, and just for a short period of time because he wasn‟t supposed to stay down 
here forever.‟ Jesus is now in that place where we will go to after our 
„resurrection‟, by which Hermione means not any physical resurrection, but the 
state of spiritual life that we will enjoy at the point when we are all awakened 
together from an interim period of soul-sleep.  
In my conversation with Duncan I had to press him quite hard to explain 
why Jesus‟ physical resurrection was different from the spiritual afterlife that he 
thought we would experience. This was not because he found this difficult to 
explain, but that he thought it was so obvious: it is what proves that Jesus is 
special. „The resurrection had to be proved to the people that were there ... that 
death had been conquered. ... So Jesus had to exist physically after death.‟ A 
continuing spiritual presence would not have been enough; Jesus had to be seen. 
When asked if we would also be resurrected physically, Duncan replied, „No, it 
had never crossed my mind to be honest. No, I had always accepted that [Jesus‟ 
resurrection] was a one-off.‟  
These examples illustrate a remarkably consistent view from the ordinary 
theologians in this project: a view quite at odds with the biblical teaching (1 Cor. 
15:20) that Jesus‟ physical resurrection was a foretaste and guarantee (first fruits) 
of our own final life after LAD.
181
 I was genuinely surprised when I first heard 
this view expressed, but quickly realised that it was the standard opinion. It is 
understandable in that those who accept a non-physical afterlife must give a 
different meaning to the physical resurrection of Jesus. It is, however, nonetheless 
remarkable. It certainly raises important questions about how clergy and academic 
theologians are conveying their views of church doctrine and biblical 
interpretation, and whether such views are, or should be, accepted by ordinary 
Christians. It is to the ordinary theologians‟ understanding of these issues that I 
turn next.  
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 For an example of this generally accepted interpretation see C. K. Barrett, A Commentary on the 
First Epistle to the Corinthians (London: A & C Black, 2
nd
 edition 1971), 350-1. 
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3.6 LITTLE TRUST IN ACADEMY AND CHURCH 
A particularly revealing set of answers were given to questions concerning 
the Bible and church doctrine. I asked first whether the interviewee could tell me 
what the Bible said about LAD. I then asked whether it would matter if biblical 
scholars or theologians thought something different to them. This was repeated 
from an ecclesiastical perspective: could they tell me what the church in general 
(that is, not their local church or denomination, but the wider church as they 
experience it) officially believes and teaches about LAD. And again, would it 
matter if the church view was different from theirs? Finally, I asked if church 
doctrine concerning LAD was as clear, clearer, or less clear than other church 
doctrines.  
The results of these discussions were very surprising. I say this as a reflexive 
researcher and not, I hope, solely as the long-term minister of these people. The 
vast majority of those taking part in this study are mature or elderly people with a 
life-long church experience and commitment to the Christian faith. They include 
graduates; people who hold, or have held, well-respected professional positions; 
and people who are clearly intelligent and knowledgeable in many other areas. 
Yet perhaps only one person demonstrated any detailed knowledge of the Bible in 
relation to LAD. This is not to say that these people are simply unfamiliar with 
the Bible, but rather that they could not apply a general knowledge of the 
scriptures to a specific doctrinal issue. They also demonstrated a deep scepticism 
concerning any claim to definitive biblical interpretation, as well as a very 
sceptical attitude toward official church teaching and doctrine (which is less 
surprising coming from Congregationalists who, of course, value the 
independence of the local congregation). This area of the interview often 
produced the most animated discussion and the most definite opinions, and was 
usually one of the longest sections of the interview.  
The reasons given for the scepticism of scriptural teaching were variations 
on a theme: that it was impossible to have a single correct claim concerning what 
the Bible actually says about LAD. However, the explanations given for why this 
situation obtains reflect a wide theological spectrum of attitudes toward the nature 
and use of the Bible, and provide some interesting comment on hermeneutics. 
Interestingly, or perhaps inevitably, the reasons given for scepticism concerning 
church teaching focused much more around the sense of „it is only their opinion‟.  
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A „conservative‟ theological attitude to the Bible was demonstrated by one 
person who thought that the impossibility of a single clear biblical view on LAD 
was due to technical problems of translation: in other words, a single truth is 
actually there but is hidden from our view by a lack of human skill in providing 
textual clarity and understanding.
182
 Laura believes that the Bible is more 
important than church doctrine or tradition, and that we should go back to the 
„pure original‟, to which we could return by accurate translation of the original 
languages. This text would then be definitive about such things as LAD. Laura 
thinks church doctrine in this area is a lot less clear than in others, „because the 
church doesn‟t really talk about it, not publicly‟.  
James also thought interpretation was key, but was less clear that a single 
correct interpretation was possible. He would not be too concerned if presented 
with scholars who said that the Bible was clear, and quite different to his own 
views, „because it might be that the translation has been misconstrued somewhere 
along the line‟. James would be interested to know  
what information they‟ve got, where they got it from. I wouldn‟t 
necessarily take it that they knew exactly what they were talking about. ... 
you get a lot of translations of the New Testament. Words being ... 
translated from the Hebrew, translated from the Greek, translated from the 
Latin. And different people translate it in different ways. So ... it can be a 
bit ambiguous about what they are getting and I‟d like to know more 
information.  
James struggled to see how he could be persuaded of a church doctrine of LAD 
that was different to his own views, even if the Pope and the Archbishop of 
Canterbury explained it to him. He also said that the doctrine of LAD was just as 
clear as other church doctrines, which presumably means that the view of experts 
on other doctrines would be equally incapable of influencing or challenging his 
views.  
Yvonne produced a conspiratorial perspective on why the single clear LAD 
view (which must be there somewhere) was still not available. Perhaps it was 
being obscured deliberately by controversial extra-biblical sources being hidden 
„back in the Vatican somewhere‟. She also conjectured that perhaps the evidence 
which would clarify things about LAD simply had not been found yet, but that 
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documents or other archaeological evidence might be one day. For the time being, 
if the church or the Bible clearly said something different from her, she would 
„listen to their views and make up my own decision. ... They wouldn‟t be telling 
me what it was; they would be saying this is what they think, and I‟m quite 
entitled to say what I think. And I might agree with them or disagree with them.‟   
Gregory recognised that there are competing and contradictory views within 
the Bible, and so argued that certain bits of Scripture should be considered 
definitive and authoritative. For him this meant that we can find reliable teaching 
only in Jesus‟ words, and „whatever else there is, is speculation‟. Gregory did not 
see in the church „any official view different from mine: that the soul lives on or 
the spirit lives on.‟ I asked what if, for example, it was shown that 1 Cor. 15 
means that when you die, you sleep until a single future physical resurrection? „If 
they‟re all going to say we‟re all going to be physically resurrected at some time 
in the future, I think, no, I can‟t take that. It doesn‟t seem plausible, logical, or 
any good reason for it. I‟d be very sceptical. They‟d have to do a bit better than 
that before I started to change my mind [laughter].‟ I asked him to expand. He 
replied: 
One sentence from somebody [Paul] saying this is going to happen is 
certainly not going to convince me. I need a lot more than that. If that was 
the established view I‟d say, no, I‟m not going to accept that, no, 
nonsense. ... I‟d need a lot more. ... I think I‟d need some words from Jesus 
that had been reported by various people, then, you know, I might think 
about it.  
The lack of biblical clarity concerning LAD was explained by Joselyn in an 
interesting way. It is to do with revelation. Joselyn said that if biblical scholars 
were to say something very different from what she thinks, „I would probably just 
say, well, that‟s how you think about it, but it isn‟t how I think about it, and we 
agree to differ.‟ If church doctrine contradicted her views, this would not be a 
problem either, and for an unusual reason. „I think if God had wanted to teach us 
about life after death he would have done it.‟ Joselyn thinks that there is no clear 
teaching on LAD because God has chosen not to make it clearly known to us. She 
is quite happy with this, and needs to know only that „I‟ve gone before you to 
prepare a place‟. She thinks that  
there is a point in your life and death where you will understand these 
things that you don‟t understand now. So I don‟t worry about it. I know 
that I will be given that information, if that‟s the right word, at the relevant 
time, at a time when it‟s necessary for me to know.  
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As well as lack of clarity, there was also mention of an apparent scarcity of 
LAD teaching, in the Bible. Alice said, „I‟ve looked and I find it very difficult to 
find anything very much.‟ She referred to Jesus saying on the cross „today you 
will be with me in paradise‟, and the text about looking in a glass darkly but then 
seeing clearly. „But it doesn‟t really say what it‟s going to be like. I haven‟t found 
anything that says this is what is going to happen, ... apart from the New 
Jerusalem. But that doesn‟t mean anything to you and me because we don‟t know 
the old Jerusalem.‟ 
The most common explanation of the impossibility of a single biblical view 
was that it is ultimately all just a matter of opinion. In other words, no one 
opinion can or should prevail at any one time. The interesting question then arises 
of which interpretation should be seen as better than others, and why?  
If biblical scholars were to give a view different to Hermione‟s, she would 
consider that to be just „an opinion based on something that was written.‟ She said 
there are „contradictions in the Bible anyway‟, so she wouldn‟t just accept the 
scholarly view. „I wouldn‟t go along and say “oh well, yeah, he knows more than 
I do, so that must be right.”‟ Charles confessed, „I don‟t study the Bible that 
much‟ and went on to mention the „story of Jesus‟, Abraham living to be 900, the 
„conversion of Saul to Paul‟, and the „Revelations bit‟ in funeral services. As far 
as the church is concerned, Charles believes that the basic belief in LAD is there, 
but that each denomination expresses it differently. Within the churches it is 
individuals who express their views. If church representatives or theologians said 
that his views were incorrect, „I think I would class it as their opinions. ... I‟d 
listen to what they say and think about it, but not necessarily accept it.‟ In any 
case, he was doubtful that you would ever get them all to agree about something 
like LAD.
183
 The key thing for Charles, in judging views different from his, is that 
it has to fit with his personal life experience and what he already knows and 
understands. For Charles, this means it has to fit with his view of the supernatural, 
and his personal experience of an out-of-body event. These are primary for him.  
Irene is comfortable with the idea that she can pick and choose from biblical 
texts: it is not all equally important (for her). She explained that „the Bible can say 
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things and I‟ll take them in my own way, and, sort of like the bits I believe inspire 
my way of life through God; but I don‟t believe I have to believe every last thing 
in the Bible.‟ What the church says about LAD is unclear, but Irene is  
happy with it the way it is, because I think everyone is entitled and should 
have their own views on it. ... I‟m sure my views of the afterlife will 
change as I sort of get more experience of people dying and see it more. 
So I wouldn‟t like it to be clearer because it would just be sort of telling 
you what to believe in a sense. And personally I don‟t like that sort of 
religion where you‟re sort of told and supposed to think what‟s there.  
What the church teaches, according to Irene, is just somebody‟s own view, which 
becomes a rule. If different people ran the church, there would be different views 
and rules. „I‟d just stick to my own views from my understanding of the Bible.‟ In 
other words, Irene believes quite clearly that she has the right to form her own 
views, based on her own understanding of the Bible. Irene would be interested in 
what eminent biblical scholars could explain to her, but „I‟d like to see where they 
got if from within the Bible and read what they‟ve read and see how they have 
interpreted it, and see how I would interpret it.‟  
Irene then explained more about her own method of biblical interpretation. 
„You can take it very literally if you want, or you don‟t have to take it as literally 
if you want. ... I think it‟s very much no one has got a right or wrong 
interpretation, but it‟s right or wrong for what‟s best for you.‟ Irene went on to 
give a clear example of how this works. Forgiveness is something that she hears 
about, but it‟s putting ideas and words into practice that counts, not just thinking 
that she has got the right ideas as a Christian.
184
 „I don‟t just believe it, I feel you 
sort of have to do something with what you hear.‟ So Irene is arguing that 
theological ideas have to be tested in practice: an extraordinary example of an 
ordinary theologian explaining ordinary theology. She hasn‟t had much 
experience of death yet in her life, so she is not too clear on this issue. She can 
„hear it‟, but is not sure about it yet; it hasn‟t been tested in her practice and 
experience. The key factor in her interpretation of the Bible is what is „best for 
you‟, by which she means „Best for your understanding and best for how you 
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would do things, and go about everything, and the way you would act with what 
you hear as well.‟  
One of those most knowledgeable about the Bible is Duncan, who expressed 
a more liberal view of Scripture. He „wouldn‟t say that the messages are very 
clear‟, but pointed to the verse in John about „many rooms‟ (John 14:2), and said 
he had always liked „the Corinthians one about glass darkly‟ (1 Cor. 13:12), 
which he sees as one of the strongest indications that there is more to life than this 
life. He also liked the bit at the end of Jude (v.24), „to present you faultless before 
the presence of his glory‟. For Duncan, these verses make him think that the 
afterlife is different from this earthly life. He didn‟t think the church was very 
clear on this issue, „partly because they are such difficult concepts, particularly in 
the times we live in now. ... I think hell is quietly sidelined.‟ Duncan was not sure 
that the church can be clear in our secular society, where „clarity‟ is often what 
people want to hear. Bishop Jenkins was good because his lack of clarity 
expressed honesty about his own doubts. „I‟m always a bit suspicious about 
people who have no doubts and are clear about things.‟ Duncan is not keen on 
dogma. „How can anybody, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Pope, say with any 
certainty what happens to us when we die. I just don‟t think they can.‟ Duncan 
thought he might be open to persuasion by theologians/scholars, but then pointed 
to a big problem. „I can‟t see that ever happening because I don‟t think references 
to life after death in the Bible are particularly clear. There are loads of things in 
the Bible that aren‟t particularly clear, and in a way that‟s perhaps the point: that 
they are open to interpretation.‟185  
Nora pointed to a clear difference between the Testaments. „I think the New 
Testament, unlike the Old Testament, does not seem to think you will be judged 
... I would say mainly my belief I think is based on obviously New Testament 
teachings rather than on hellfire and damnation of any of the Old Testament.‟ If 
theologians and bishops produced a doctrine that was at odds with her own view? 
„The churches do that all the time, you know, they come out with things that we 
don‟t all believe in. ... I think I would get quite irate and get quite hot under the 
collar, but it wouldn‟t shake my faith, no. I can‟t imagine it doing that, no.‟ Nora 
believes the big voices of the Christian church get bogged down in irrelevancies 
                                                     
185
 Duncan was, I believe, referring to the idea that interpretation of biblical passages changes over time 
with changing church contexts. See above ‟Continuing Revelation‟, pages 24ff., for a discussion of 
David Brown‟s approach to continuing biblical interpretation. 
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such as the role of women and gay priests, and that this detracts from talking 
about things like LAD. She thinks the church is less clear about LAD than it is in 
other areas. It needs to be stronger and clearer, and more relevant for non-church 
people. Imogen also thought that „Churches can be very dogmatic about things 
which I consider unimportant‟, by which she means topics like homosexuality or 
abortion. She thinks the church is clear about these, but waffles about LAD. 
However, even if the whole church was very clear, she wouldn‟t just accept it, 
although she would think more about it.  
Claire believes that „The church does say there is life after death, but ... I 
think it‟s more of a personal thing. ... you can‟t sort of say “this is heaven” and 
“this is what it‟s going to be like”, you know, four walls, a roof, whatever.‟ A lot 
of the Bible is „what humans have written over the years and interpreted. So, I 
don‟t think ... the church as a whole can dictate that heaven is x, y and z. I think 
they can point us in the right direction and help us to think about it as an 
individual and as a group together.‟ Claire pointed out that there are other (extra-
biblical) sources of real guidance for her: for example, other people such as 
novelists tell us things which are true. However, she doesn‟t like being told what 
to think, and certainly not „about an afterlife that none of us have gone to and 
come back from.‟ She did not mention Jesus here. For Claire, „it‟s very much an 
individual thing as to how you perhaps envisage it, how you reconcile you‟re 
getting through this life and into the next life, and ... everybody has perhaps got a 
very different picture of it.‟ She sees the Bible „as being what people have written, 
you know, people have tried to explain what they‟ve seen, what‟s happened to 
them over the years. [pause] So it‟s not always sort of black and white. It‟s 
people‟s interpretations in the first place of what they‟ve seen over the years.‟186  
How are we to understand this level of scepticism among these ordinary 
theologians concerning the authority of biblical teaching and church doctrine? I 
suggest there are two related influences. The first is a particular aspect of 
contemporary secular culture which emphasises the role of the individual in 
choosing what she wants to believe. The second is the failure of church and 
academy to convey biblical scholarship in a meaningful and constructive way.  
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Relativism and Individualism 
Whether the secularisation paradigm of Steve Bruce provides a complete 
explanation,
187
 or whether the more nuanced views of, among others, Grace Davie 
(„believing without belonging‟,188 and later, „vicarious religion‟189), Callum 
Brown (the role of women in the swinging sixties
190
), or Robin Gill (competitive 
church building
191
), provide a more appropriate understanding, it is surely 
undeniable that formal church affiliation, and the public role of Christianity in 
contemporary British culture have undergone radical decline and change over 
recent years. To attend church and to be a practising Christian today is to do so in 
a society which largely ignores or even devalues such proclaimed views, and 
which provides numerous (and apparently equal) competing alternatives. This is a 
very different situation from the one that older Christians (the vast majority of my 
sample) remember from their early years in the church. 
There is one particular aspect of the secularisation debate which I believe is 
relevant to the findings of this study: relativism and individualism. Bruce 
considers relativism to be an absolutely vital component of the secularisation 
thesis. What he means by relativism is the status with which we view our own 
ideas in relation to those of others. „Increasingly social and cultural diversity 
combines with egalitarianism to undermine all claims to authoritative knowledge.‟ 
So,  
it is difficult to live in a world that treats as equally valid a large number of 
incompatible beliefs, and that shies away from authoritative assertions, 
without coming to suppose that there is no one truth. … The tolerance that 
is necessary for harmony in diverse egalitarian societies weakens religion 
… by forcing us to live as if there were no possibility of knowing the will 
of God.
192
  
This is why Bruce sees as inevitable the pattern of fractioning within the church, 
from sect to denomination, and from conservative to liberal theologies. However, 
the key point here is the way that personal views have gained in importance and 
standing compared to taught and received religious tradition. As Kelly puts it, part 
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of the postmodern condition is „the autonomy of the individual which is taken to 
mean that one carves out one‟s own world of meaning.‟193  
What postmodernism makes legitimate is individual processing of, and 
reflection on, received ideas, beliefs and values in relation to our own 
particular story. In present day Western society, we have permission to be 
our own person and in relation to matters of belief to do our own theology 
and not simply absorb and accept what is handed on to us.
194
 
The personal view rules: we are individual and independent meaning-makers and 
definitive interpreters of truth. This is not the position only of the younger 
participants in this project, or the more formally educated among them. It 
pervades the whole group. In other words, this element of our secular culture has, 
I suggest, influenced even those ordinary theologians with a life time of 
traditional church attendance and practice behind them. 
 However, the role of this element of secularism should not be over-stated, as 
shown by the fact that two axiomatic „Grand Statements‟ of belief were made by 
participants in the group meeting. These were not said as invitations for 
discussion, or employed to seek other opinions. Rather, they were stated as self-
evident and self-contained propositions.
195
 The first is „God loves us‟, and the 
second, „all will be well‟. Alice stated that in the afterlife, „I just know peace and 
love are the most important things. I don‟t even need to have any questions 
answered. I just believe that is what is going to happen and it‟s going to be 
wonderful.‟ 
Failure to Convey Biblical Scholarship  
I believe this data also strongly suggests a failure by church and academy to 
convey in a meaningful and constructive way the results of biblical scholarship to 
ordinary Christian people. I include myself firmly within this criticism. Nobody 
referred specifically to 1 Cor. 15, or 2 Cor. 5, or Romans 8, or Mark 12:18-27 
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(marriage in heaven). It is as if biblical teaching, academic biblical scholarship 
and the theology of the church down the ages had hardly communicated with 
them at all. In fact, the way in which biblical scholarship has been perceived by 
these ordinary theologians actually reinforces the first (secular) point of individual 
choice. That different interpretations of biblical passages are possible means only 
that none are definitive and trustworthy; that a process of translation and 
transmission of the scriptures has taken place means only that we therefore need 
the one correct translation, the pure original; that only some sources were selected 
as being canonical means only that there may be unknown or hidden sources that 
could yet change it all.  
Towards the end of Martin‟s interview, in the context of discussing what 
church doctrine says about LAD, he told me that he had prepared for his interview 
with considerable thought, and had obtained a copy of Tom Wright‟s Grove 
pamphlet. However, in trying to explain why it was so difficult for people like 
him to understand such matters, Martin emphasised (as did many others) the 
differing opinions of scholars. He thought that „there are so many different 
interpretations that ... any [his emphasis] interpretation is covered that you can 
make.‟ This is an interesting observation by a man whose career was in 
engineering. The sheer variety of academic views is a matter of significance for 
him, and is probably quite different from his experience of other, scientific 
disciplines where (usually) there would be, at any given time, one definitive and 
accepted opinion or position to learn and understand. As I have shown, these 
ordinary theologians have a deep suspicion of, and significant scepticism about, 
academic and ecclesial opinion; largely because they perceive many competing 
and contrasting interpretations of biblical teaching on this (and other) subjects. So 
why should one view be better than another, or better than theirs?  
Martin referred to the Grove pamphlet during his interview, and mentioned 
Wright talking about two recent books (by James Barr and John Bowker). Martin 
then said, „Yes, he [Tom Wright] talks of the Platonic view that the body is a shell 
which the immortal soul happens to inhabit. I agree with that.‟ Martin had, I 
think, misunderstood the second paragraph of page 21 of that pamphlet, and 
believed Wright to be a supporter of the Platonic view, rather than a severe critic 
of it. I mention this not to highlight Martin‟s misunderstanding, but to suggest that 
this is a vivid illustration that the best intentions and efforts of a reflective 
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ordinary theologian to seek help in understanding an issue of such importance as 
LAD, can be so easily thwarted by the academic fog of formal theological debate. 
Martin had also prepared for the interview by looking up „afterlife‟ in the New 
Dictionary of Christian Theology. „But there are so many things that have been 
written about it that it‟s very hard to make up your mind what the afterlife is 
about.‟ So he had concluded that he had better just put the matter to one side until 
he finds out the real answer personally.  
I‟ve only looked at the afterlife from the point of view of what Jesus said. 
And [this] has been interpreted in a number of different ways; and so you 
cannot gain, glean, any total understanding from the Bible itself. I suppose 
one has to make your own mind up that there is an afterlife and leave it at 
that, and I‟ll experience that when I get to it, if I‟m so fortunate.  
Martin had also tried to look at what the church teaches about LAD, but had 
found this equally complicated and difficult. „There are so many things [that 
have] been written about life after death, that you try, and my mind does not get 
around it.‟ Again Martin demonstrates how difficult it can be for an ordinary 
theologian to seek guidance from academic sources. The church and academy 
might do well to ask how more effective help could be offered to genuine 
enquirers such as Martin. 
 Ordinary Biblical Interpretation  
I believe that these ordinary theologians have something positive to 
contribute concerning correct biblical interpretation. Their views cannot simply be 
dismissed as the untutored ramblings of people with insufficient biblical 
knowledge: they have far greater significance. In one sense, this should be an 
obvious claim and can be supported by clear evidence of some sophisticated 
approaches to biblical interpretation. Duncan, for example, provided an 
interesting view of how belief and rationality are related, and on the importance of 
spirituality.  
There are times when you don‟t have any reason, really, for believing what 
you believe other than that you believe. ... I do believe that, however 
learned and scholarly and [pause] high-ranking or whatever, people may or 
may not be, I don‟t think ... they have any greater access to the truth, 
whatever that is, than your average punter. There are plenty of ordinary 
people who have a far greater insight into faith and spirituality and God 
than many people who are in exalted positions.
196
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This same sort of appeal to spiritual discernment as a key component of biblical 
interpretation is made (in more academic fashion) by recent reformers of 
theological education such as Farley, Lindbeck and Briggs.
197
  
Another example of a sophisticated approach is from Hermione, who puts 
forward the view that at various stages in one‟s life, a particular interpretation of 
the Bible is better (more necessary) than another. What you believe relates to 
what you experience, and both develop over time.  
When I was younger it was necessary to believe in one particular way, 
because that was more comforting to me at that age [death of her father]. 
So I think maybe in twenty years time I may have a different view again, 
because of other things that have affected, and because of, you know, the 
person I‟ve become ... I think you question all the time as well. Because 
there is no ... definite proof of how things are. 
When asked if the Bible was less clear about LAD than other areas, Nora gave a 
very interesting and sophisticated defence of the scriptures and the need for 
continuing reinterpretation.  
I think as you grow, and you mature, and your life experiences change, 
and your knowledge of the Bible changes or deepens or whatever, you see 
different things in it. So I think it‟s maybe the responsibility is back to us 
isn‟t it? We need to be reading, and to be studying, and to be reflecting. ... 
if there is a weakness it‟s on my part, it‟s not on the part of the Bible. 
But in order to see more clearly that the biblical views of these ordinary 
theologians are of importance, I return to Wright‟s approach to biblical 
interpretation. In Appendix H, I critique approaches to biblical interpretation to 
show that it is not possible to have either a neutral reading of a text, or a text 
which is not already an interpretation. The issue of world view is also critical: the 
modern scientific (pro-physical) world view is vastly different from the world 
view of first-century Palestine. This difference can have a profound effect on our 
interpretation of key texts regarding the physicality of the afterlife. Finally, there 
is a bewildering (to the ordinary theologian) array of competing „expert‟ 
interpretations of key LAD texts. The academic process itself exacerbates this 
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situation further: academic debate usually takes the form of corrections being 
offered to existing positions. So, for example, Cullmann accepts an interim period 
and disembodied existence with Christ, but wants to make sure we see it as God‟s 
gracious action and not some inherent property of the soul.
198
 Wright wants to 
stress physical continuity in the afterlife as a correction to an over-heavenly 
position.  
No wonder, then, that the ordinary theologians of this project struggle to 
accept the views of academic biblical interpretation or church doctrine. What in 
fact ordinary theologians do in deciding on the „correct‟ interpretation of a text is 
to apply simple but effective criteria. Does it work for me; and does it fit with 
other areas of my life experience and my experience of Christian faith? In other 
words, do I really believe (in) it?  
Reading Key Texts in an Ordinary Way 
I suggest that we cannot simply dismiss the apparently naïve approach to 
biblical texts by ordinary theologians. Rather, if ordinary theologians struggle to 
understand a particular biblical text or theme, or if they fail to accept one (or all) 
of the established academic interpretations of a text, then the academic and 
ecclesial communities would do well to consider carefully why this is the case. 
The results of this research suggest a number of such instances: the interpretation 
of Jesus‟ resurrection as a one-off proof of his person and work (rather than a 
foretaste of our afterlife); a non-physical afterlife in truly „spiritual‟ form; a 
dualist view of the human person as permanent soul-spirit and temporary body; an 
inclusive heaven that is social in character; a desire for continuing relationships 
with the dead.  
A simple experiment sheds further light on this situation. I wanted to see if, 
by reading some relevant biblical passages in the manner of an ordinary 
theologian, I could better understand and appreciate their interpretations. I would 
try to read them with a completely open mind, seeking to forget or ignore any 
previous academic understanding. This, of course, is an impossible ambition, but 
the result of this small experiment was nevertheless surprising. I realised that it 
was quite reasonable for the ordinary theologian to see things very differently 
from those who are immersed in academic theology.  
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Adopting this „ordinary‟ approach, the remarkable interpretation of the 
meaning of Jesus‟ resurrection in the data is actually not as surprising as one 
might first assume. There is no obvious mention in the Gospel accounts of our 
resurrection, and the impact on the disciples of Jesus‟ resurrection can certainly 
suggest that affirmation of his teaching and endorsement by God are the main 
factors. The early speeches in Acts (by Peter, Peter and John, Stephen) are not 
about our resurrection, but about a gospel of repentance and Jesus being the one 
who told us the truth because he was resurrected. The key message given by the 
resurrected Jesus was to baptise and preach the gospel of repentance, in a rather 
urgent way. The setting up of a church for the long term, or thinking about what 
happens after natural death, is markedly absent. Also, the Synoptic Gospels could 
easily be read as indicating a very short period of physical resurrection for Jesus, 
perhaps only a few days. The timescale of forty days comes only in Acts 1.  
With regard to our post-mortem condition and the nature of afterlife 
existence, it is surely undeniable that the Pauline texts, and 1 Cor.15 in particular, 
are very convoluted and complex for the ordinary reader. An interpretation of 
„spiritual body‟ as meaning an entirely different form of existence from this 
earthly physical one is a reasonable assumption for an ordinary reader to make. 
Further, from this perspective the accounts in Acts of Paul seeing the risen Jesus 
are clearly supportive of a „visionary‟ interpretation.  
I am claiming very little for this small experiment. I am not suggesting that 
an ordinary („common sense‟, or naïve) reading of Scripture is sufficient or 
definitive. However, I would suggest that less-ordinary theologians should think 
carefully before seeing any particular biblical interpretation as obvious, and think 
even more carefully about how their arguments can be understood at the 
„ordinary‟ level. It would be interesting to speculate about ways in which an 
ordinary reading of a text could add a different perspective to an academic debate 
concerning that text, and how this might be undertaken as a structured process.
199
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That is beyond the remit of this project, however, and must be left to other 
researchers. What I claim in this project is only that when ordinary theologians 
express views which clearly support one side of an academic debate (even, or 
perhaps especially, the minority opinion) over the interpretation of particular 
text(s), then this represents a real contribution to that debate and lends support to 
that side. For example, the overwhelming rejection of a physical afterlife gives 
support to the interpretation of 1 Cor. 15 and 2 Cor. 5 along the lines of Borg 
rather than Wright (see Appendix H); and the unorthodox understanding of Jesus‟ 
resurrection nevertheless finds support from Wiles.
200
 
Even when ordinary theologians express views that are at odds with all sides 
of an academic debate, this should still cause scholars (and the church) to wonder 
why. There will, of course, be instances where this means that ordinary 
theologians are wrong. However, the assumption that this will always be the case 
could deny the possibility of guidance from the Holy Spirit to the church at large.  
Andrew Village makes an illuminating point in his research on how lay 
people read the Bible.  
The perceived gap between reader and text was reduced if readers came to 
the text with certain presuppositions about the Bible and about the 
supernatural. For the scholar, this confirms that presuppositions make us 
blind to the „otherness‟ of the text and explains why lay people fail truly to 
understand it. For lay people this confirms that scholars lose that crucial 
childlike faith that enables the text to be properly understood as a message 
for them and their lives today. Who is reading „correctly‟ here?  
Village asks, „Do the virtues of innocence outweigh the dangers of ignorance?‟201  
 
3.7 THE SUPERNATURAL 
I use the term „supernatural‟ in this context in a very broad sense. It means, 
here, events occurring outside normal human experience or knowledge and not 
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explicable by the known forces or laws of nature. This very broad definition 
therefore incorporates what others might term the „paranormal‟, and includes the 
experience of ghosts, mediums, near-death experiences (NDEs), out-of-body 
experiences, and the presence of the known dead. However, within this broad 
range I want to suggest that the data shows a qualitative difference between some 
categories of experience.  
A set of questions were included in order to ascertain the extent of 
supernatural experience and belief among the interviewees. These asked the 
interviewee: if the dead were now aware of what was happening here on earth, 
and if so, how; had they any direct experience of the continuing life of someone 
who has died; had they observed any remarkable experiences of people near to 
death; and, had they ever attended a Spiritualist Church or consulted a medium? 
The reason for including these questions was the evidence from other research 
that suggested a high level of supernatural belief in the general population. For 
example, the „Rural Church Project‟ found that 26% of the total sample believed 
in ghosts, although this was less among the church roll people (19%). It was also 
a more pronounced belief in the younger age groups, generally reducing with age; 
these beliefs were not gender dependent.
202
 D. J. Davies comments that his large 
1995 Re-Using Old Graves survey found that „approximately 35 per cent of this 
sample of the general public had gained some ... sense of the dead.‟ He also notes 
that „when people reckon to see the dead it is usually within the domestic circle, 
... where they were used to seeing the deceased when alive.‟203 This study shows a 
quite extensive range of locations for people experiencing, although not 
necessarily seeing, the dead: including the local seaside, and random occasions in 
a car or a street. With respect to ghosts, Davies points out that they are usually the 
unknown dead, a view supported by the present project. Abby Day
204
 found, in 
her doctoral research on belief in the population at large, clear examples of 
supernatural experiences, including feeling the presence of deceased loved ones. 
But she cautions against any assumption that such experiences are necessarily 
religious, and
 
so talks of the „secular supernatural‟, meaning that such beliefs are 
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not legitimated by belief in God. She also found that only a few of these 
experiences involved the unknown dead.  
Young and Cullen comment, „No sooner is the coffin closed than people 
encounter the dead person again. It can hardly be otherwise when the dead have 
left behind so many reminders of themselves, and any of the reminders can be so 
vivid as to recall the dead to life.‟205 Widows talk to husbands in the house, and 
„see‟ him; children are told that „grandpa‟s watching you‟. They show, from their 
conversations with East Londoners, that it is a very common experience for the 
memory of the deceased to be so strong as to become a voice or presence. Hay 
and Morisy
206
 found that 62% of a random sample of the population of a northern 
industrial city reported types of human activity which are commonly given a 
religious interpretation. One of the types of experience reported was „presence of 
or help from the deceased‟. The authors „were unprepared for this group of 
experiences, yet they constitute more than a fifth of the total. Quite often the 
experiences were integrated into an orthodox theological framework.‟ The 
subjects of the present study also reported this particular experience.  
My data shows a high level of supernatural experience and belief among the 
26 interviewees. I was surprised by the nature and volume of these reported 
experiences, from people whom I had known well for many years. I was also 
often surprised by exactly who was telling me these things. Thus some of the 
clearest examples of, for instance, Spiritualist experience, came from people 
whom I would not easily have associated with such ideas. This also cautions 
against any simplistic association of supernatural beliefs with personality, 
psychology or personal history. My impression is that such views gain credence 
from personal experience and from trusting the testimony of others, plus a deep-
seated view that there is „no smoke without fire‟, hence something more than 
meets the eye must be going on. Perhaps we too easily forget that the church 
claims many supernatural beliefs and experiences as true (for example the healing 
miracles, the resurrection of Jesus, and resuscitation of corpses). The cut-off point 
may not be as clear as some of us, perhaps especially clergy, wish to believe.  
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Spiritualism, Mediums and Seances 
Vera related two very different experiences. The first involved an impromptu 
use of a Ouija board.  
When it came to my turn, it seemed like it was, I‟m not saying it was, my 
mother having a conversation with me through the words she used. She 
said, „I am coping.‟ But it was a weird feeling and I felt very upset 
afterwards.  
The second experience concerned someone Vera worked with, „a nice guy who 
was a Spiritualist‟. This man said to her one day that there was a lady standing 
next to her, that is, a dead person who could not be seen by others. He described 
this person in enough detail for Vera to identify her as a relative who had believed 
in Spiritualism. This experience „was quite nice, it wasn‟t frightening‟. I asked 
Vera to explain for me more clearly the difference between the two experiences. 
The first, she thought, was something that she should not have done. „Maybe I 
disturbed something, I don‟t know.‟ The second was much nicer and just 
happened by chance. „And, obviously, whoever was there wanted to come and see 
me; I didn‟t call it.‟ Vera said she had always been really interested in that kind of 
thing, but didn‟t think she would ever go into a séance again or anything like that, 
„because I don‟t think that‟s necessarily right. I know some people think it‟s a 
load of rubbish, but it makes me feel that there is something out there and 
something that maybe you have to be careful about.‟  
Yvonne also related an uncomfortable experience. Many years ago she was 
in a situation where, „like students do, somebody had an Ouija board going, and 
the things it said scared me off doing anything like that in the future.‟ She 
remembers that the glass seemed to be moving on its own, and she couldn‟t work 
out how it was happening. So, „I‟ve never ever gone in for anything like that ever 
again. ... it just left me cold ... I seem to remember it told people, it spelled out 
things, that nobody else could have known about.‟ Yvonne felt very 
uncomfortable, „just because ... scientifically, I couldn‟t work out how things 
happened‟. I asked her what she made of that experience now. „No idea, 
absolutely no idea. The whole thing was weird at the time, and whether these 
were actual predictions ... Don‟t know. No idea.‟  
Patricia gave the clearest account of a Spiritualist influence: „the place that 
has endorsed the afterlife for me is the Spiritualist Church‟. She is convinced that 
the Spiritualist approach works. For example, „because things that were said [at a 
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Spiritualist Church], and my grandfather, who couldn‟t talk very well, he came 
through; and the things that were said, I know without a doubt it was him.‟ 
Patricia also related an experience with a medium who said that her grandmother 
was waiting for her. She believes this medium talked about things which nobody 
else could have known and that the experience helped her. Her grandfather had 
also „come through‟ to her when she was 21, through the use of tarot cards by a 
medium.  
Katie related one particular encounter with a medium. She went for a „girl‟s 
night out‟ to a place where there were mediums and „people who do cards‟. A 
couple of her friends had been to one before and were convinced there was 
something in it, so Katie decided to try it. She went to a medium who used cards 
and who came out with names, like Colin Fry does. Katie was very sceptical 
about the names‟ business. „If you go back far enough you‟re bound to find one.‟ 
The medium said „James‟, but Katie assured her that there was no-one of that 
name in her family. The medium insisted and suggested that Katie ask the family 
about that name. So when Katie returned home, she asked her mother about the 
name, and was very surprised to learn that James was the name of her mother‟s 
elder brother, who had died as a child. Katie had never known this. „I did find that 
strange, because she could have said any name really. ... I did think that was a bit 
odd, and makes me think how did this woman know that?‟ This kind of story is 
probably typical of the folklore surrounding the supernatural industry: the „there 
must be something in it‟ kind of story.207  
Duncan reported he had known some Spiritualists and respects what they 
think, but he is not sure how it all ties up. „I wonder, well, there must be better 
and more direct ways of communicating than the way it would appear. But 
[pause] it interests me; I don‟t discount it. I wouldn‟t say I was a follower.‟ He 
has been to a Spiritualist Church with his wife and quite enjoyed it. He talked to 
someone there who was enthusiastic about ghosts in a Northumberland castle, and 
it all sounded very convincing and plausible. But at the same time the whole 
concept of dealing with spirits in a matter of fact, almost physical, way is 
implausible to Duncan. He doesn‟t doubt these people, but wonders if there could 
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be other, more rational, explanations. However, Spiritualism helps persuade him 
of an afterlife, and does not contradict his Christian faith; in fact it reinforces it. 
He feels „quite comfortable with it‟ and does not think he is „going somewhere 
weird‟ when he goes to the Spiritualist Church. Duncan would actually feel 
weirder in some Christian churches. In the Spiritualist Church, as with any 
church, „there are a range of people, some of whom you think they are just 
completely way out, and some who seem eminently grounded in good sense and 
decency and so on.‟ It is contact with the sensible people in the Spiritualist 
Church that makes Duncan think he can‟t discredit what they believe. This is the 
same with the Christian church. „I suppose I tend not to take things as a package, 
which maybe I should more. And I don‟t in the church either. ... people might say 
that‟s ... pick and choose ... but I just think that there are elements of all aspects of 
life that are intermingled‟. For Duncan, beliefs come from people you know and 
trust, and admire and respect; and this is no different with Spiritualism.  
Those who had never been to a Spiritualist Church, visited a medium, or had 
any supernatural experience usually offered no critical opinion on those who had, 
or on supernatural belief in general. However, others did. Nora once did a „séance 
thing‟ with a board when a young teenager. Something had happened, and she felt 
a message had been given, but found this „quite creepy and frightening‟. She has 
no desire to repeat this. „I don‟t believe we can communicate physically with 
people once they‟ve gone. I think it‟s hugely open to corruption. I haven‟t 
researched it, but my gut feeling is that it‟s open to corruption or to people using 
it to influence very vulnerable people.‟208 Hermione had been to a Spiritualist 
Church many years ago as a teenager with a friend, to see what it was like. „I 
thought it was hilarious.‟ She mentioned that someone had apparently seen a dead 
rabbit jumping around, and she felt the whole thing misguided. She concluded, 
„that‟s one thing I‟ve never ever really believed in at all, sort of ghosts and things 
like that.‟ 
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Ghosts and Spirits  
Charles, the only person to report an out-of-body experience, has also had 
other supernatural experiences; but he thought his ideas came mainly from 
reading around the subject, rather than the experiences themselves. „Most of it is 
from our reading. Both of us [he and his wife] have steadfastly refused to take 
part in any of these séance sessions, holding hands round a table, that sort of 
thing, not really believing in it.‟ But, as a child, Charles saw somebody at the top 
of the stairs of a friend‟s house: a ghostly figure in white, a lady, who was seen by 
his friend also. This was only a childhood memory, but „I don‟t dismiss reports of 
paranormal activity out of hand. There‟s obviously somebody who believes in 
what‟s been going on. And I‟m not sceptical enough to say, “rubbish, go away, I 
don‟t want to know”. I‟ll listen to what they‟ve got to say and make my own mind 
up.‟ Charles also said that his daughter had seen the ghost of a woman who 
apparently haunted a local rest home. This ghost has been seen by others, and he 
understood it to be somebody who had died in the house before it became a rest 
home. He had no personal experience of this one, but the ghost he had seen as a 
child was almost like a physical presence, in that he could see the shape of her 
hands and dress. However, he was sure it was „not solid‟.  
Jacob had one memorable experience of sitting bolt upright and seeing a 
person sitting on his bedside in the middle of the night. He couldn‟t get back to 
sleep afterwards, and was sweating. He told his wife that he had seen a woman, 
aged about 50, and described her clearly. This was apparently the woman who 
had previously been in that house, but was now dead. Jacob said this was a very 
real but not a pleasant experience; quite different from his experiences of the 
presence of dead relatives. Martin reported that a close friend had taken a 
photograph on which his dead grandfather, who had no known grave, had 
mysteriously appeared. Also, his own grandfather apparently just stayed in bed 
one morning and died, after saying that his dead wife had come to him in the 
night and said it was time to go with her. Patricia reported experiencing the 
presence of a long-dead Roman soldier in a house she had previously lived in.  
Joselyn related her experience of the ghost of a lady that used to live in her 
house, whom she had never met when alive. „I saw this lady in my bedroom just 
looking around, and I put my shopping down, and I went back just to speak to her 
or just to acknowledge her, and she was gone. ... I wasn‟t frightened in any way, 
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you know, there was no fear about it.‟ Joselyn then described the woman she had 
seen to a neighbour who had known the previous owner, and it was the same 
woman. Joselyn said this is the sort of thing her Gran could do. „She could see 
people, you know. She could be sitting in bed talking to people at the bottom of 
her bed who we couldn‟t see, but she could. And my mother was the same, and I 
suspect as I get older I will become the same as well.‟ The ghost that Joselyn had 
seen was very real, „she looked as if I could touch her. I couldn‟t see through her 
or anything.‟ 
Irene has no direct experience of ghosts, but reported that „My grandma used 
to work in a hospital and she had seen sort of people [that is, dead people, ghosts] 
walking down corridors before. And you trust the word from someone like that, 
you know. It‟s not just a story.‟ She also mentioned a friend who told her that she 
had seen the dead mother of another friend. Of particular note is the fact that Irene 
concluded this discussion by confirming that she didn‟t know of any other 
examples of people she knew who had directly experienced the continuing life of 
a dead person, but then went on to refer to the „biblical references‟, which she 
explained as „when everyone saw Jesus after he had died‟. In other words, Irene 
was putting the New Testament testimony of the risen Jesus in exactly the same 
category of experience as her Grandma seeing ghosts in a hospital. (Irene had 
never been to a Spiritualist Church.) 
NDEs and Out-of-Body Experiences 
Vera related that her mother-in-law „had been, towards the end, almost 
unconscious most of the time. But before she died, she suddenly became much 
more alive, which was strange. And that happens to quite a few people I think 
when they‟re very ill. I don‟t know why it should, but it seems to.‟ Also, her 
father, when recovering from a serious illness, „said that he thought that he‟d seen 
my Mum, and thought that he was going to be going away. But he knew it wasn‟t 
time so he had come back. That‟s as much as he said really.‟  
Martin mentioned some experiences his wife had as a nurse. For example, a 
patient was revived and, on waking, said „why did you bring me round? I was 
going down a tunnel and at the end was a peaceful sunlit field.‟ His wife also 
reported seeing a big white cloud at the bottom of her bed when dealing with a 
particularly difficult period in her life; and she felt that she could either have left 
 120 
 
to go with the cloud, or stayed. Jacob talked about his father-in-law who died in 
hospital. He was in a coma and near the point of death, 
but every now and again he woke up with a smile on his face and said „I‟m 
going along the king‟s highway.‟ ... But he said that on several occasions 
... I don‟t know what to make of that Michael, but he seemed at peace.  
Jacob also talked of his own father who was once resuscitated after a heart attack, 
and „when he came to he was really angry, and he was (laughter) swearing at his 
daughters; and he kept saying “I was in a beautiful place and some bugger has 
brought me back.”‟ Jacob wasn‟t sure what this meant, but his father was 
obviously happy and not in pain. It was something very nice to him.  
Joselyn reported that both her husband and mother had great difficulty in 
breathing at the end of their lives, but both, at the very end, had suddenly been 
able to breathe quite normally and comfortably again. Joselyn also reported an 
out-of-body experience which her mother had during the birth of her younger 
sister.  
She was up on the ceiling looking down on the operating theatre and 
herself. ... She talked about walking along a lovely tunnel. It was green at 
the sides, and she was happy, and she wasn‟t in any pain. She was walking 
towards a bloke. It wasn‟t pearly gates or anything, but she thought it was 
St. Peter, and he had brown robes on ... He said to her, „No, no we don‟t 
want you, go away. You can come back later.‟ And she turned and came 
back and then she was aware of the nurse shouting, „We‟re losing her, 
we‟re losing her‟.  
Joselyn went on to relate the story of her young sister falling from her pram with 
something around her neck, choking her. Her mother, out of sight, somehow 
became aware that something was wrong and dashed out to save her daughter 
from choking. „We know there‟s something wrong with each other and contact 
each other to see what it is. ... I‟ve always grown up in that kind of atmosphere on 
my mother‟s side, and so it doesn‟t bother me. It makes me think there‟s another 
dimension. Well I know there is, there must be – which we don‟t always 
understand or know. But so what, it‟s there.‟ Joselyn said these supernatural 
experiences are certainly one of the influences which have shaped her views of 
LAD. The other influence is „from going to church, from my faith‟. She saw no 
conflict between these two influences.  
Patricia is sure that at the point when you approach death, some people, often 
relatives who have died before you, „come for you‟ to take you into the afterlife. 
She witnessed this happen with a close friend who died of cancer, and who was in 
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great pain. Right at the end this friend „brightened‟, sat up, and said to someone 
she could obviously see but we couldn‟t, „I‟m coming‟; and then just laid back 
and died. But Claire, a nurse, reported only that people „just kind of know‟ when 
they are about to die; but she has not seen anything remarkable, and thinks she is 
„not very receptive in that way‟. Nora has heard of NDEs, people who say their 
heart had stopped and then a bright light, and a tunnel; but believes this to be only 
a physical effect of the dying body. 
Paul and Linda Badham argue that the ever-growing collections of NDE 
reports
209
 „provide some of the strongest grounds for supposing that the separation 
of the self from the body is possible.‟ They also point out the remarkable fact that 
those who have such experiences „become absolutely convinced of the reality of 
life after death no matter what their previous views were.‟210 However, the 
relevance of NDEs is still hotly contested.
 211
 Jan Bremmer has looked at ancient, 
medieval and modern accounts of NDEs and believes they are obviously 
culturally determined. For example, medieval NDEs are much more concerned 
with sin and purgation, and much less with reunion with relatives, than are 
modern NDEs. Bremmer concludes that modern NDEs do not prove an afterlife, 
but rather  
testify to the continuing decline of the afterlife. Heaven is still made of 
gold and marble, but it is rather empty, except for a few relatives, and even 
God is no longer there. It has now become a means for psychological 
improvement, not our final destination: salvation is not outside but within 
us. As such, it is a clear reflection of the modern world, where the 
development of the individual more and more becomes the main goal of 
life. Evidently, every age gets the afterlife it deserves.
212
  
An important point is being claimed here. For Bremmer and others, if the 
vision of heaven reflects our vision of earthly life, then it signals falsity. This is an 
assumption which rests on a strange premise – that something can only be judged 
to be trustworthy if it is somehow (impossibly) utterly new to human experience. 
Carol Zaleski also finds profound cultural influence in reported NDEs, but 
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alongside remarkable similarity suggests „that there are some enduring – perhaps 
even universal – features of near-death experience.‟213 While NDEs cannot prove 
an afterlife, Zaleski believes we should take them seriously. 
The Presence of the Dead 
As I have explained above (see 3.2 An Immediate and Non-Physical 
Afterlife‟ page 57), several people reported experiences of the dead very early in 
the interview, and this provided evidence for them of an immediate afterlife. 
Many others reported experience of the dead later in the interview. Laura had a 
definite experience of the presence of her dead sister. „I didn‟t see her; she wasn‟t 
there as a vision or image. ... It was just a very strong sense that she as a soul or in 
some other form was there in the room. ... it was very clearly her. ... She was just 
there. That‟s the only way I can describe it.‟ It was the death of her sister which 
prompted Laura and other members of her family to attend a Spiritualist Church, 
and to read about Spiritualism. 
There was very often a particular way in which the presence of the dead was 
seen. As Janet put it, „I do think that they‟re there trying to keep an eye on us or 
look after us. ... they are watching out for us.‟ Patricia believes that each of us has 
a „guardian‟, someone watching over us. Jacob and Duncan think that their dead 
relatives have an influence and concern for us now. This was a very strong 
element of the understanding of the presence of the dead: the comforting thought 
that people in the afterlife (usually, but not exclusively family) were seeking to 
help you in this life. This thought was also seen in discussion about „what we do‟ 
in the afterlife, where some people were clear that this „helping‟ role is an 
important activity which we, in our turn, will undertake in the afterlife (see pages 
92ff.). Yvonne said, „You hope they‟re like a guardian angel, ... looking after 
you.‟ I asked her if she had felt this. „Hmm, definitely felt somebody‟s there ... 
just keeping an eye on you; and you hope there is somebody there looking after 
your children. Well I‟m sure there must be, but how or why I‟ve no idea.‟ Yvonne 
gave the startling example of one of her daughters being in a phone box two 
minutes before someone was murdered there. The point being it could have been 
her, but someone apparently was looking out for her (but presumably not for the 
person who was murdered). „You just feel there‟s somebody there helping you 
                                                     
213
 Carol Zaleski, The Life of the World to Come: Near Death Experience and Christian Hope (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 33. 
 123 
 
along your way all the time, particularly if anything goes wrong, really wrong, 
then you feel there‟s something there just at the back of you.‟  
Several people were so sure of the presence of dead relatives with them that 
it was a source of real help and advice. When Katie is faced with a difficult 
choice, or problem, she asks herself what her dead mother and father think about 
it. „I feel sometimes that decisions I‟ve made have been guided‟, but this is not 
like „an angel sitting on my shoulder‟. Katie gave an example of a recent difficult 
situation where she had sat down alone and talked out loud to her dead parents.  
There was nobody speaking back to me or anything like that, but I just sat 
here and spoke out. ... I needed somebody, and I wanted my mum or my 
dad to tell me what to do. ... And I did feel, you know, that I wasn‟t alone. 
... I wasn‟t sitting talking to an empty room.  
Martin is sure that previous generations seek to help, and cited an example from 
his own life where he felt influenced by someone who had died when considering 
taking on a church responsibility. „I felt that [he] was behind me there, guiding 
me.‟ However, he admitted that this doesn‟t always seem to work. There have 
been other times when Martin needed such influence, but didn‟t get it. He doesn‟t 
know why. Duncan used to think of his deceased relatives as being in heaven and 
„up there‟, but this has changed. „I definitely think of people being with you in 
this life as it were.‟ Asked to explain this feeling in more detail, Duncan said, 
„There are times when I think I would know what people who are close to me 
would do in certain situations. I sort of, [pause] yeah, that sometimes feels like 
guidance.‟ He said when important decisions are to be made, or in difficult 
situations or crises, „I think just that you know you are being supported in what 
you are doing.‟  
Olive said, „I‟ve no desire to see a medium. ... I don‟t feel the need. I can talk 
to [deceased husband] every night and every day.‟ I asked her to clarify what she 
meant by this. „I talk to him every night when I go to bed. [I] just sort of ask him 
how his day has been and go through my day. And if I‟ve got anything bothering 
me I chat to him about it.‟ (She added that he doesn‟t tell her what it‟s like there.) 
Grace has also talked with her dead husband. For example, he was a handyman, 
so she would ask him where to find a certain tool, and shortly afterwards would 
just know how to find it. „And in that way I feel he is watching over me.‟ Grace 
does not believe in „guardian angels‟ as such, but is nevertheless sure that 
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something has helped her at key points in her life; for example, in getting a 
particular job which proved ideal for her.  
Imogen still contacts her dead father for help whenever she is worried about 
something. She goes to a favourite seaside spot to „sit and listen to the sea, and 
ask for my father‟s help‟. She is absolutely sure that it is her father who is there, 
although he died when she was a small child. The answer comes when „suddenly I 
just feel at peace, happy with myself.‟ She then knows what to do or say „because 
I just feel comfortable with it‟. If she had gone straight into the situation this 
would not have happened. „But because I‟ve talked to my dad, he sorted me, and I 
just go away comfortable with that. I‟ve done that ever since I was about ten years 
of age.‟ Imogen is also sure that her father is aware of what is happening in her 
life. She is not sure, however, whether everyone has such a relationship with a 
dead person. Perhaps her relationship with her father is necessary because he died 
when she was young. Experiences of her dead mother, who died in old age, are 
quite different. „My mother is always with me. We were together for such a long 
time that, ... the minute I walk there [the house] she‟s in the back of my mind.‟  
This is not always uncritical. Nora said, „There‟s a fine line isn‟t there 
between, perhaps, you thinking what would they have said and what they would 
advise, and actually feeling a voice or hearing a voice telling you what to do.‟ Her 
experience is more like the former. She had a strong sense when younger of 
thinking, „what would my father have done?‟ or, „what would my Gran have 
said?‟ But as one‟s life moves on into situations and relationships they were not a 
part of, so this sense weakens. However, Nora is still clear that they have 
definitely influenced her, albeit not as strongly as if they were speaking to her 
directly. Others were more sceptical. Ursula thinks we talk to the dead in a „one 
way‟ sense, almost like keeping them up to date with events and stages in the life 
of, for example, grandchildren. In effect it‟s „me trying to keep him [dead father] 
alive for myself, and for my immediate family.‟ Ursula was clear that this doesn‟t 
actually keep them alive, because some people die without anyone close left 
behind. But in this way their lives still continue to influence people. Allan thought 
people who have lost a loved one may wish that they have seen them, as a way of 
coping with bereavement; but it is not actually possible. Of course, for Allan we 
are all, in effect, locked away in our personal heavens.  
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There was a clear division of opinion concerning whether the dead would be 
aware of what is happening here. For some, this was a desirable aspect of the 
afterlife; the ability not only to be aware of earthly life, but also to influence it. 
Bernard, for example, would like this, so that he could see what is going on in his 
family; how his children were faring. He would also like to think that he could 
help if needed, from the afterlife. Olive said, „I‟d like to think my parents have 
seen [pause] have somehow known about the family that has carried on since 
then, and their parents before them.‟ Others, however, pointed out that this could 
be hellish rather than heavenly, depending on what they saw of earthly life. 
Ursula questions why you would want to know what you were missing, or the 
mistakes your children were making without your guidance, or how your wife‟s 
new husband was making her very happy? In the group meeting she commented 
that we can‟t see what our family does in this way in this life, so why should we 
in the next; and if we could, surely it would be much worse? But there is another 
point seemingly overlooked by those who take the view that the dead are aware of 
the lives of the living: would not simply being conscious and aware of your post-
mortem state produce some of these same problems? In other words, one would 
be aware of what one had left behind, albeit temporarily; so perhaps knowing 
what was going on is not as bad as they imagine?  
From an analysis of written memorials at a hospice, Andrew Goodhead 
suggests that the use of traditional religious language in such expressions of 
mourning is the result of a lack of secular vocabulary, and belief in the afterlife 
has been transformed into a „familial reunion‟.  
By writing that the deceased person has gone to heaven, a sense of control 
is gained over a catastrophic moment. The survivor‟s desire for the dead to 
be in the presence of God or angels means the deceased person is not 
alone.
214
 
In a remarkable and detailed study of a small group of terminally ill patients and 
their carers, Young and Cullen found strong belief in reunion with dead loved 
ones, and common experience among the bereaved of their continuing 
presence.
215
 The subjects mostly considered themselves to be attached to a 
church, but „There was little indication that people in general had got their belief 
in the afterlife from their church.‟ The church views which they had heard and 
                                                     
214
 Andrew Goodhead, „A Textual Analysis of Memorials Written by Bereaved Individuals and Families 
in a Hospice Context‟, Mortality 15, no . 4 (2010), 323-39. 
215
 Young and Cullen, A Good Death, 172-3.  
 126 
 
known seemed different to their „seeing and hearing‟ of the dead now. „Most did 
not think of the experiences they were now having in their encounters with the 
dead as being in any way the same as those that were featured in the church.‟ 
Their religion was mostly private and personal, and based on love in the sense 
that only if they loved the person who had died would they believe in that 
person‟s continuing existence. This is not biblically or doctrinally orthodox, but 
rather reflects their assumption that only the loved seem to live on. Their religion 
is a „family religion‟, mostly to do with family reunion. In his study of older 
Aberdonians, Williams also found that, with regard to the afterlife, „the usual 
conception was a reunion with kin in a better place.‟216 
Bennett and Bennett claim that there is bias toward the „materialist 
discourse‟ in much of the literature regarding experience of the dead. Thus, it is 
often assumed by researchers that the explanation for such events involves 
hallucination and illusion rather than any other form of reality: a human mind 
coping with grief rather than any contact with a spiritual reality beyond this life. 
In contrast, there is another explanatory framework which they claim is equally 
rational and traditional, the „supernatural discourse‟. This alternative discourse 
includes claims of contact with the dead via a soul or spirit existing in an afterlife. 
Bennett and Bennett found that subjects would switch between these two 
discourses depending on their perceived expectation of the interview context, with 
many being reluctant to „risk‟ the supernatural explanation in certain situations.217 
In this project it is clear that these churchgoing subjects were happy to offer a 
supernatural discourse of the soul and afterlife as their real experience.  
Continuing Relationships with the Dead 
There was a significant difference in tone between reported experiences of 
the dead. Most experiences were comfortable, even enjoyable, but some of the 
ghost stories and experiences of séances or mediums were not. „Ghost‟ was not a 
term used by people who were relating experiences of their dead relatives or those 
known to them. Ghosts are generally the unknown dead, and this can sometimes 
be a quite disturbing experience, especially if linked to a view of ghosts as 
disturbed spirits, or spirits with something yet to do or put right. There are also 
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two very different reactions with regard to séances and mediums. There are those 
who are quite convinced by and quite comfortable with such things; and there are 
those who have been frightened or disturbed by them. This suggests that there is a 
basic difference between a benign, reassuring experience of a dead relative or 
friend, and a more disturbing supernatural experience. The former is, at least 
tacitly, also seen as much more within the realm of Christian experience, and in 
fact has been seen as such historically within the tradition (see below).  
Moltmann provides a modern argument for a continuing relationship with 
the dead. „Ideas about a life after death are not only important for the dying and 
the dead. They are also important for the living, who see themselves as “coming 
after” or as the “surviving bereaved”. These ideas express the relationships of the 
dead to the living and of the living to the dead, and influence the life led in 
remembrance or forgetfulness of those who have died.‟ Moltmann believes that 
we have lost in modern western societies the idea of a „sequence of generations‟; 
we venerate the young and disregard the old (who are nearing death). He warns 
that „Anyone who forgets the rights of the dead will be indifferent toward the 
lives of those to come as well. Without a “culture of remembrance” that tries to do 
justice to the dead, there will also be no “culture of hope” that will open up a 
future for our children.‟218 
Carlos Eire claims that the medieval world was one which took eternity very 
seriously; it was „the warp and woof of the medieval West.‟219 The rituals of the 
medieval church made eternity available to people. Every mass was a miracle 
linking heaven and earth, and also linking the living and the dead. Masses for the 
dead could reduce time in purgatory for the deceased; the dead were not 
segregated, but were brought into church and buried there. There were 
undoubtedly many distortions and corruptions of these ideas, „but no matter how 
crassly unspiritual many of the established customs, feasts, and rituals of 
medieval Europe might have been, the fact remains that eternity infringed on the 
temporal world at nearly every turn, not just as a concept but also as something of 
real political, social, and economic value.‟220  
Eire emphasises that the Reformation brought about a fundamental revision 
of the relationship between the living and the dead, and between the temporal and 
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eternal. Initially this happened along the fault line of the afterlife, but then went 
on to incorporate monasticism, mysticism, and clerical claims to superiority. Pre-
Reformation, the dead could command time, money, and energy from relatives 
and friends in the celebration of masses and other ways that sought to reduce time 
in purgatory. The dead could be great aids, putting forward arguments on your 
behalf in heaven. But the Reformation changed all of this. For Luther, „death was 
no gossamer veil through which the living and the dead remained within sight of 
each other but rather the thickest of final curtains.‟ Death was a one-way lonely 
experience. There was now no such thing as purgatory, and the communion of 
saints was an eschatological hope of the resurrection and kingdom to come. 
Ghosts and visions of the dead were demonic, not human. Eire claims that the 
idea of purgatory was borne, not out of formal theology or Scripture, but rather 
from practical piety, ritual, and logic. 
Sheer hope in the possibility of forgiveness in the afterlife, coupled with 
the longing for some connection with the dead, had more to do with 
purgatory than did biblical interpretation: it was an eschatological 
necessity drawn from the inevitably painful reality of grief, the certainty of 
moral failure in this life, and the fear of eternal damnation.
221
  
It would seem that modern British people continue to seek relationships with 
their dead loved ones, as Eire tells us was the norm in medieval Europe. This is 
not just about any final reunion in the afterlife, but rather about contact between 
the dead and the living. In fact, some of these ordinary theologians look forward 
to taking a role in this relationship from the afterlife, maintaining links with the 
living. Is ordinary theology here pointing to a necessary continuing element of the 
Christian understanding of death?
222
 This data shows a strong desire for 
continuing relationships with the dead and some significant experience of this 
taking place.  
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3.8 FORMATION AND EFFECTS  
What influences have been at work in shaping the views of these ordinary 
theologians concerning LAD? Tony Walter points out that most of us now don‟t 
actually witness death at all, and we are largely informed by cinema and media 
(which dramatises the process) rather than by real experience.
223
 Peter Jupp also 
points to the effect of film and TV in making plausible images of afterlife that 
have little basis in religious tradition, such as reincarnation and beneficent ghosts. 
„Those whose Christian ministry is to comfort bereaved people in public or in 
private must take account of the fact that, today, people‟s beliefs are unlikely to 
be traditional, and are far more individualistic.‟224 Sara Knox points to the way in 
which contemporary cinematic representation of dying and death illustrate our 
cultural preoccupation with how individual identity may be preserved beyond 
death.
225
 One example she uses is Vanilla Sky, a source of inspiration for Allan 
and his individual heavens (see page 55). It seems that for the population at large 
we should expect considerable cultural influence. As Davies suggests: 
Many people probably gain their ideas of the afterlife as much from ghost 
films or science fiction as from the New Testament with, perhaps, the 
para-medical world linking the two through the two new categories of 
„near-death-experience‟ and „out of the body experience‟.226  
However, with regard to the group of Christians who are the subject of this 
study, this is not the case. Walter suggests three reasons why non-religious people 
may hold beliefs about LAD, or why religious people do not link it to other 
beliefs: intuitions from paranormal or mystical experiences; the fact that the 
church has little control over belief, and „pick and choose‟ reigns (perhaps 
especially in the area of LAD, where doctrine is lacking or unclear); and tolerance 
both inside and outside churches, together with postmodern scepticism of any 
belief system, including science.
 227
 I believe this is much nearer the mark, 
pointing us back to the supernatural and to individualism and relativism.  
Indications of major sources of influence were given by the subject 
throughout these interviews. In one sense, the whole interview was a potential 
opportunity for the subject to convey such information, and for me to pick this up. 
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I am sure this did not happen perfectly or comprehensively, from either side, but 
sufficient communication and understanding did take place for me to identify 
clearly two major factors. In the final part of the interview, I usually tried to check 
what they had indicated to be the main influences, and to ask if there were others 
that had not been mentioned. I also asked if their views had changed over time. 
The two major sources of influence identified by these ordinary theologians 
concerning their views on LAD are family and church background, and their 
experiences of the supernatural.  
Family and Church Background 
Alice‟s views have changed over time; for example, she used to believe in 
hell but not now. „It‟s growth and development through experience and through 
Bible learning and going to church and mixing with people who go to church.‟ 
She explained that „I think what my beliefs come from is what I‟ve been taught 
over the years.‟ The people who have most influenced her, from Sunday school 
onwards, have been those who „you respected always, and haven‟t really heard 
anything bad about them since‟. People outside church have also been influential 
for Alice, for instance, lecturers and work colleagues. She gave the example of 
someone at work who sat with her and prayed with her when she was in trouble. 
Very important for Alice have been the „people who have shaped my thoughts‟; 
but she hasn‟t accepted any one particular view, but rather has developed her 
own.  
Olive said she thought her belief in LAD had always been there due to her 
upbringing, the influence of her parents and going to church from being very 
small. Her views had not changed. Imogen said she had come to her present 
views, „mainly I think through, a, my upbringing, involvement with church since 
I was three; b, with patients, listening to a number of them that talked about 
dying.‟ Her views „have become clearer. Certainly when I was younger I don‟t 
think I even thought about life after death. When you are a teenager you don‟t.‟ 
She began to think about it in her 20s and 30s. Gregory echoed these thoughts in 
saying that he probably didn‟t think about it carefully or strongly until more 
recently, as he‟s grown older. „The nearer you get to it the more you think about 
it.‟ When parents have died, and contemporaries start to die, then you think about 
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it more. Bernard thinks that life experience is necessary to form stable views 
about LAD. The birth of his own children has made him think more about this. 
Nora believes her views have developed over time, although even as a child 
she had a simple belief in the afterlife. In adult life this has developed; as you 
experience the death of people close to you, you think more about your faith and 
LAD. Also influential for Nora have been people who pose questions which make 
her stop and think. Nora is thankful for being brought up in the Christian faith, 
and feels that lots of young people now do not cope with death because they have 
no faith. She feels that she would have been lost without her faith. Yvonne 
pointed to „Just the experience you‟ve had in life, and ... other people‟s 
experiences I suppose. It‟s something you don‟t really discuss with anybody. 
Nobody has ever discussed their views of life after death with me.‟ She thinks we 
should talk about it more in church. 
Experience of the Supernatural 
Several clear examples of strong influence were given by subjects when 
relating their experience of the supernatural (see 3.7 The Supernatural‟ page 112). 
In addition, other confirmations of strong influence from supernatural experience 
were given in the final part of the interview, sometimes these are not direct 
experiences but rather the experiences of others.  
Jacob said his mother and his personal experience had been important in 
forming his views; but a key aspect of his experience has been a clear sense of the 
presence of deceased relatives. Irene has been influenced by the Bible but also by 
supernatural experiences of family and friends which had been related to her. Two 
of her friends had seen ghosts, „that definitely made me believe. ...You hear lots 
of things like that, and I do believe they have influenced me and that there is 
something still there.‟ James has been greatly influenced by his experience of a 
ghost, and other spiritual phenomena, which would have to be comprehensively 
explained by any satisfactory view of the afterlife. When asked if the church had 
taught him about LAD, James said, „I don‟t think it has really. No. I don‟t think 
it‟s changed anything as far as teaching me anything about it.‟ He thinks that 
perhaps the church should be clearer in teaching about LAD, and that we should 
talk more about it in church. James has not been to a Spiritualist Church, but his 
mother had been and he said she had „experienced this sort of thing‟. He also had 
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an Auntie who claimed to be a medium. Laura said, „The main influence I 
suppose is from Christianity and being brought up in the church, and ending up 
with the view that there is afterlife, there is life after death. ... beyond that any of 
the detail probably comes from reading around much of the either Spiritualist or 
NDE literature.‟ Laura read this because of the death of a close relative, which 
„impelled me to go back to church‟ to look for answers or some kind of 
explanation. However, the church was not too good initially, so she experimented 
with Spiritualism.  
Nature 
A third minor factor was also identified. Alice has been influenced by places 
of natural beauty where she has felt at peace. Claire also has been influenced by 
the „great outdoors‟. The amazing beauty of the natural world shows, in her 
opinion, that there must be a God. And the natural world must be a „precursor of 
heaven‟. She said, „If that‟s what he can do on earth, goodness knows what we‟re 
going to get in heaven. And not just the physical, but that feeling when you‟re 
outside in the middle of nowhere, in the highlands of Scotland. That‟s like a 
glimpse of how it‟s going to feel in heaven.‟ Martin recalled the impact of scout 
camps many years ago, where „you have a feeling of limitless space and that there 
is some other life.‟  
The Effect of Belief in LAD  
One of my initial interests in this research concerned theodicy. I wanted to 
explore the link between suffering and the afterlife, and so devoted a section of 
the interview to this issue. I also wanted to explore whether having a belief in 
LAD made a difference to how suffering and death were understood and dealt 
with in this life.  
Theodicy is Not an Issue 
It quickly became apparent that theodicy was not an interest shared by most 
of these ordinary theologians. It seemed that for nearly all it was either a question 
with such an obvious solution that they were puzzled as to why was I asking it; or 
that it was not actually a question for them at all. Martin, for example, said he had 
never thought about this, and yet he, like many others, had given great thought to 
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many of the other issues raised by the interview. Several people said that, of 
course, they knew that bad things happened, but they just did. It was not God‟s 
„fault‟, nor was it a „problem‟ for their faith. Perhaps this is a clear message to 
me, and to others who seek to apply philosophical theology to a more 
straightforward human experience.
228
  
Vera was typical in thinking that the key thing about the afterlife is that 
suffering stopped there. The physical suffering so prevalent in our human 
experience would simply cease in the non-physical afterlife. Also typical was the 
idea that the fact of afterlife in itself „puts things right‟. There was no sense of the 
rage against suffering which is so clearly conveyed in the theology of McCord 
Adams, or the demand for God to „make it right‟ for each person individually in 
heaven. Neither was there acceptance of the notion that one could be angry with 
God for the sufferings of this life.
229
 Indeed, there was often clear surprise when I 
raised this. The overwhelming view was that a wonderful afterlife would 
obviously make it all fine. All will be well.  
Ursula speaks for the majority when she says, „life after death is not an 
answer to suffering, it doesn‟t explain why it happens to some and not others.‟ 
Perhaps more importantly, the „problem‟ of theodicy is not present in these 
ordinary theologians. Ursula is clear. „No matter how terrible your life has been, 
in the afterlife it won‟t matter; and I don‟t think in the afterlife you‟ll be thinking, 
“I had an awful earthly life and he had a wonderful earthly life.” I think those sort 
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of things will just not be important.‟ Duncan said belief in LAD „doesn‟t help me 
rationalise the whys and wherefores of suffering in this life.‟  
Belief in LAD Does Make A Difference 
The question of whether belief in LAD makes a difference produced more 
clarity and enthusiasm than the issue of theodicy. Alice was typical in saying that, 
for her, it certainly does; because she does not worry about dying and never has 
done. Bernard feels it has really helped him, and he will talk to his own young 
children at the appropriate time about LAD so that they will also have this belief 
to help them. Claire thinks that at funerals she sees how people without this belief 
struggle to cope with death. The LAD faith of her father was a great help to her 
when he died. Jacob can‟t understand how people can cope in this life without 
faith; what happens when they „hit the wall [of facing death]?‟ Nora also wonders 
about how people can cope with death without faith, and suggested that the 
increase in grief/bereavement counselling is an indication of this. Charles would 
prefer a bereaved person to have Christian friends to help rather than „professional 
comforters‟. Katie thinks it does make a difference, „that‟s why I‟m not 
frightened.‟ Joselyn said, „I really do not know how people deal with death if they 
haven‟t got a faith. I think that must be a very, very difficult thing to do.‟ Irene 
said, „Yeah, it helps knowing that this is not it, that there will still be more.‟ 
Felicity says LAD makes a difference „because I‟m not afraid of it [death], and I 
feel it‟s quite exciting, and something to look forward to really.‟ Gregory said it 
does make a difference for him, because without it, „I might be more troubled ... 
by death.‟ 
This strong affective dimension demonstrates the seriousness with which 
belief in LAD is held by these ordinary theologians. However, there was an 
exception to this view from two people, who made an important point about how 
some will experience the death of a loved one. Laura does not feel that belief in 
LAD has helped her, „because what you‟re missing is the person who was there, 
and who no longer is, and who is not going to be for the rest of your life. So, 
whether they are living in another dimension or not doesn‟t change the fact that 
they are not there with you now.‟ Hermione also took this view. „When someone 
very close to you dies, your grief is for yourself not for the person who has gone. 
So your views of whether life after death even exists, there‟s no real impact on 
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your grief, because your grief is about the fact that you‟ve been left and not where 
they‟ve gone. So that would make absolutely no difference. ... Your grief is what 
you‟re feeling because you don‟t have that person anymore.‟230 
Reluctance to Talk about LAD 
In contrast to clear views about how much a belief in LAD matters, there 
was a very marked reluctance on the part of the interviewees actually to speak to 
someone recently bereaved, or someone facing death, about LAD. For example, 
Alice said it had never entered her head to talk about this with her husband when 
he was very ill. On the rare occasions when something had been said, it was 
usually in very bland or general terms, such as „they (the deceased) are not 
suffering now‟. Janet would say to a bereaved person that the deceased is still 
with you and watching out for you, and not in pain, but „I don‟t know that I would 
feel comfortable saying anything to people whilst they‟re still here.‟ Gregory and 
Jacob were not unusual in saying that they had never talked about LAD to anyone 
who had been bereaved, nor had anyone ever talked to them about this, other than 
clergy.  
Nora is an exception to this general state of affairs. She has talked about 
LAD in bereavement situations with relatives after family deaths, and found it 
very comforting, a „lovely conversation‟. She believes that doing this is mutually 
supportive, and that families or groups with a shared faith need to do it. Felicity is 
also unusual in actually talking about LAD, largely because she does hospital 
visiting where this topic comes up quite regularly. However, „I think you‟ve got 
to be careful not to overdo it.‟  
Claire has said something to a friend who had faith, but would not say 
anything to someone without faith. Olive stressed the comfort which her own 
belief in LAD gave her, but was reluctant to use these words with others, although 
she had „tried to reassure people‟. She said, „I believe my beliefs and my religion 
in a lot of ways is a very personal thing, so I‟m very conscious of not trying to 
thrust it [on others]‟. Allan would not want to force his views on anyone by 
talking to them about LAD, but he would try to „be there for them‟. Imogen said 
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the only example of people saying something to her regarding death or suffering 
is a Jehovah‟s Witness. Joselyn has written to people who have been bereaved, 
but she will not say that „time heals everything‟; it doesn‟t, it just helps you to 
cope. Also, she doesn‟t agree with the often-expressed sentiment that it „would be 
a blessing‟ for someone in pain to die. She is not sure why people feel the need to 
talk to strangers in bereavement counselling, and would have turned to the church 
if she had needed help in this way. 
Within the group meeting, which was organised in response to requests to be 
able to share views on LAD, the issue of whether we should talk more about LAD 
was raised several times. Laura: „Maybe it should be more of a, you know, an 
everyday thing because people die all the time, and we‟re going to die, you know, 
it‟s the one certain thing.‟ Felicity „was just so curious to know what other people 
had said.‟ Laura replied, „It‟s never sort of discussed.‟ Joselyn: „No, it‟s not your 
everyday subject is it?‟ Olive commented that „I think until it has sort of 
personally affected you, you tend not to think about it.‟ Claire had seen lots of 
death and dying as a nurse, but confirmed that, „until I lost dad, it didn‟t click.‟  
I commented in the group meeting that the conversation seemed very easy 
and natural, but that some in the interviews had asked why we don‟t talk about it 
more in church. Should we talk more about it? Ursula commented, „I think as a 
society we don‟t talk about death, ... but I think if we just talked about it all the 
time more as part of life we would be better prepared, you know, whether as 
Christians or not, and as a society.‟231 She related the experience of her first 
funeral, of her grandmother when she was aged 23, and reflected on the fact that 
she didn‟t know what would actually happen, and so felt very anxious about it all. 
This interview data suggests that a reluctance to talk about LAD is an 
interesting variation of the relativism and individualism identified above with 
regard to biblical and church authority. It is the opposite side of the same coin. As 
individuals we have the right to form and hold our own opinions, so the opinions 
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of scholars and church are just that, other opinions. But because we realise the 
importance of our own opinions as our opinions, we are very reluctant to suggest 
to anyone that they might like to think of a different view. This reluctance is both 
a result of embarrassment and the fear of giving offence. Even those within 
church communities are not easily able to talk about death and LAD. However, 
this data also shows that these church members perceive clearly the potential 
value of bringing LAD „out into the open‟ by just such discussion and sharing of 
views. The church is well placed to seek to reintroduce „death talk‟ as a necessary 
and beneficial part of social reality. Perhaps a first step would be for more clergy 
to listen to more ordinary theologians concerning their ordinary eschatology. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS  
4.1 A METHOD AND CONCEPT TESTED  
The basic method of this project has worked well and can be commended for 
other congregational settings. The dual role of interviewer-minister has great 
potential for enabling interviewees to disclose with confidence deeply-held beliefs 
and ideas which were hitherto „hidden‟. Listening is a very important tool of a 
minister or priest: this project has shown that it can be greatly empowering for 
ordinary Christian members of a church. I believe it is clear that the subjects of 
this research benefited from the experience. They greatly appreciated being 
listened to and being taken seriously on matters of theological concern.
232
 They 
also learned a great deal from their critical reflection on their own beliefs, a 
process encouraged by this interview method; and they enjoyed doing it.
233
  
The researcher‟s experience is also relevant. I have had the great privilege of 
hearing most of my congregation telling me with complete honesty and sincerity 
what they really think and believe about LAD. This has been in some ways a very 
humbling experience. I have become more fully aware of them as extra-„ordinary‟ 
Christians seeking to live their faith. I have been entrusted with deeply felt 
memories and personal stories, and have been allowed to share in how they view 
their ultimate destiny beyond death. I believe that I now appreciate more fully the 
value and richness of the non-systematic ordinary theology of those to whom I 
minister.  
Also proven in this project is the value of ordinary theology as a practical 
concept for the church. It is absolutely clear to me that members of my 
congregation do ordinary theology: perhaps not consistently or systematically but 
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sincerely and in a critically reflective manner. I believe they have now begun to 
realise this themselves, which is a remarkable comment on how church and 
academy have hitherto valued their views. It should be obvious that those who 
actually live the Christian faith test out the beliefs and practices of that faith. It is 
surely reasonable to expect that the guidance of the Holy Spirit will at least 
sometimes, albeit always imperfectly, be discerned by such people: they are 
„signal processors‟ of the Spirit. It is surely also reasonable that church and 
academy should therefore seek to hear and take seriously this ordinary theological 
voice. With regard to LAD this voice has said some remarkable and important 
things. 
4.2 THE KEY ELEMENTS OF ORDINARY ESCHATOLOGY 
The following issues are the key findings on ordinary eschatology from this 
project: 
1. The afterlife is immediate: there is no „soul-sleep‟ or unconscious state. 
Experiences of the dead confirm this; and ordinary theologians do not find 
any sense in the idea of an unconscious interim period. We continue to 
exist spiritually after death, so why should we not always be conscious of 
this?  
2. Human beings are dual in nature: there is a substantial soul (or „spirit‟), 
and this is what survives death and leaves the „shell‟ of the body. As God 
himself is non-physical, we can also live in a „spiritual‟ form. A dualist 
view is confirmed by human lived experience of the „inner self‟, and a 
strong belief in continuing personal identity post-mortem resulting from a 
substantial non-physical „me‟. This is also confirmed by those „lost‟ to 
dementia, but still living. 
3. The afterlife is obviously non-physical. Bodies of dead people are clearly 
experienced as „empty‟. Physicality is actually the problem: it is not a 
desirable experience to repeat because it means suffering, decline and 
death. The afterlife must be quite different, which means it must be non-
physical. The very idea of a physical afterlife is ridiculous because of 
practical and logical problems: space and resources, organisation and 
regulation, meeting recognisable others, environmental and climatic issues. 
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But the non-physical afterlife will have elements of physical-like 
experience, to continue aspects of this earthly life.  
4. The afterlife will be social, but this does not necessarily mean that we will 
meet everyone, or that earthly relationships will continue in the same way. 
God will probably be present in the afterlife, but many thought it unlikely 
that we would „meet him personally‟. There is probably no form of 
objective judgement, but perhaps some form of self-judgement. While 
some expect that the afterlife will be active; others hope for something that 
is quite the opposite. 
5. So complete is the notion of a non-physical afterlife that resurrection has 
been confused by some with reincarnation. The idea of „becoming physical 
again‟ has moved so far from traditional Christian ideas in the minds of 
some of these ordinary theologians that it has become associated with the 
non-Christian idea of reincarnation. 
6. Jesus‟ physical resurrection is not relevant to our final afterlife state. It was 
a completely unique event, which was necessary to provide sufficient 
proof to confirm who he was and the value of what he had taught us. It 
also showed that there would be LAD, but this will be a non-physical soul-
spirit existence (which is what Jesus himself entered following his brief 
resurrected „proof-state‟).  
7. There is deep scepticism concerning any claim by either academy or 
church to a definitive interpretation of what the Bible says concerning 
LAD. This is a consequence of the mutually reinforcing factors of the 
influence of relativism and individualism in contemporary British culture, 
and the failure of church and academy meaningfully to convey the results 
of biblical and theological scholarship.  
8.  The „ordinary‟ approach to biblical interpretation is „what works for me‟ 
What the Bible is understood to say must make sense to life experience 
and context. An „ordinary‟ reading of key LAD texts can provide relevant 
commentary on current academic debates concerning the interpretation of 
those texts.  
9. Experience of the supernatural is a significant factor for many ordinary 
theologians. In particular, experience of the known dead confirms that 
there is LAD and that it is immediate, good, and social. The frequency of 
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such experiences suggests a continuing need on the part of modern 
protestant Christians for contact with the dead.  
10. Family and church background has also been important in forming the 
views of these ordinary theologians. Belief in LAD makes a difference for 
these people in how they face their own death and how they deal with the 
death of loved ones. It removes fear, and provides comfort and hope of 
reunion. Theodicy is not seen as an issue. There is no need to explain 
differential suffering in this life: all will be well in the afterlife. 
11. Despite the deep level of disclosure of views within interviews, there is 
nevertheless a marked reluctance on the part of these ordinary theologians 
to express their LAD views to others. They have rarely sought to help 
others in their bereavement situations by talking about LAD, and have 
rarely received such help in their own bereavements. Yet they were very 
interested in the views of others who had taken part in the project, and 
recognised that we could benefit from being more open about talk of LAD. 
A Potential Criticism 
Of course, all of this is open to the criticism of wish-fulfilment: the 
continuing re-invention of heaven to meet the changing longings and imaginings 
of human beings. The accusation can be made that „popular views of life after 
death smack more of an eternally cosy family circle than of the call of a 
dramatically creative God.‟234 Alan Segal applies this form of scepticism to an 
historical overview of the afterlife in religions of the West, asking what he sees as 
the key question – „To whose benefit is this belief in the afterlife?‟235 The basic 
assumption of his approach is that beliefs emerge from culture in order to serve 
the (non-theological) purposes of some people. The great variety of concepts of 
the afterlife shows simply the great variety and ingenuity of changing cultures. He 
rejects out of hand any possibility of the revelation of something beyond human 
experience. A clear victim of his study is „the reassuring notion that the afterlife is 
part of unchanging revealed truth. ... We are telling ourselves what the Scriptures 
must mean in the current circumstance; it is not God speaking to us directly.‟236 
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This is an extremely narrow view of biblical interpretation and continuing 
revelation.
237
 Ultimately, Segal is simply rejecting the possibility of the Christian 
God, replacing it with a self-contained human explanation. If a concept of heaven 
was not relevant to the prevailing cultural milieu, then what meaning could it 
have?  
Wiles reminds us that 
 our assessment of the evidence is bound (logically bound) to be related to 
our general expectations of what is conceivable. If there were nothing 
(literally nothing) in our more general experience that made the idea of a 
survival of death a conceivable notion, then we would be forced to 
conclude that in no sense could Jesus be understood to have survived 
death.
238
  
Zaleski is clear that God must use our human symbols and images if he wishes to 
be known. „If God is willing to descend into our human condition, may he not 
also, by the same courtesy, descend into our cultural forms and become mediated 
to us in and through them?‟ 239 This point is not lost on ordinary theologians. In 
the group meeting, Ursula made the point that „I think the trouble is we can only 
sort of try and relate it to life on earth and we always try to do that don‟t we, but it 
must be completely different.‟ Laura thinks, „the human mind needs to construct 
something that makes sense to it.‟  
McDannell and Lang argue that, unlike other theological doctrines, LAD 
does not progress in a linear fashion toward some overall agreed position. 
„Christians still associate God with the afterlife, but the great variety of concepts 
of God which exist in the contemporary Christian world erases the possibility of a 
common notion of heaven.‟240 During the pendulum swings between 
anthropocentric and theocentric views of heaven, which have taken place 
throughout Christian history, there is development and change and not simply 
repetition. „Traditional concepts and concerns lead to ever new and characteristic 
configurations coloured by the general cultural and social climate. We would be 
wrong in defining the history of heaven as the alternation between human wishful 
thinking and biblical truth.‟ 241 Jeffrey Russell makes a similar point about the 
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concept of heaven, which can be heard as singing in the silence of human 
existential longing.  
Theological tradition claims that over time the tradition develops under the 
guidance of the Holy Spirit and ends by telling the equivalent of truth as 
God knows it. The history of concepts respects but does not endorse that 
claim. One cannot assume that the concept of heaven progresses inevitably 
until it becomes complete; it may continue to open out perpetually. … 
Concepts develop through time. Some concepts die; others narrow down; 
others stagnate. The concept of heaven opens. It opens up in the cosmos in 
ever-widening circles and opens down in the human character to the 
deepest self.
242
  
It is undeniable that views of heaven change over time and are influenced by 
shifts in the prevailing social and cultural norms: the extent of historical variation 
in concepts of heaven is remarkable. Russell‟s vision of an ever opening and 
expanding concept of heaven portrays this as an ever richer reservoir of Christian 
expression with regard to our central hope: a reservoir which indeed has a 
shoreline, a limit, which is partly visible, but which expands off into an ever 
unknown horizon. This conception allows different „correct‟ views of the afterlife, 
or perhaps a continuing succession of appropriate views of heaven for particular 
human contexts. Lindbeck perceives these as different propositional doctrinal 
expressions of the same underlying rules of theological grammar concerning LAD 
(see „Doctrine Tested in the Ordinary‟ page 33). In other words, the fact that 
expressions of the afterlife change over time is by no means an indication of 
something insubstantial, but can actually be quite the opposite.  
Carole Zaleski argues that imagination has a key role in eschatology. She 
believes Cullman and others have failed to grasp „the principle of “development 
of doctrine” in eschatology‟, and have not appreciated „the varieties of the 
eschatological imagination‟. What such critics „gain in consistency, they lose by 
cutting Christian eschatology off from its imaginative roots, from its links to the 
past, and from its relevance to popular religious longings.‟243 David Brown sees a 
modern decline in visions of heaven: they have become meagre and dry, and 
while there are complex reasons for this, he suggests the key factor is „a simple 
failure of imaginative nerve‟. He warns that, „Because we are now aware of the 
considerable extent to which such descriptions of the society of heaven mirror the 
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concerns of the writer‟s own day, it is easy to jump to the negative conclusion that 
this is all that they do.‟ Brown argues that the church is mistaken in so easily 
retreating from imaginative descriptions of the afterlife, because despite their 
faults they „clarify what Christianity in fact offers as its ideal of society when 
wholly directed by Christ. That is a matter of no small moment if it is indeed true 
that the humanity Christ has in heaven remains, like ours, essentially social.‟244 
Richard Bauckham argues that hope is „an imaginative enterprise‟ and we 
need to think about an eschatological future in terms other than a simple 
extrapolation of the past and present. But this is not fantasy: „Christian hopeful 
imagining is grounded in the promise of God and resourced by the images of the 
scriptural revelation.‟ It is also „inspired by the event of eschatological promise‟, 
the resurrection of Jesus. It is also characterised „by its relevance to the way 
Christian life now is lived‟.245 Bauckham and Hart argue that contemporary 
society needs to rediscover the „irreducibly imaginative‟ Christian hope. 
Eschatological imagining is much more than factual reference or straightforward 
description, it is rather „the deliberate and sometimes striking and discomforting 
development and conjunction of ideas and pictures drawn from this world but 
presented now starkly in ways which correspond to no this-worldly 
experience.‟246 Bauckham and Hart believe that „resurrection is in origin not a 
concept, but an image.‟ The NT images of resurrection are themselves exercises 
in eschatological imagination: Paul gives us images to express what cannot 
otherwise be understood, even partially. Theologians then generate other images 
(rather than explanations of the biblical image); for example, Barth, Moltmann 
and Pannenburg provide another image in their proposals that we should 
understand bodily resurrection as „the raising into eternity of precisely the whole 
temporal life which the dead have lived.‟ As with all the other images, it cannot 
be adequate in itself, but can be of great value in providing an image of how an 
Alzheimer‟s sufferer „will in the resurrection be who she was in the whole of her 
mortal life, not merely how she finally was at death. That we cannot imagine how 
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this literally could be is, of course, beside the point. We cannot imagine what 
resurrection as such will literally be.‟247  
Ordinary theologians also exercise eschatological imagination. This does not 
mean it is mere fantasy. 
4.3 WHAT THESE VIEWS CAN TELL US 
As I have shown, there is no clear protestant orthodoxy as such concerning 
LAD; neither (of course) is there a clear statement of Congregational orthodoxy in 
this area. However, using relevant protestant creedal statements, doctrine and 
liturgies, in conjunction with Wright‟s view of „life after LAD‟, I have 
synthesised a form of protestant orthodoxy for the comparative purposes of this 
project. By comparison, the ordinary eschatology of this research may seem so 
unorthodox that it could simply be dismissed as the untutored ramblings of some 
strange northern Christians. However, this would be greatly to overemphasise 
protestant orthodoxy with respect to LAD, and greatly to undervalue the relevance 
of the „ordinary voice‟. The volume of this particular ordinary voice may be 
relatively low: this sample of ordinary theologians is numerically small and 
perhaps unrepresentative. However, it is still clearly audible. Their disclosed 
views are remarkably consistent, and nearly all of their views can find support, at 
least to some extent, in one „side‟ of the relevant, current academic theological 
debates. In other words, their views are not entirely unique. In fact, some aspects 
of ordinary eschatology may be considered to be a return to a more traditional 
view (with regard to the soul, for example).  
The non-physicality of the afterlife in ordinary eschatology is the key point 
of difference from the „norm‟. There is no future final physical resurrection, or 
new earth and heavens. The final afterlife state is an immediate, conscious, social, 
soul-spirit existence. The soul is substantial, providing the mechanism for 
continuation of personal identity: the view of human being is therefore dualist. So 
clear is this conviction of a non-physical afterlife that a radical interpretation of 
Jesus‟ resurrection follows. Ordinary eschatology generally accepts that this was a 
physical (bodily) resurrection, but considers it a necessary proof to convince the 
disciples and others that Jesus was the Son of God, rather than an indication of 
what their own afterlife will be like.  
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When stated in summary form like this, ordinary eschatology can seem 
surprising. However, the stark contrast between the physical („orthodox‟) and the 
non-physical („ordinary‟) is much less apparent when it is noted that ordinary 
eschatology expects elements of earthly physical experience to be (somehow) 
available in the non-physical afterlife. Rather than two extreme poles, the physical 
and non-physical views are better conceived as positions on a continuum. The 
issue is the extent of transformation, of difference, between this world and the 
next. Wright is keen to emphasise continuity with this world to comply with what 
he regards as biblical teaching, and to ensure that Christians in this life do not 
have an over-heavenly outlook that distances them from the joys and 
responsibilities of the present Kingdom of God. These ordinary theologians are 
keen to emphasise discontinuity, although not completely because they see an 
obvious need for physical-like characteristics in the next life. This „ordinary‟ 
emphasis is not based on their longing to escape this life, however, but rather on 
their clear understanding of the drawbacks of this physical life. Wright fails fully 
to appreciate the force of the common human experience of ageing with its 
attendant decline and ill health. It is also clear that emphasis on the physical leads, 
in the minds of ordinary theologians, to significant logical and practical problems 
the solutions to which can seem as fantastic as any non-physical afterlife.  
This ordinary eschatology also finds significant support within the current 
academic debates (philosophical and biblical). Rejection of the substantial soul is 
a recent phenomenon within protestant theology and is by no means universally 
accepted. Ordinary eschatology considers the substantial soul to be the obvious 
explanation of both how this life is experienced, and how I can still be „me‟ in the 
next. It is also the way that personal integrity and continuity can be understood 
when mind-robbing diseases such as dementia strike. Wright would undoubtedly 
claim that ordinary eschatology is non-biblical. However, there simply is no 
consensus regarding the interpretation of key LAD texts such as 1 Cor.15. 
Competing and contradictory opinions abound, some of which would lend support 
to this ordinary eschatology. Furthermore, even if it were accepted that Paul 
clearly meant a bodily „spiritual‟ resurrection, and that he envisaged the recreation 
of the physical earth and heavens, this can be challenged by our total change in 
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world views.
248
 What may have been a reasonable conclusion for Paul, with his 
understanding of a small (worldly) and young physical creation, may not be 
reasonable for us who now know of an almost infinite, complex physical cosmos, 
which has existed for an almost unimaginably long period of time. God‟s actions 
at „the end of the world‟ surely look different from this perspective; although 
paradoxically, some physicist-theologians seem not to see this. The imminent 
conclusion that Paul probably expected, for a small and young creation, has 
become the almost eternally prolonged evolutionary progress of an immense 
cosmos. In the light of this, our conception of the afterlife must surely change.  
I am not arguing that this ordinary eschatology should simply be accepted in 
its entirety as the new orthodoxy. I wish to claim only that there is good reason to 
take it seriously. If ordinary theologians have been Spirit signal processing at all, 
and I have suggested the means to assess whether this is the case, then the church 
and academy need to hear their results. The strength of this „ordinary voice‟ 
depends on several things. There is the matter of „volume‟: the voice of 26 
ordinary theologians is clearly not as loud, in one obvious sense, as the voice of 
26 thousand. Consistency is also important here: 26 voices saying the same thing 
has a much greater impact than the same number of people saying several 
different things. If ordinary theology were taken more seriously then perhaps the 
church could seek actually to hear its true (and possibly very substantial) volume 
across all denominations. The strength of the ordinary voice also relates to the 
extent to which it differs from the theological „norm‟, and the extent to which it 
finds support in current theological debates. If the results of ordinary theology 
were entirely different from the theological norm and found no support in current 
debates, then it is possible, but unlikely, that it could be the result of Spiritual 
discernment. In such situations the obvious implication could be that the church 
and academy may well need to reconsider how it conveys orthodox theology to 
ordinary Christians, rather than to reconsider completely such orthodoxy. 
However, where the results of ordinary theology differ from the norm in key 
aspects, but still finds support in current theological debates, then it is more likely 
that the guidance of the Spirit is being reflected. In such situations, church and 
academy should allow these views to contribute to the discussions. This data 
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suggests that the relatively small voice of this ordinary eschatology falls into the 
latter category.  
The potential benefit of listening to such an ordinary voice has, I believe, 
already been realised and demonstrated within this project. As part of this project 
I obviously needed to look at the relevant literature and theological debates in 
detail. This began as a process of expanding my own understanding in these areas, 
and providing a theological norm for the critique of this ordinary theology. As the 
ordinary eschatology emerged more fully from the interviews, I began to identify 
support for and opposition to these views from within the debates. A surprising 
and important development followed from this: I found myself in a creative 
„hermeneutic spiral‟, fuelled by the ordinary eschatology that was being disclosed 
to me. I was no longer just checking the literature to critique these ordinary views 
(by identifying points of support and opposition), but I was also using the 
ordinary eschatology to critique the debates: and each influenced the other in a 
continuing process. So, for example, I have moved from a position where I simply 
took it for granted that the afterlife must be physical, following a probably 
unconscious interim period, to one in which I can increasingly see the reasons 
why a physical afterlife is problematic. Similarly, I have reassessed the monist 
positions on human being and have moved toward a dualist position. I suggest 
that this is precisely the benefit that ordinary theologians, as Spirit signal 
processors, can provide to the church and academy. Ordinary theology can 
provide real stimulus to re-examine and reassess existing assumptions within 
ongoing theological debates. 
If ordinary views are ignored, then potentially damaging disjunctions can 
appear between ordinary Christians and ecclesial and academic authority. 
McDannell and Lang argue that the „modern‟ view of heaven is still popular, with 
many Christians hoping for reunion with their loved ones. However, in the 
contemporary church, „hoping to meet one‟s family after death is a wish and not a 
theological argument. While most Christian clergy would not deny that wish, 
contemporary theologians are not interested in articulating the motif of meeting 
again in theological terms.‟249 I have suggested that protestant „orthodoxy‟, 
including Wright, is not as theocentric as McDannell and Lang suggest. 
Nevertheless, the warning about such disjunctions remains pertinent.  
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4.4 FURTHER IMPLICATIONS FOR CHURCH AND MINISTRY 
‘Ordinary’ Teaching and Learning  
A clear message from this project is that ordinary theologians seem to learn 
more by testing in practice ways of Christian living and belief, rather than by 
seeking to understand (in mental isolation) new propositional truth.
250
 These 
ordinary theologians believe in things, not just that things are such and such. My 
limited data suggests that church and academy may have failed to communicate to 
recent generations of Christians an appropriate understanding of biblical 
interpretation, and any appreciation of doctrinal development via continuing 
revelation within a living tradition. These ordinary theologians are highly 
sceptical of academic or ecclesial authority in such areas, seeing the views of 
church and academy as merely „their opinion‟. This suggests that the ways in 
which such academic and ecclesial views are arrived at are seen by those in the 
pews as completely dissociated from themselves; something done apart from them 
and without them. The clarion call of Wright for a right biblical and doctrinal 
understanding of LAD will therefore not be heard clearly by such people: his 
seeds of propositional correction will fall mainly on stony ground. 
The church, at all organisational levels, needs better to appreciate the 
disjunction between what is „taught‟ in doctrine, sermons, liturgy and ritual, and 
what is actually learned. For example, what those attending funerals actually 
understand by the ritual is, in my experience, often very different both to what the 
officiant intends, and to what the church understands by the liturgy. Is the 
intended effect of liturgy ever tested against its actual reception by those in the 
pews? Should draft liturgy be „trialled‟ in this way? This project has demonstrated 
that what I think people are learning from my sermons and Bible study/discussion 
groups is not necessarily what they actually are learning. I have no doubt that the 
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same is true for clergy colleagues across the denominations. My schoolteacher 
friends know, of course, that it is good practice to check what is being learned. 
This simple lesson seems generally to have evaded the church.
251
 Surely we need 
to know what our congregations actually think and believe before attempting to 
facilitate further learning; and surely we need to know what they actually think 
and believe after we have done so.  
The ordinary theology of our church members represents a great, but largely 
untapped, resource for more effective education in the church. Furthermore, the 
process of articulating their ordinary theology can itself be a rewarding and „deep‟ 
learning experience for ordinary theologians; and also for the clergy-researcher. 
In this project this happened not just through the one-to-one interview itself, but 
also by further personal reflection of the interviewee outside of the interview, and 
by the sharing of views with others. This overall process helped ordinary 
Christians to clarify, and even articulate for the first time, their own beliefs on key 
issues of the lived faith. I believe the listening-conversational process may also 
have enabled them to do so in a positively critical way, and perhaps helped 
change them from being „unlearning religious people‟.252  
I intend to apply some of these insights in following up this project with my 
own congregation.  
i. I will disseminate these results and create the opportunity for further 
discussion of LAD, and further reflection on their experience of this 
research process. In doing so I will seek both to consolidate and build on 
their new self-understanding as ordinary theologians. 
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 See Roger L. Walton, „Assessment in Adult Christian Education‟, in Astley (ed.), Learning in the 
Way, 90-112; Alan Rogers, Teaching Adults (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002), chpt. 11, 
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ii. I have already begun to adapt funeral liturgies and will seek to „trial‟ these 
(that is, to seek detailed feedback on how they would perceive such liturgy 
at a funeral service) with some who have taken part in this project.  
iii. I will seek to develop a streamlined process for the „ordinary‟ 
consideration of further issues such as euthanasia and assisted dying, and 
atonement. Clearly, any further processes of articulating ordinary theology 
cannot be as resource intensive as this one, but the main „listening‟ and 
„clarifying‟ benefits should be preserved wherever possible. Initially I will 
explore a group method rather than further one-to-one interviews.  
The Need for More ‘LAD talk’ 
A clear finding of this project is the disjunction between the feeling of these 
ordinary theologians that more talk about LAD within church and society is 
desirable and beneficial, and their reluctance to engage in such talk. Death in 
England has become „unnatural‟, an unsuitable topic for ordinary conversation, an 
experience to be hidden behind hospitals and professionals. Views of life after 
death have also become matters of personal choice, which should not therefore be 
imposed upon others, even (or especially) in bereavement situations. The church 
is well placed to resist this trend, and to help articulate the common experience of 
death in our country where „mourners and others are actors without any lines, 
participants in a drama without any parts to play.‟253 There is a clear need here 
which the church can begin to meet.
254
 
Walter has written extensively about the effect of contemporary culture on 
how we understand and deal with human death. He argues that the taboo about 
death has turned into the personalised postmodern death obsession, an interesting 
process of ritual reinvention where the „I did it my way‟ approach (Sinatra‟s 
ballad, now a popular choice for funeral music) is becoming the norm. Walter 
claims that people now not only have to confront their own death, but also to 
construct a death „out of the fragments of ideologies and religious sentiments with 
which our culture provides us.‟255 This is radically new – „In all previous societies 
                                                     
253
 Young and Cullen, A Good Death, 204. 
254
 See John Swinton, and Richard Payne (eds.), Living Well and Dying Faithfully: Christian Practices 
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there were shared norms as to how to die and how to mourn.‟256 For Walter, this 
new situation is the logical conclusion of western individualism where religion 
has lost its authority in such matters. Philippe Ariès shows how death and 
mourning, together with its rituals and visible representations, have become 
hidden in modern society - the unpalatable reality that contradicts the pretence of 
a non-mortal self.
257
  
Jupp points out that the location of death has changed greatly, limiting our 
direct experience of dying and corpses: most of us now die in the institutionalised 
setting of hospital or care homes, only one in six die at home. He also argues that 
the way in which dying and corpses are dealt with influences how people 
understand and seek to make sense of death; for example, the commercialisation 
of funerals has had a significant effect on how we deal with death. „In Britain, 
currents of social and cultural change have affected our lives and institutions and 
also the British way of death.‟258 Walter points to „the “invention” of 
bereavement‟, by which he means „the shift of focus from the soul of the deceased 
to the feelings of survivors, and declining value given to theological expertise in 
eschatology compared to the increasing value given to expertise in the psychology 
of grief.‟259  
Young and Cullen conclude that all the bereavement post-death situations 
they observed were lacking something critical, „the presence of a wider 
community, of people and of spiritual as well as material support.‟ They identified 
four main needs: that funerals should be more personal and focused on the 
deceased; that support should be extended well beyond the funeral; that continuity 
between the dead and the living should be established; and that death can 
regenerate mortality. Death is not instant: a sociological view shows that it is a 
lengthy business. „The bereaved whom we saw were recovering their dead and 
holding on to them, not so much because they wanted to as because they had 
to.‟260 Young and Cullen point to a specific church which has thrived because it 
has adopted a vigorous death ministry, offering personal support before and after 
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the funeral, and using lay people who have gone through bereavement themselves 
and wanted to share their experience. They also argue that death is the ultimate 
common experience of human life, which „can generate the mystical unity with 
other people which transcends the boundaries of the body and the self.‟ Even the 
churches ignore the „perpetual fund of goodwill‟ which death generates; even the 
churches seem to have forgotten that „by supporting the dead, they support the 
living; that ritual is a method of demonstrating fellow-feeling; that the structure of 
morality is in good part spun out from the vigour it can get from death.‟261  
I will be considering how my own church can more fully recognise this and 
improve our support for the bereaved. This will include seeking to make „death 
talk‟ a more regular conversation topic within the church community. 
 
4.5 FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further empirical study of the views of other ordinary theologians 
concerning LAD would clearly be desirable. The ordinary eschatology of 
Christians from other denominations and contexts would show if this data is 
representative. A particularly interesting comparison would be with Roman 
Catholic ordinary theologians.  
The strength of scepticism regarding claims to authoritative biblical 
interpretation also suggests a need for further research. How do ordinary 
theologians actually understand the Bible and church doctrine? How and where 
do they seek guidance? Can the „ordinary interpretation‟ of the Bible be disclosed 
systematically to church and academy, and applied to current theological debates?  
Further research concerning the positive Christian theological learning 
experiences which seem to result from this kind of „listening-conversational‟ 
project would be of benefit in understanding how better to realise the potential of 
ordinary theology and ordinary theologians.   
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Finally, the issue of euthanasia and assisted dying was raised by ordinary 
theologians: it was not part of the interview schedule but nevertheless formed a 
lengthy and engaging part of the group meeting. This suggests, first, that the 
question of euthanasia and assisted dying follows directly from discussion of 
LAD; and, second, that it is an issue that people want to consider. It seems to me 
that it is an „elephant in the room‟ for contemporary church and society.262 I 
strongly suspect that research into the ordinary theology of euthanasia and 
assisted dying would demonstrate another clear disjunction from the existing 
church „norm‟. It may well be a situation where Spirit signal processors could be 
leading, rather than following, the church.  
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 See Paul Badham, Is There a Christian Case for Assisted Dying? Voluntary Euthanasia Reassessed 
(London: SPCK, 2009) for a recent attempt to place this issue firmly on the Christian agenda. 
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APPENDIX A - EXISTING EMPIRICAL DATA ON LAD 
BELIEF 
A number of major surveys and studies have included relevant questions 
about LAD. Comparisons between and amalgamation of different data sets is 
notoriously difficult (owing to their different methodologies, populations, times 
and places, phrasing of questions, interview technique, etc.), but nevertheless it 
can provide useful information for understanding further some of the results of 
this research.
263
 It can also provide relevant insights into common areas, and was 
helpful in forming the range and nature of my own interview schedule.
264
  
The think tank THEOS commissioned a survey
265
 in 2008, the press release 
highlighting the key finding as „Over half of Britons believe Jesus rose from the 
dead.‟266 Fieldwork was carried out in February 2008, and the key question (for 
my purposes) was: Q4. What do you believe about life after death? People were 
asked to indicate AGREE, DISAGREE, or DON‟T KNOW for each option. The key 
group from my point of view are the 90 people (out of a total sample size of 1107, 
i.e. 8% – 42 male, 48 female) who self-described themselves as „Christian 
regularly attending church‟. The results were as follows. 
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 For example, the Rural Church Project findings on the sense of presence of the dead encouraged me 
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OPTION 
 
AGREE DISAGREE DON‟T KNOW 
I believe that I will go to 
heaven when I die 
 
68 
76% 
10 
11% 
12 
13% 
I believe we are judged after 
death on the way we have 
lived our lives 
 
69 
76% 
12 
14% 
9 
10% 
I believe in a physical 
resurrection 
 
38 
42% 
34 
38% 
18 
20% 
I don‟t believe in a physical 
resurrection but I do believe 
that your spirit lives on after 
death 
 
45 
50% 
39 
43% 
6 
7% 
I believe that death marks the 
end of human existence 
 
20 
22% 
57 
63% 
13 
14% 
I believe in reincarnation – 
After death I will be reborn 
into another body 
 
5 
6% 
64 
71% 
21 
23% 
 
There are marked gender differences in the overall sample as shown 
below,
267
 but the report does not allow gender differentiation in the above 
„Christian‟ sample. 
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OPTION 
 
AGREE 
male 
AGREE 
female 
DIS-
AGREE 
male 
DIS-
AGREE 
female 
DON‟T 
KNOW 
male 
DON‟T 
KNOW 
female 
I believe that I will 
go to heaven when I 
die 
 
113 
21% 
187 
32% 
203 
38% 
143 
25% 
216 
41% 
246 
43% 
I believe we are 
judged after death 
on the way we have 
lived our lives 
 
150 
28% 
207 
36% 
229 
43% 
176 
31% 
152 
29% 
193 
34% 
I believe in a 
physical 
resurrection 
 
44 
8% 
51 
9% 
332 
62% 
324 
56% 
155 
29% 
201 
35% 
I don‟t believe in a 
physical 
resurrection but I do 
believe that your 
spirit lives on after 
death 
 
174 
33% 
308 
54% 
206 
39% 
113 
20% 
152 
29% 
155 
27% 
I believe that death 
marks the end of 
human existence 
 
250 
47% 
201 
35% 
133 
25% 
205 
36% 
148 
28% 
169 
29% 
I believe in 
reincarnation – 
After death I will be 
reborn into another 
body 
 
57 
11% 
92 
16% 
296 
56% 
231 
40% 
178 
34% 
253 
44% 
 
In relation to beliefs concerning LAD, Davies and Shaw
268
 in their mammoth 
survey of 1995 sought to explore the beliefs of their respondents using questions 
devised, tested and administered successfully in the earlier Rural Church Project 
study of religion in Britain. Interviewees were shown a card and asked „which, if 
any, of the views on this card accord with your own attitude to life after death?‟ 
(Q21)‟. 269 The fixed options were:  
Nothing happens, we come to the end of life.  
Our soul passes on to another world.  
Our bodies await resurrection.  
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 D. J. Davies, and A. Shaw, Reusing Old Graves: A Report on Popular British Attitudes (Crayford: 
Shaw & Sons Ltd., 1995). 
269
 Davies and Shaw, Reusing Old Graves, 92. 
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We come back as something or someone else. 
Trust in God all is in God's hands. 
 
The results are shown below.
270
 An individual could choose as many options 
as she or he wished, so the table shows the percentage of the total responses 
gained by each category.  
 
Soul passes on  546  34.1 %  
End of life  461  28.8 %  
In God's hands  348  21.7 %  
Reincarnation  195  12.2 %  
Resurrection  126  7.9%  
Don't know  145  9.0%  
Some other idea about the afterlife  23  1.4 %  
 
However, 79 % of the total sample opted for just one of these responses, „so 
we may see the above table as a moderately good sketch of popular attitudes to 
the afterlife‟271. When these responses were analysed by Christian affiliation, the 
following results were obtained.
272
  
 
Religion End of 
Life 
Soul passes 
on  
Resurrection Reincarnation Trust in 
God  
Church of England  32%  33 %  4%  14 %,  17 %  
Roman Catholics  14%  48 % 18 %  11%  32%  
Church of Scotland  22%  35 %  6%  6%  31 %  
Methodists  30%  26 % -  6%  30%  
 
The gender differences seen in the THEOS survey are in general agreement 
with the Davies/Shaw findings, although these are not as marked in some 
categories.
273
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BELIEF MALE FEMALE 
Soul passes on 37% 63% 
Life ends 61% 39% 
All in God‟s hands 38% 62% 
Come back as something 37% 63% 
Resurrection 45% 55% 
 
Davies uses previously unpublished data from the 1995 survey to show the 
complexity of afterlife beliefs, for example as held by those describing themselves 
as atheist or agnostic. He warns that such results „show that beliefs are complex 
and do not necessarily follow the neat assumptions often held in explicit 
philosophical positions.‟274 The strong positive response to belief in a soul 
surviving death, the significant reincarnation response, and the substantial 
minority of those within Christian denominations who indicated that death was 
final, all lead to another caution. „Formal theology is not, however, always 
reflected in the popular religion of active church members, let alone the wider 
public who may attend church only periodically.‟275 Of particular note is the low 
Anglican response to resurrection, only 4% supporting the idea of the body 
waiting for this afterlife outcome. It is worth quoting Davies at length here, given 
the central importance of this theme for the Tom Wright view:
276
 
This is an important observation and well worthy of comment given the 
importance of the idea of the resurrection of Christ and of ordinary 
believers in the Creed and in the basic theology of the Church of England. 
Whilst it cannot simply be assumed that the idea of the resurrection and of 
a resurrection body are clearly intelligible to all, it might be expected that 
the very word „resurrection‟ would evoke a response in people‟s own 
grammar of faith when responding to survey questions about life after 
death. Yet this seems not to be the case. Belief in a soul and in a broad 
trust in God seem to cover the basic Anglican grasp of life after death.
277
 
In fact, the Anglican response to reincarnation was far greater than to resurrection.  
                                                     
274
 Davies, „Contemporary Belief‟, 133. 
275
 Davies, „Contemporary Belief‟, 134. 
276
 Appendix D sets out the view of Tom Wright concerning LAD. The importance of this viewpoint for 
the current project is explained in 1.4 Assessing the Theological Contribution of Ordinary Theologians‟ 
page 39. 
277
 Davies, „Contemporary Belief‟, 135. 
 160 
 
Davies also uses previously unpublished data from the 1995 survey to 
explore the sense of presence of the dead. Approximately 35% of respondents 
claimed such an experience, with a very distinct gender bias toward women. 
Davies suggests two important things here. First, that the gender bias can be 
explained largely by the demographic fact that husbands/men tend to die at a 
younger age than wives/women, hence many of these experiences are claimed by 
women who have sensed the presence of a loved one in a domestic setting. 
Second, the high level of belief in LAD may be explained, at least in part, by the 
fact that experiences of sensing the dead are largely positive and seem to reinforce 
ideas of an afterlife for those who experience them.  
A major survey of Anglican views was conducted with Church Times 
readers in 2001, and subsequently analysed by Francis, Robbins and Astley.
278
 
Two issues of the paper (March and April) included the questionnaire, and 9,000 
responses were received, which was reduced to a final sample of 7,611 Anglicans 
in England who attended church at least once per fortnight (5,762 lay people, and 
1,845 clergy). The survey identified three doctrinal areas (beliefs about God, 
Jesus and LAD) where the orthodoxy of Anglicans was assessed. The analysis 
identifies five „fault-lines‟ between clergy and laity, between lay men and women, 
between older and younger lay people, between catholic and evangelical clergy, 
and between charismatic and non-charismatic clergy. The first three are most 
relevant to this research, and within these the first two themes of „patterns of 
belief‟ and „patterns of truth‟ are most significant. Key overall findings include 
that 78% affirm the physical resurrection of Jesus and only 6% deny this; 88% 
affirm belief in LAD, but 2% reject this and 10% are agnostic; 79 % believe that 
heaven really exists, 4% reject this and 17% are agnostic; 46% believe that hell 
really exists, 20% reject this and 34% are agnostic. Consequently, „the image 
which they carry of life after death may be at some variance with the historic 
creeds.‟279 It is also clear that committed Anglicans do not see the Bible as the 
only source for their faith, tradition remains important. 70% reject the view that 
the Bible is without error, and 62% argue that biblical truths are culturally 
conditioned. While the benefits of the traditional practices of Bible reading and 
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prayer are strongly affirmed, there is much less enthusiasm for Bible study groups 
and prayer groups.
280
  
In relation to the „fault-lines‟, the following information emerges. Clergy are 
more orthodox than lay people with regard to LAD, being more committed to the 
belief itself and to a real heaven and hell. But clergy are much more comfortable 
with the notion of biblical truth being culturally conditioned.
281
 There is little 
gender difference with regard to orthodoxy of belief or understanding of religious 
truth among lay people.
282
 However, there were significant differences among age 
groups. Younger Anglicans (defined as less than 50 years of age) are more 
orthodox in their beliefs about God and Jesus. With respect to LAD, however, 
there was little difference.
283
 Evangelical and catholic clergy differ greatly over 
the reality of hell, and significantly over the reality of heaven and belief in LAD 
itself. Catholic clergy are also much less likely to uphold the inerrancy of 
Scripture. „Overall, the fault-line between catholic and evangelical clergy 
concerning the grounds of theological truth is strongly developed and very 
pronounced.‟284 Also significant and profound is the difference between 
charismatic and non-charismatic clergy, the former being much more committed 
to a real heaven and particularly a real hell.
285
 While this data might at first seem 
less at odds with Wright‟s view than that outlined previously, the clear differences 
between clergy and between clergy and laity present real issues for him.
286
  
Of the more general social surveys, the European Values Survey (EVS) is 
most relevant, containing a number of questions around the issue of LAD. 
Longitudinal analysis and comparison across countries is possible. This data 
shows, in Britain, a persistent high level of belief in God, heaven and soul; a 
fairly high level of belief in LAD; and significant belief in hell, reincarnation and 
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resurrection. The following table uses the summary data of Walter
287
 plus data 
from the EVS 1999/2000 dataset (release 2, May 2006).
 288
 The data is partial in 
that the question set is not consistent over time.  
 
% 
believing in 
 1968 1981 1990 1999 
God 77 76 71 61 
heaven 54 57 53 46 
soul  59 64  
LAD 38 45 44 45 
hell 23 27 25 30 
reincarnation 18 27   
resurrection   32  
 
The General Social Survey (GSS) of the National Opinion Research Centre 
(NORC) at Chicago University conducts basic scientific research on the structure 
and development of American society and has in the past asked some interesting 
questions regarding the specific nature of an afterlife.
 289
 In 1983 and 1984 the 
interviewer, in response to a positive or undecided answer to the question, „is 
there life after death?‟ said, „of course, no one knows exactly what life after death 
would be like, but here are some ideas people have had.‟ The interviewee was 
then given a card showing a number of ideas and was asked to say how likely she 
felt each possibility to be: very likely, somewhat likely, not too likely, or not 
likely at all? The results are as follows (percentage of respondents responding in 
this way to each question): 
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Afterlife Idea Very 
likely 
Somewhat 
likely 
Not too 
likely 
Not likely 
at all 
A life of peace and 
tranquillity. 
67 28 4 1 
A life of intense action. 13 28 39 19 
A life like here on earth, only 
better. 
30 31 22 18 
A life without many things 
which make our present life 
enjoyable. 
22 27 29 22 
A pale, shadowy form of life, 
hardly life at all. 
5 13 29 52 
A spiritual life involving our 
mind but not our body. 
48 31 9 12 
A paradise of pleasure and 
delights. 
37 31 22 11 
A place of loving intellectual 
communion. 
55 36 7 3 
Union with God. 81 17 2 1 
Reunion with relatives. 73 21 4 2 
 
Although this data is not directly applicable to British culture, it nevertheless 
provides an interesting insight into how some people viewed the nature of the 
afterlife. In the years 1986-89 a series of similar questions were put in the form of 
contrasting images, with the interviewee being asked to place themselves in this 
contrast within a range of seven positions (1 meaning total support for image A, 7 
meaning total support for image B). The results appear to show that LAD was 
expected by these people to be: probably better than life on earth but possibly 
without many things which make earthly life enjoyable; very probably a spiritual 
life (mind not body) rather than a sensual life of pleasures; much more likely to be 
a peaceful life rather than one of intense action; and very probably a more 
fulfilling life than a pale shadowy life. 
  
 164 
 
APPENDIX B - EXCURSUS ON CHURCH DOCTRINE 
CONCERNING LAD 
There are two issues here: the peculiar situation of the Congregational 
churches with respect to doctrine as such; and a notable lack of clarity in 
protestant LAD doctrine.  
CONGREGATIONALISTS AND DOCTRINE 
This study has been conducted within a Congregational church, a 
denomination which traditionally does not adhere to the practice of requiring 
subscription to creeds and is suspicious of anything which could undermine local 
authority. The available written resources for conducting sacraments and other 
services within Congregational churches are not compulsory, and give only a very 
simple statement of faith in relation to church membership.
290
 The suggested 
order for the induction and ordination of ministers is more comprehensive with 
regard to statements of faith, which are clearly recognisable as being related to the 
creeds but are entirely non-creedal in format.
291
 However, we are a federation of 
churches who recognise the need to understand both our own faith tradition and 
those of our fellow Christians. The website of the Congregational Federation 
gives this statement of „what we believe‟.292  
Generally, Congregational churches have a broadly orthodox faith 
commitment, believing in God as a Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
It is believed the Jesus Christ is the Son of God, who has uniquely 
revealed to humanity as much of His nature as they are able to accept. It is 
held that Jesus died on the cross to reveal fully the length to which the love 
of God goes, and that he rose from the tomb on the third day after his 
crucifixion.  
By His death on the cross, it is held that full atonement is made for the sins 
of humankind. God accepts that sacrifice and is willing to forgive us. 
It is believed the Holy Spirit is powerfully available to those who place 
their trust in God, and that He is present in worship and witness. 
Doctrine is not an alien concept and the traditional creeds are known by 
many. The role of tradition is substantial, if not explicit, for most 
Congregationalists. Shortly after the formation of the Congregational Union in 
1831, it adopted (in May 1833) a „Declaration of the Faith, Church Order, and 
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Discipline‟ of the church.293 This document states in its introductory comments 
that the churches of the Union 
wish it to be observed, that, notwithstanding their jealousy of subscription 
to creeds and articles, and their disapproval of the imposition of any 
human standard, whether of faith or discipline, they are far more agreed in 
their doctrines and practices than any Church which enjoins subscription 
and enforces a human standard of orthodoxy; and they believe that there is 
no minister and no church among them that would deny the substance of 
any one of the following doctrines of' religion, though each might prefer to 
state his sentiments in his own way. 
Among the stated doctrines of religion are the following: 
XV. They believe that the Scriptures teach the final perseverance of all 
true believers to a state of eternal blessedness, which they are appointed to 
obtain through constant faith in Christ, and uniform obedience to His 
commands. 
XVII. They believe that the sanctification of true Christians, or their 
growth in the graces of the Spirit, and meetness for heaven, is gradually 
carried on through the whole period during which it pleases God to 
continue them in the present life, and that, at death, their souls, perfectly 
freed from all remains of evil, are immediately received into the presence 
of Christ. 
XIX. They believe that Christ will finally come to judge the whole human 
race according to their works; that the bodies of the dead will be raised 
again; and that, as the Supreme Judge, He will divide the righteous from 
the wicked, will receive the righteous into „life everlasting‟, but send away 
the wicked into „everlasting punishment‟. 
The link to the Savoy Declaration of 1658 (which is identical with the 1646 
Presbyterian Westminster Confession in relation to the doctrine of LAD) is 
obvious. The key chapter of the Savoy Declaration is chapter 31, „Of The State of 
Man After Death, and of the Resurrection of the Dead‟. Here it is stated that:  
1. The bodies of men after death return to dust, and see corruption; but their souls 
(which neither die nor sleep) having an immortal subsistence, immediately 
return to God who gave them. The souls of the righteous being then made 
perfect in holiness, are received into the highest heavens, where they behold the 
face of God in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies: 
and the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, where they remain in torment and 
utter darkness, reserved to the judgment of the great day: Besides these two 
places for souls separated from their bodies, the Scripture acknowledgeth none.  
2. At the last day such as are found alive shall not die, but be changed; and all the 
dead shall be raised up with the self-same bodies, and none other, although 
with different qualities, which shall be united again to their souls forever.  
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3. The bodies of the unjust shall by the power of Christ be raised to dishonour; the 
bodies of the just, by his Spirit unto honour, and to be made conformable to his 
own glorious body.  
What is perhaps most striking from these historical Congregational 
statements is the clear expression of the life of the soul after death, with the Savoy 
Declaration talking specifically of the soul „having an immortal substance‟. There 
is an interim stage of conscious soul-existence,
294
 and of course (post-
Reformation) there is no purgatory. A final bodily resurrection is also clear. It is 
perhaps remarkable to note how clearly Calvin defended the concept of a soul and 
its immortality,
 295
 arguing that this is proven from the testimony of conscience, 
knowledge of God, the noble faculties with which it is endued, its activity and 
wondrous fancies in sleep, and innumerable passages of Scripture. The image of 
God, for Calvin, is one of the strongest proofs of the immortality of the soul. The 
image of God is in the soul and its nature may be learnt from its renewal by 
Christ. Plato is favoured among the philosophers for his correct identification of 
the soul as immortal, and Calvin is clear that the soul is an incorporeal substance. 
Moreover, having already shown from Scripture that the substance of the 
soul is incorporeal, we must now add, that though it is not properly 
enclosed by space, it however occupies the body as a kind of habitation, 
not only animating all its parts, and rendering the organs fit and useful for 
their actions, but also holding the first place in regulating the conduct.
296
 
However, it would be stretching credulity to believe that ordinary 
Congregationalists of today have been influenced by doctrinal documents and 
arguments such as those above. They are far more likely to have some awareness 
of the creeds used in the Church of England or of Catholic teaching on the matter.  
CREEDS AND ANGLICAN DOCTRINE 
The Apostles‟, Nicene, and Athanasian creeds are widely used by the Church 
of England in their liturgies. However, these key Christian creeds actually say 
little about LAD. In order, the relevant extracts are: 
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APOSTLES‟ CREED297  
he ascended into heaven, 
he is seated at the right hand of the Father, 
and he will come to to judge the living and the dead. 
I believe in the Holy Spirit, 
the holy catholic Church, 
the communion of saints, 
the forgiveness of sins, 
the resurrection of the body, 
and the life everlasting.  
 
NICENE CREED
298
 
He will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead, 
and his kingdom will have no end. 
We believe in the Holy Spirit, 
the Lord, the giver of life, 
who proceeds from the Father and the Son. 
who with the Father and the Son is worshipped and glorified. 
who has spoken through the prophets. 
We believe in one holy, catholic and apostolic church. 
We acknowledge one baptism for the remission of sins.  
We look for the resurrection of the dead, 
and the life of the world to come.   
 
ATHANASIAN CREED
299
  
For as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man: so God and Man is one Christ. 
Who suffered for our salvation: descended into hell, rose again the third day from 
the dead. 
He ascended into heaven, he sitteth on the right hand of the Father, God Almighty: 
from whence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead. 
At whose coming all men shall rise again with their bodies: and shall give account 
for their own works. 
And they that have done good shall go into life everlasting: and they that have done 
evil into everlasting fire. 
 
Other than these creeds
300
 (and the expression of doctrine within funeral 
liturgy – see Appendix C), Anglican Christians can look to the 39 Articles (1571, 
compulsory in 1662 Conformity), the Ordinal (not in 1980 ASB or Common 
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Worship), the Revised Catechism,
 301
 and most recently the 1996 Doctrine 
Commission report, The Mystery of Salvation. Stephen Sykes comments, in the 
composite volume which contains this report, that „These are documents with a 
pastoral concern, and, because of this, stand close to the Church‟s public teaching 
of the faith.‟302 However, „They are not an Anglican systematic theology, but they 
teach the faith from within the Church of England, attempting to discern a faithful 
and true pathway for the contemporary disciple.‟303 He claims the reports are 
written in a „semi-popular‟ style, but even as someone with considerable 
theological training I did not find it easy to find clear summaries of key issues.  
It is interesting that both John Polkinghorne and Tom Wright were members 
of this commission. Their influence can be clearly seen. The adoption of 
Polkinghorne‟s redefinition of the soul as a „complex information-bearing pattern‟ 
surely provides little further clarity in a key area of common concern and 
confusion.
304
 We are later assured that on death we are (our pattern is) 
„remembered‟ by God.305 This strikes me as a rather weak and unattractive 
expression of hope for ordinary Christians, and suggests echoes of process 
theology. The same may be said of the Polkinghorne view of how the matter of 
this creation is to be re-used in the eschaton, a view which sounds too 
scientifically transient to form doctrinal foundations.
306
 The voice of Wright can 
be seen in the emphasis on bodily resurrection, from a particular interpretation of 
1 Cor. 15; and a renewed cosmos, the „new heavens and new earth‟, from a 
particular interpretation of Romans 8 and Revelation 21. To this reader the report 
contains too many attempts at being all-inclusive. There are a number of 
occasions where a variety of differing views are brought together, perhaps more 
in order to be seen to be inclusive rather than from any motive of clarity of 
thought. The treatment of hell and damnation illustrates this point.
307
 
Universalism is rejected, but then partially endorsed by saying that ultimately 
only we can exclude ourselves from God‟s salvation. Hellfire and damnation is 
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rejected for moral and ethical reasons, but then accepted by redefining them as the 
awful state of those who finally cannot accept God‟s salvation.  
I could not find any clear doctrinal statement regarding LAD on the Church 
of England website (www.churchofengland.org), nor did I find clear reference to 
other sources for such information. The Revised Catechism is less than 
comprehensive:  
59 What are we to understand by the last judgement? 
By the last judgement we are to understand that all men will give account 
of their lives to God, who will condemn and destroy all that is evil, and 
bring his servants into the joy of their Lord. 
60 What are we to understand by resurrection? 
By resurrection we are to understand that God, who has overcome death 
by the resurrection of Christ, will raise from death in a body of glory all 
who are Christ‟s, that they may live with him in the fellowship of the 
saints. 
61 What, then, is our assurance as Christians? 
Our assurance as Christians is that neither death, nor life, nor things 
present, nor things to come, shall be able to separate us from the love of 
God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord. Thus, daily increasing in God‟s 
Holy Spirit, and following the example of our Saviour Christ, we shall at 
the last be made like unto him, for we shall see him as he is. 
 
By contrast, the Catechism of the Catholic Church,
308
 as with their funeral 
liturgy (see Appendix C), provides much clearer and more comprehensive 
doctrinal guidance: dealing in detail with such issues as the origin and nature of 
the soul, the meaning and significance of Jesus‟ resurrection, and the resurrection 
of the body (including the obvious and common objections that people raise 
against this doctrine). I say this as a Reformed Minister, standing at the other side 
of the Reformation, who disagrees with some of this guidance. My point is rather 
to admire the availability and clarity of expression therein, compared to my own 
church and the national protestant church. The protestant churches seem to have 
little of substance and clarity with which to guide our own faithful concerning 
LAD. The rather important question of „what happens to us when we die‟ either 
seems to have found little common ground for agreement and doctrinal statement 
in the protestant denominations, or it has not been communicated to the ordinary 
protestant faithful in any effective way.   
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APPENDIX C - A MINISTER REVIEWS HIS OWN 
THEOLOGY AND PRACTICE 
Before exploring in detail the ordinary theology of members of my 
congregation, it was important that I become more aware of my own beliefs and 
practice concerning LAD. I had kept full service notes of all funerals I had taken 
since 1987, but had never reviewed them systematically. I therefore undertook 
such a review, with the following results.  
I have never used the word „soul‟ in a funeral service, except incidentally via 
the reading of Psalm 23, and have never used Wisdom 3:1. I have rarely used the 
word „heaven‟, preferring instead „the afterlife‟ or „life with God after death‟. My 
most often used passages of Scripture are Romans 8 (never separated from God) 
and Revelation 21 (wiping away tears from eyes). In the context of my funeral 
services, the first has undoubtedly suggested an immediate, post-mortem, 
personal relationship with God and protection and comfort by him; the second, a 
final peaceful resting place where all the problems of this life are taken away 
(although this passage is a picture of a new physical city, the message as given 
and received in funerals is actually metaphorical and non-physical). I have also 
infrequently used Mt. 11:28, again implying a peaceful rest after death. 
The service books I have used over this period are equally illuminating. 
Patterns for Worship
309
 has no mention of soul other than in the Wisdom 3 
reading, and the committal wording is „we have entrusted our brother‟ (i.e. the 
whole person, as we knew him). It also uses „in sure and certain hope of the 
resurrection to eternal life through our Lord Jesus Christ‟, but in my experience 
this has actually been received and interpreted by those attending funeral services 
as an immediate state of continuing „spiritual‟ life, rather than a delayed physical 
re-embodiment. In the introduction to the service we are assured that „death is not 
the end; that Christ has faced it and fought it and conquered it, so that – name – 
can go where he is leading us all, to be welcomed in the arms of his grace.‟310 
Again, this suggests an immediate and peaceful state of continuing non-physical 
life. The service book of the United Reformed Church which I have used (now 
updated) does not mention soul except within optional Bible readings (but 
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Wisdom 3 is not included). The commendation prayer gives thanks for the life of 
N „whom we commit into your care and keeping‟ or „whom today we commend 
into your sure keeping‟ or „entrust ... to your merciful keeping‟,311 all of which 
implies the immediate transference of the non-physical person to the afterlife. The 
„empty‟ body in a coffin is displayed clearly to the gathered relatives and friends 
of the deceased, and in the adjacent room the furnace equipment is ready to 
destroy this body literally to ashes. I have conducted only two burials in my 
whole ministry: cremation is the norm in my experience and Davies is surely right 
to point to a link between cremation and belief in a continuing soul rather than a 
physical resurrection.  
What cremation allows to come to the forefront is the otherwise strongly 
implicit belief in a human soul which leaves the body and continues into 
another dimension of existence at death. The traditional burial service 
focuses on the body and its resurrection future. While the modern 
cremation service explicitly follows that pattern its implicit message is that 
the body has come to its end but the soul has gone on. The only hope that 
many can read into the cremation service is the hope of a surviving soul. 
Even though it is sometimes argued that as far as God is concerned it is as 
easy to resurrect an individual from a myriad of ashes as from a single 
grave this point carries little weight at the popular level of thought.
312
  
In his work with older Aberdonians, Williams found that „the trend to cremation 
does not depend on indifference to the spiritual survival of the dead. On the 
contrary, the body is often devalued in order to emphasise the spirit.‟313 
The funeral service books provided at the crematoria in my area are those 
produced by the Joint Group on Funeral Services at Cemeteries and Crematoria. I 
have most often used the original 1986 first edition of this publication, but I 
compare this below with the most recent 2009 fourth edition. The 1986 service 
has two interesting aspects. First, in the commendation options (which is prefaced 
by „entrust our brother N to the mercy of God‟ – that is, the whole „spiritual‟ 
person) we get a very strong suggestion of final reunion with those we love (not 
those whom God loves). Option 1 has „so that at the last we may be one with 
those whom we love in thy presence‟, and option 2 has „so that, at the last, we 
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may come, with all whom we have loved, to that abiding city where you reign‟.  314 
Second, in the options for the final prayer, there is a suggestion of a two-stage 
process, i.e. a „sleep‟ and a final future event. We have „that in the last day, when 
you gather up all things in Christ‟, and „now rests in the sleep of peace, ... grant to 
him and all who rest in Christ, refreshment, light, and peace‟, and „by whose 
mercy and grace your saints remain in everlasting light and peace‟.315 This 
probably reflects ecumenical influence on this publication, and offers options not 
present in the Congregational Federation (CF) and 1980 URC liturgies. In the 
CofE „modern language‟ service (from the 1980 ASB) there is little difference, 
but in the CofE „traditional language‟ service there is a much clearer articulation 
of the soul and a 2-stage process. We find in the prayers, „Almighty God, with 
whom do live the spirits of them that depart hence in the Lord, and with whom the 
souls of the faithful, after they are delivered from the burden of the flesh, are in 
joy and felicity: ... that we ... may have our consummation and bliss, both in body 
and soul, in thy eternal and everlasting glory.‟316 Also, that „when we depart this 
life, we may rest in him, as our hope is this our brother doth; and that, at the 
general resurrection in the last day, we may be found acceptable in thy sight.‟ 
Equally obvious is that we suddenly get soul in the committal – „We commend 
unto thy hands of mercy, most merciful Father, the soul of this our brother (or this 
thy child) departed,‟317 The clearest mention of judgement in the 1986 CofE 
services is in the „traditional‟ service – „Enter not into judgement with thy 
servant, O Lord‟.318 The „modern‟ service refers only to the Lord being „justly 
angered by our sins‟ in a Committal option.319 
As might be expected, the 1986 representation of the RC funeral rite is much 
more explicit with regard to both the soul and a two-stage process culminating in 
physical resurrection. The deceased person „has fallen asleep in the peace of 
Christ.‟320 Prayers at the graveside make clear the separation of body and soul 
until a final resurrection day: „Grant, we pray you, that your servant may rest at 
peace in this grave until that day when you, the resurrection and the life, enrich 
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him (her) with life made new.‟ Also, Jesus has risen from the dead and broken the 
bonds of hell, „to save all believers and bring about the resurrection of their 
bodies.‟321 When the coffin is taken out of the chapel to go to the grave, the 
following may be said – „May the Angels lead you into paradise, and Martyrs 
welcome you as you draw near and lead you into Jerusalem, the heavenly city‟322 
(which seems to confuse the order of things?). There is nothing similar in prayers 
and readings for those cremated in the RC rite, but a rather stunning final prayer 
in which Mary is asked to „commend to her Son the soul of his servant who had 
departed this life, that through her maternal intercession, he (she) may quickly 
reach his (her) longed-for home in the heavenly fatherland, and live for ever and 
ever‟323 (implying a doctrine of purgatory?). 
The most recent 2009 publication of the Joint Group on Funeral Services 
provides some interesting contrasts.
324
 It contains an updated JLG service, the 
new Common Worship service of the CofE (2000), and the new Catholic Funeral 
Rites from the Order of Christian Funerals (1990). Trevor Lloyd, commenting on 
the process of and motivation for revision to the CofE funeral services which 
resulted in the 2000 Common Worship liturgy, sees a welcome return to an earlier 
„continuum‟ concept of the funeral, where a „theme of movement and journeying 
from one place to another, reflecting the pilgrimage of the whole of the 
Christian‟s life‟ is key.325 So the new liturgy provides a comprehensive series of 
services and resources enabling pastoral response to all aspects of the death and 
grieving process. Also, it is „more overtly Christian‟ than the preceding ASB 
service, this being the intention of the Commission to the House of Bishops who 
stated that „The basic rite is a Christian rite for Christians. We believe that it 
should be possible to have the same basic rite for all, and not one service for 
church members and one for others. Hence the basic structure is eucharistic.‟326 
By this Lloyd means, that, in contrast to the minimalist 1552 Cranmer service 
„with no Communion and no need even to go into church‟, we now have a service 
which becomes „empty-tomb and heavenly banquet-centred rather than coffin-
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centred. It moves in a “normal” way to a eucharistic climax and, at that moment, 
conscious of the open door between heaven and earth, we move on to the 
Commendation and Farewell, followed by the Committal.‟327  
Within the crematoria service book, the 2009 version of the CofE „modern 
language‟ service is indeed noticeably different from the 1986 version. It has an 
obvious structure, with the new elements of an Introduction, Prayers of Penitence, 
and Collect. Judgement is clearer, both with the prayers of penitence and the 
introduction stating that we commend the deceased „to God our merciful 
redeemer and judge‟.328 There is also the new statement in one of the committal 
options that our Lord Jesus Christ will „transform our frail bodies, that they may 
be conformed to his glorious body‟.329 However, this optional phrase is far from 
an unambiguous statement concerning physical resurrection. The impression 
remains from this service that the afterlife is immediate, peaceful, restful and 
spiritual or non-physical. 
The 2009 JLG service has more modern language than the 1986 version, a 
clearer introduction, and a completely new end section „Prayers For Our 
Continuing Journey Towards Heavern [sic]‟. There is less emphasis on reunion, 
the shorter Commendation options mentioning only being received „into the 
glorious company of the saints in light‟,330 and no indication of a two-phase 
process (no „sleep‟, for example). The final section of prayers reinforces the 
impression of an immediate, everlasting, and peaceful state of LAD. They are 
quite remarkable in this respect, including, from Newman, „the fever of life is 
over and our work is done, ... grant us safe lodging, a holy rest, and peace at last‟; 
and from Milner-White, „dwell in that house, where there shall be no darkness nor 
dazzling ... no noise nor silence ... no fears nor hopes ... no ends nor beginnings, 
but one equal eternity.‟331 The question is not so much what was actually meant 
by the author of these prayers, but rather the way in which they are likely to be 
understood at a funeral; which is surely that the afterlife is an immediate, 
peaceful, and therefore spiritual state. By contrast, there is the clearer statement in 
the second Opening Prayer, „As we rejoice in the promise of resurrection‟.332  
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Overwhelmingly my purpose in funerals has been focused on the bereaved 
rather than the deceased. I have tried to help them better cope with grief, and to be 
confident in the promise of eternal life which is proclaimed by the Christian 
gospel. My funeral addresses have consistently made the point that the „whole‟ 
person, by which I mean not just as they were when they died (often elderly and 
in poor health for some time) but rather their entire lived life, is now in God‟s 
hands and will be made whole in new life.
333
 In this way I have tried to say that 
illness and handicap will be removed and all stages of life will be restored. I have 
encouraged people to remember all aspects of the life of the deceased, and to 
think of this whole person-experience as now being with God. I have never 
preached that they are in a „sleep‟ state, waiting for resurrection, because I have 
not thought this a scriptural or comforting message. I have also, at least tacitly, 
implied that there is an immediate reunion with others who have preceded them in 
death; and have never directly raised the issue of judgement (rather implying a 
universalism based on the overriding premise of a God of love).  
Funeral liturgies give to the ordinary Christian member, and the many 
nominal Christians who attend such services, a confusing picture of what happens 
when we die. It is hardly surprising that ordinary Christians reach a variety of 
conclusions and opinions about LAD. The resources of the Reformed tradition 
that I have used in funeral services are poor in terms of biblical imagery, and 
hardly touch on key questions involving the relationship between body and soul, 
any two-stage process, final physical resurrection, or family reunion. However, 
even the updated CofE services, which must surely be used at the majority of 
funerals in this country, are less than clear as to our final destiny.  
Tony Walter and Guy Cook have compared the language of contemporary 
and traditional Anglican services, setting this against the sociological background 
of the decline of ritual and the rise of individualised and personalised funerals.
334
 
They argue that the weakening of religious certainty results in a concentration on 
the life and character of the deceased and on what has been lost by those grieving 
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her, rather than her future beyond death. „Greater religious certainty allows the 
traditional service to look towards the future: both the immediate grim physical 
decomposition, and the later glorious physical resurrection, references to which 
have significantly declined in contemporary versions despite an attempt to 
reaffirm the physical resurrection in Common Worship compared with versions of 
the previous three decades.‟335 Walter has proposed a new sociological model of 
grief,
 336
 rather than the old emotional-psychological one.  
With increasing individuation, with serial monogamy and with mobility 
separating the bereaved from friends and family, it is particularly 
important for the funeral to state who this person was. To have a public, 
and accurate, biography told in the funeral may help mourners find an 
enduring place for the deceased in their lives – not least because the 
recounting of it there gives them permission to continue their own 
recounting in the weeks and months ahead.
337
 
But, of course, the assumption of a clear and direct link between what a 
funeral liturgy says and what is understood and believed by those attending is 
highly suspect. It will come as no surprise to anyone who has performed Christian 
rites (of baptism, marriage, communion, funeral, church membership) that the rite 
is capable of multiple interpretations. D. J. Davies talks of „dual-purpose rituals‟ 
in which the officiant and participants can have very different views of exactly 
what is taking place in the rite.
338
 Collins finds that there are numerous ways of 
interpreting a ritual (he uses the example of a Quaker meeting); and that the 
interpretations of the participants themselves must be taken into account as well 
as those of anthropologists.
339
 If I were to ask the members of my congregation to 
express what they had understood by the funeral I had just conducted, I would 
expect to receive a range of views quite different from what I thought I was doing, 
or indeed to any „official‟ theology of the rite. Ministers and priests can benefit 
from advice on how to make funerals meaningful to those attending, that is, on 
how to reinterpret and re-present the traditional rite in a way that „connects‟ with 
the experience and pre-understanding of those attending.
340
 But multiple meaning 
of ritual is not simply a phenomenon of postmodern suspicion, or one of the 
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consequences of secularisation; it is an inherent characteristic of ritual itself. 
Ritual has the power to convey a depth of meaning beyond what can be defined 
by propositional logic, an observation which should make any minister or priest 
think of the „space‟ she leaves in worship for such experience. „It may be that 
clergy learn much theology in a formal way, but many other people of varying 
degrees of faith learn their religion through practical involvement; this is why it is 
important to have forms of religious service which encode Christian truth in ways 
which may be acquired by participants.‟341 Practice is key to understanding a 
religion, particularly as expressed in ritual. „Practice produces policy, rites yield 
popular theology. This is why symbols are important since they are vehicles for 
thought.‟342 The powerful symbol of cremation implies a non-physical soul-spirit 
afterlife. Davies borrows (from Talal Asad) the phrase „untaught bodies‟ to 
portray a generation of people who have never been exposed to the „bodily 
teaching‟ of attending worship, singing hymns, participating in ritual etc.343 
Walter talks of the „ritual incompetence‟ of mourners, a generation of people who 
don‟t know how to sing hymns or to be quiet during prayer, or when to stand and 
sit, which makes the clergy role in modern funerals more difficult.
 344
  
Paul Sheppy points to the inherent problem of any Christian service book, 
which must „assume (to a greater or lesser degree) a Christian understanding of 
what is to happen. In an increasingly secular society this draws attention to the 
gap between what the texts take for granted and what the person in the pew 
apprehends.‟ Rehearsing some long held opinions, he states that „A funeral 
service is not always an unequivocally good example of user-friendliness. Much 
of what is said must sound strange – even alien – to those who hear it.‟345 (For 
example, the priest/minster saying „to the One who is able to keep you from 
falling‟ as the coffin is lowered into the grave.) What Sheppy is concerned about 
(in contrast to Wright) is not so much correct doctrine, or accurate propositional 
statements of truth concerning the afterlife, but rather the pastoral situation of 
people facing death and grief. Ewan Kelly recognises this also in his argument for 
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the need for funerals in contemporary society to be co-authored between the 
theological specialist or wordsmith and the bereaved.
 346
 He calls for church 
representatives to act creatively as facilitators of theologising, to re-form 
meaningful ritual around death, while maintaining theological integrity (the 
funeral to be shaped and informed by the Easter story
347
). The funeral can and 
should be an opportunity for the church truly to help others in a time of great 
need. „The bereaved are not looking for answers from a church representative but 
an opportunity to give vent to what is a deep and heartfelt desire to try to make 
sense of what has happened and why.‟348 
In my experience, Sheppy is quite correct in saying that „Some mourners are 
acutely sensitive to the least infelicity of expression, and one detail may colour 
their recollection and, indeed, the effectiveness of the entirety. ... What, of course, 
happens in practice is that in most cases the minister and the mourners negotiate a 
mutually acceptable “halfway house”.‟349 As a working Christian minister I 
clearly recognise this place, the halfway house between, on the one hand, 
apparently „pure‟ Christian doctrine and „correct‟ Christian liturgy, and on the 
other, the real pastoral needs of people under the care of the Christian church. It is 
not that I am seeking to make my life easier in funeral contexts by avoiding the 
clear „truths‟ of Christian doctrine concerning LAD; it is rather that I am not sure 
that such certainty exists, and even if it did, whether it should simply be 
proclaimed irrespective of the likely effect on the hearer.
350
 Neither am I sure that 
the link between what I proclaim in a funeral rite, and what the congregation 
hears and understands, is either certain or clear. Surely our pastoral practice as 
Christian ministers in bereavement situations is at least as important as our 
proclaimed theological position?  
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APPENDIX D - THE TOM WRIGHT VIEW OF „LIFE AFTER 
LAD‟  
Wright‟s reforming views are set out in a variety of publications, including 
his impressive volume on the resurrection of Jesus. He has also published a Grove 
pamphlet aimed at a wider non-academic church audience,
 351
 a small book 
focusing on the celebration of All Saints Day,
 352
 and a work on the nature of 
Christian hope.
 353
 Wright, of course, comes at the issue of LAD from a biblical 
perspective. In defending the bodily resurrection of Jesus as the proposal which 
„possesses unrivalled power to explain the historical data at the heart of early 
Christianity‟, 354 he also clearly exposes the New Testament view of what happens 
to a Christian when she dies. Wright believes that a significant „correction‟ is 
required in the way that Anglican (and other) clergy and church members 
understand and communicate this because we have had a liberal drifting away 
from biblical truths. He has become  
increasingly aware of a mismatch between what the earliest Christians 
believed about life after death – and about resurrection as a newly 
embodied life after „life after death‟– and what many ordinary Christians 
seem to believe on the subject today. ... I have come to the conclusion that 
what we do and say in church at this point is increasingly at odds with 
anything that can be justified from the Bible or earliest Christian 
traditions.
355
  
Wright disparages popular (ordinary theology?) views of LAD. 
Christians regularly speak of their hope in terms of „going to heaven when 
they die‟. One hears it in hymns; one finds it in prayers – not least (in my 
tradition) in liturgical prayers, but also when people pray extempore. One 
hears it in sermons, both explicitly and implicitly. The point seems to be 
that there is something called „eternity‟, which is regularly spoken of as 
though it has only the loosest of connections with space and time, and one 
day we are going to step into this eternal existence, whether in the form of 
heaven or of hell, which has almost nothing to do with this earth and this 
present history. I suggest that this view, widely held though it is, is far 
less warranted by the New Testament than would normally be supposed; 
that it can be at the very least seriously misleading, and at worst quite 
positively damaging to a healthy Christian faith; and that it should be 
challenged by a more biblical picture altogether. I suggest instead that 
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what we find in the New Testament, and what I commend, is the Christian 
hope for a new, or renewed, heaven and a new, or renewed earth, with 
these two integrated together.
356
  
It is important to understand what the former Bishop of Durham is saying 
here with regard to correct thinking and practice. He is assuming that it is possible 
to arrive at „correct‟ doctrine which is definitive and applicable in all Christian 
contexts and times. This clarity can only come from an appropriate study of the 
biblical evidence, which apparently is capable of a single correct interpretation: 
this is the meaning intended by the original author in her historical context, which 
is nevertheless directly applicable to the present historical context. He is further 
assuming that correct doctrine can and should be encapsulated in correct church 
teaching and liturgy, and that participation in such liturgy will thereby lead to 
correct understanding.  
Wright is concerned that ordinary Anglicans are apparently mistaken about 
the nature, timing and location of heaven; the existence of purgatory and hell; the 
relationship of body and soul; and the definition of soul. These are significant and 
worrying results of wrong thinking. For example, the „steady erosion of belief in 
hell‟ has the result that the church has become unable also to articulate the clear 
promises of the New Testament about the resurrection of the dead. „Indeed, to 
read what some have written, and observe what some see fit to do liturgically, we 
have to say that the sure and certain hope of the resurrection to life has been 
replaced, for many Anglicans at least, by the vague and fuzzy possibility of a long 
winding journey to somewhere or other.‟357 Purgatory has crept back into 
Christian currency, evil is not being taken seriously enough, and hell has been 
taken out of the equation.  
For Wright, the timing and nature of post-mortem life is clear from the New 
Testament. After death we enter immediately a disembodied state of paradise (or 
heaven), a state of „restful happiness‟ where we peacefully await the future 
general bodily resurrection. We are conscious in this intermediate state. The use 
of the term „sleep‟ by Paul „means that the body is “asleep” in the sense of 
“dead”, while the real person – however we want to describe him or her – 
continues.‟358 But what exactly is the real person without a body? Wright 
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denigrates what he sees as the entirely incorrect and non-Christian (Platonic) idea 
of an immortal soul leaving the mortal body at death, yet is entirely convinced of 
an interim state of non-physical existence. In fact, he permits the use of the word 
„soul‟, as long as what is meant by that is „a whole human being living in the 
presence of God.‟359 But what we are in this intermediate state is not entirely 
clear. Wright accepts the hardware-software analogy of Polkinghorne to illustrate 
how difficult and vague it is to talk of a disembodied soul, but this adds little by 
way of clarification.
360
  
Wright is clear that there is no purgatory (a Roman Catholic mistake) in this 
interim existence; but there is still judgement and hell (to come). He is also 
absolutely clear that the final goal is a new heaven and a new earth joined 
together, a re-formed world where God is fully present. Such a view prevents us 
from adopting a too-heavenly theology, where the role and responsibilities of 
Christians in the present „kingdom of heaven‟ are undervalued.  
In the Grove pamphlet (based on his 1993 Drew Lecture on immortality), 
Wright makes a comprehensive series of clarifications regarding relevant biblical 
passages, themes and terminology. The „Kingdom of Heaven‟ (Matthew) is the 
same as the „Kingdom of God‟, that is, not a place where you go or where God 
reigns, but rather the fact that God does rule. Wright suggests it would be better 
translated as the Kingship of God/Heaven. The phrase „eternal life‟ (from John 
and Paul) refers not to a timeless existence, but to a new era which God will 
create at some future point. Heaven is not a future state or place, but rather the 
hidden dimension of God‟s present reality where His purposes are stored up. 
Salvation comes from heaven (God) to you; you do not go to a place called 
heaven. „It is rather like a parent, in the run-up to Christmas, assuring a child that 
“there is indeed a present kept safe in the cupboard for you”. That does not mean 
that on Christmas Day and thereafter the child is going to have to go and live in 
the cupboard in order to enjoy the present there.‟361 Being a citizen of Rome did 
not mean that all such citizens went back to the mother City; rather, it meant that 
when citizens were in trouble, the Emperor of Rome would come from Rome to 
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deliver them from their enemies. Thus, we do not go to „heaven‟, God comes to 
us (Philippians 3:20).
362
 
Wright insists that the scope of the new creation should not be limited, as in 
such mistaken hymns as Wesley‟s Love Divine. It does not just concern what God 
does in human beings, but rather involves everything. Paul‟s great vision in 
Romans 8 is of the whole of creation being set free from its bondage to decay. 
Furthermore, and again correcting Wesley, being „changed from glory into glory‟ 
is something that happens in the present not the future. 2 Cor. 3:18 refers to the 
present process whereby Christians, looking at the work of the Spirit in one 
another, are transformed from one degree of glory into another. Finally, the 
casting of crowns before God in heaven is not some future event but is happening 
now. The worship in Revelation 4 and 5 is a present event not a future state: 
creation worshipping God now. The book of Revelation is not a „Cook‟s tour‟ of 
heaven; rather it is a disclosure of what is true all along in God‟s dimension of 
reality. Revelation 21 and 22 is about the final unification of heaven and earth, not 
about escaping „up‟ to a New Jerusalem. The New Jerusalem will in fact come 
down to earth (Revelation 21:10-11).
363
 
 Resurrection is critical for Wright in several respects. Jesus was physically 
resurrected, showing that God will renew material existence (an assumption 
which Wright shares with the scientist theologians Polkinghorne and Wilkinson – 
see pages 224ff.). Wright points to a Maccabean origin of the idea of resurrection: 
people who had died serving God must be brought back to life to witness the final 
victory of the new age of world history which God would bring about.
364
 So 
resurrection is about a renewed world, not continuing individual existence, and 
resurrection lies in the future. When Jesus says to the brigand, „Today you will be 
with me in Paradise‟ (Luke 23:43), he means the temporary place of rest before 
rising from the dead. 1 Cor. 15:51-6 speaks of the second of a two-stage process, 
a future point of general resurrection, when all will be raised. „Departing and 
being with Christ‟ or „living to God‟ are New Testament ways of expressing a 
temporary stage ahead of the time when God restores all things.   
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APPENDIX E – METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH365 
AN APPROPRIATE „CONVERSATIONAL‟ MODEL  
This qualitative study seeks to adopt an appropriate methodology of practical 
theology. Swinton and Mowat suggest that the situation and problem(s) should be 
established, so that clear research questions can be (eventually) generated. But it 
is important to understand that qualitative research is different from quantitative 
and „begins with a general field rather than a specific hypothesis. As the research 
progresses, material for the development of hypotheses begins to emerge. 
However, they tend to emerge from the data rather than be imposed on it by the 
researcher. It is therefore both usual and acceptable to pose a general question or 
to lay out an initial observation which later becomes the general field of study.‟366 
Both the field and the purpose may change in response to the data gathered. This 
has been my experience in this research project, and the eventual clarification of 
inappropriate (or impossible) research questions has been very helpful.  
Woodward and Pattison state that practical theologians „must be prepared to 
engage in inter-disciplinary learning, because the theological tradition does not in 
itself provide all the information about the modern world that is needed to have a 
good understanding of many issues.‟367 A recent development of a model for 
„Theological Action Research‟ (TAR) sounds a warning here: „The practical 
theologian as practitioner, social scientist, theologian and cultural expert is in 
danger of becoming an impossible person!‟368 The authors of the TAR model 
have adopted a team approach as an essential response to this difficulty, that step I 
consider unnecessary for a project such as this, although I do recognise the 
limitations on personal competence to which they point.  
The usual starting point for practical theology is some sort of theoretical or 
practical concern that demands attention. It is a kind of unsystematic conversation 
between theory, theology and practice.  
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Because it continuously has to re-engage with the fragmented realities and 
changes of the contemporary world and the issues it presents, much 
practical theology is not systematic or complete. It provides shafts of light 
into situations and issues rather than final answers or durable solutions. … 
This contrasts with some traditional kinds of theology that have claimed to 
be universally valid, complete, essentially unchangeable and 
unchallengeable, because of their historic role and authority in the life of 
the church.
369
  
Practical theology also takes the experience of contemporary people with 
utmost seriousness. Pattison believes we have to set theology free from „dusty 
academic bondage‟; it should rather be seen as contemporary enquiry.370 In 
similar vein, Ballard and Pritchard state that, „It is the task of the practical 
theologian not only to know the Church and the world as it is, but also to stand at 
that point where the concerns of the Church and the world meet in creative 
encounter exploring the perceptions of the gospel. That is, the primary task of the 
practical theologian is to facilitate theological reflection.‟371 Ballard and Pritchard 
also point to an important characteristic that should be present in a practical 
theologian, which they designate their Habitus model. The word habitus is 
borrowed from Edward Farley, whose work emphasises the importance of 
developing a correct spiritual and mental disposition within theological endeavour 
(there are strong links here to Astley‟s ordinary theology).372 Ballard and 
Pritchard see four models of how theory and practice can be held together, while 
Graham, Walton and Ward provide a more comprehensive typology of seven 
models
373
 and from a more complete historical perspective. However, this adds 
little to the argument which Ballard and Pritchard present with clarity. Their four 
models are: Applied Theology (linear and unidirectional, from theory to practice), 
Critical Correlation (dialogue between the tradition and contemporary reality, 
using other disciplines), Praxis (theory is a reflection on practice and arises from 
committed action, e.g. liberation theology), and Habitus (truth is found in the 
community of shared meaning and is appropriated by growth into wisdom). 
Ballard and Pritchard claim that these four positions are not mutually exclusive 
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and that the best features of all can and should be used together in their version of 
the Pastoral Cycle.  
The Pastoral Cycle model has clear strengths. It allows experience to be an 
appropriate and sufficient starting point; it is relatively easy to visualise and 
understand; it recognises the contribution that other disciplines can make; and it 
facilitates a systematic approach to complex questions. However, it implies too 
clear a separation between the various stages of the cycle, and a linear one-way 
process. Theological reflection can and should be a continuous element. There is 
also a need to be more aware of our own values and theology when doing a cycle, 
as well as the philosophical and methodological „baggage‟ and limitations of 
other disciplines. Emmanuel Lartey
374
 suggests a revised cycle with more 
feedback, and the structured involvement of others to facilitate „collective seeing‟, 
but my basic concerns remain. Stephen Pattison offers a more flexible model. 
„The basic idea here is that the student should imagine herself as being involved 
in a three-way conversation between (a) her own ideas, beliefs, feelings, 
perceptions and assumptions, (b) the beliefs, assumptions and perceptions 
provided by the Christian tradition (including the Bible) and (c) the contemporary 
situation which is being examined.‟375 He recognises that it is important to be 
self-critical, and like Lartey, he argues that a good way to do this is to work in 
groups.  
Swinton and Mowat see the Pattison model as a good example of the critical 
correlation type, but have a major concern with this overall approach. They 
question  
whether it is theologically appropriate to give all of the dialogue partners 
equal weighting within the research process. … Can the social sciences 
really challenge theology at a fundamental level as the wider implications 
of this model would suggest? … If mutuality truly means that both parties 
have an equal voice in the research process and that the social sciences can 
actually override theology on central issues, then the danger of idolatry 
becomes a real possibility.
376
  
So the mutual critical correlation method must be revised to prevent a drift into 
relativism and a reformed „cycle‟ is therefore proposed. They say that theology 
should be present in all stages, but there is still a strong sense in which it remains 
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a basic pastoral cycle, and the additional flexibility of Pattison has been missed. 
The issue is the understanding of continuing revelation. Swinton and Mowat 
stress the role of experience in practical theology, but also make it very clear that 
human experience is not a locus for fresh revelation. They want to keep a „pure‟ 
gospel, intact and separated off from human historical life. They talk of remaining 
faithful to the „script‟ of revelation, a script which cannot be altered or added to. 
Human experience will not „counter or contradict the script provided by Scripture, 
doctrine and tradition.‟ 377 However, I would maintain that human experience can 
and does bring fresh revealed truth, and the human world is the vehicle for 
continuing revelation. This reflects the way our scriptures actually came into 
being and were „canonised‟, and how a living Christian tradition has operated 
subsequently.  
Of course, with any correlational approach, the key issue is „that it may lack 
criteria for giving adequate relative weighting to different sources in the 
conversation. Presuming that the Bible or tradition has a normative status for the 
Christian how is that to be evaluated?‟378 In this thesis I set out a clear view of 
biblical and ecclesial authority, and continuing revelation, and argue that ordinary 
theology must be theological and exposed to critique from the normative 
tradition.  
The recently developed TAR model has an „Action-Reflection‟ cycle 
(bearing many similarities to a pastoral cycle) which is intended to be theological 
at all stages. The primacy of the theological endeavour and the possibility of 
theological insight are achieved by structured conversation between „theology in 
four voices‟.379 The first of these voices, „operant theology‟, is based on a key 
assumption, that „Practices of faithful Christian people are themselves already the 
bearers of theology; they express the contemporary living tradition of the 
Christian faith.‟380 It is recognised that Astley explores this dimension of theology 
in a different way as „ordinary theology‟.381 Faith practitioners (ordinary 
theologians) are „generally always and already consciously aligned to an 
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articulated theology. This is the “espoused” theology of the group.‟382 Espoused 
theology may or may not reflect well the actual practice (operant theology) of a 
Christian; it is rather why they say they do what they do. Such espoused 
theologies must come from somewhere, so we have both „formal‟ and „normative‟ 
theology. Formal theology is the theology of academic theologians; normative 
theology is the Scriptures, creeds, official church teaching and liturgies. These 
four voices (theologies) are distinct, but interrelated and overlapping. The format 
of „outside‟ and „inside‟ teams is designed to facilitate productive critical 
reflection between these four voices. Such „conversation‟ produces theological 
insight. 
This model is designed for group-based research and the key characteristic of 
TAR is that the research question is generated by the „inside‟ group themselves, 
not by „outside‟ researchers. It is not therefore directly applicable to the type of 
qualitative research undertaken in this project. However, the four „voices‟ are 
encapsulated in the model below (and indeed in most of the other models of 
practical theology discussed above). Operant and espoused theologies are the 
beliefs of ordinary theologians; formal and normative theologies are the Christian 
tradition and the critical application of contemporary theological debate.  
The model I adopt is an adaptation and extension of the Pattison 
„conversation‟ idea. In the following diagrammatic representation of my model, 
the arrows represent a linking process between the elements concerned, and where 
appropriate this process is made clear. So, the key processes are: use of the 
relevant social and physical sciences, and critical application of contemporary 
theological debate, by the practical theologian (and others who assist in providing 
self-critical awareness – supervisors, fellow students and ministerial colleagues), 
to the situation and the tradition respectively. The practical theologian (and others 
in a more general sense) also uses prayerful contemplation and Bible study as a 
process to further enhance the link with God‟s presence and continuing activity. 
This is not to imply that God is merely one actor among others in this model, but 
rather to recognise that his very presence in the world influences all human 
participants. I have also included a process link (reflexive awareness) between the 
two key processes of the critical application of social sciences and contemporary 
theological debate. Thus the model incorporates the means by which the 
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application of theological insight and social science are reflexive, that is, the very 
application of each approach should inform the other on a continuing basis. This 
iterative feedback loop is therefore not just about final results but about what is 
learnt from every stage of the process.  
 
This model recognises and accepts that the Christian tradition (by which I 
mean theology in the broadest sense, including the interpretation of Scripture) is 
not a fixed entity, but is itself a changing and dynamic element, both influencing 
and being influenced by the other elements. The Christian tradition has been 
influenced by real-world situations in the past and Scripture is capable of 
numerous „correct‟ interpretations dependent on the particular human historical 
context.  
REFLEXIVITY AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
This model recognises the subjective viewpoint of all human actors, 
particularly the theological and cultural predisposition of the practical theologian. 
So, following Lartey and Pattison, the researcher should have structured dialogue 
with others, as an important way of checking one‟s predispositions and 
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prejudices. This has happened formally via regular meetings with academic 
supervisors, periodic peer group feedback within the DThM programme, and 
informally via consultation with other ministerial and church colleagues. I have 
also reviewed my own funeral theology and practice (see Appendix C) and have 
undergone a process of deliberate self-reflection. 
The issue of the researcher being self aware of her own biases and pre-
dispositions is a critical aspect of all elements and stages of the research project. 
Swinton and Mowat state that reflexivity is „the process of critical self-reflection 
carried out by the researcher throughout the research process that enables her to 
monitor and respond to her contribution to the proceedings.‟383 The researcher has 
to be sensitive as well as reflexive, „While the researcher‟s primary task is to 
describe the encounter, in reality, she is inevitably a co-creator of the mode and 
content of that encounter.‟384 This is especially the case with interviews, which 
are not conversations.  
However, such (inevitable) personal bias is not a barrier to being able to 
discover something real and truthful. Epistemologically, I adopt a critical realist 
position, assuming that truth concerning the social (and physical) world is 
available to the researcher, and what we can discover by research approximates 
to, although does not match exactly nor capture entirely, reality. This project 
involves qualitative research and recognises that both the researcher and the 
human subjects interpretively construct reality. This is not to say, though, that 
reality is nothing but a human construction.  
Charlotte Aull Davies sets out to provide a workable reflexivity, which she 
defines as „a turning back on oneself, a process of self-reference.‟385 She identifies 
the problem of how to retain the actuality of research on a reality outside 
ourselves. It is assumed we are connected with the social reality, and therefore 
influence and are influenced by it within the research process; but is there a reality 
that can meaningfully be explored? Postmodern critiques can lead to an infinite 
regress of reflexive thought which leaves us only with the constructed reality of 
the interviewer-ethnographer herself, „the extreme relativism and antipathy to 
generalised explanation that is essentially destructive of the research 
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enterprise.‟386 Davies points to a critical realist alternative which „provides a 
philosophical basis for ethnographic research to provide explanatory (law-like) 
abstractions while also emphasising its rootedness in the concrete, in what real 
people on the ground are doing and saying.‟387 Critical realism „accepts the 
reflexivity of the social sciences in the fullest sense‟, recognising that the 
development of knowledge and the development of the object of knowledge are 
themselves linked.
388
 According to Davies, many ethnographers adopt a critical 
realist approach but do not specifically acknowledge they are doing so. 
The scientist-theologian John Polkinghorne also promotes „critical realism‟ from an 
entirely different perspective. Science is an activity of persons, in communities of 
practice and belief where theory and experiment are inextricably intertwined. „There 
are no significant scientific facts that are not already interpreted facts.‟ There is no 
universal epistemology, „but rather entities are knowable only through ways that 
conform to their idiosyncratic nature.‟ Polkinghorne argues that because we live as 
created persons in a created world, our minds can discern truth in the physical and 
theological and social reality of the world. While the social world (and the scientific) 
is not simply „there‟ for us to read without hesitation or confusion, nevertheless it is 
real and we can access it at least approximately. 389  
Unlike classical scientific methodology, qualitative research „presumes that 
meaningful knowledge can be discovered in unique, non-replicable 
experiences.‟390 This, of course, raises the question of generalisation. „It is true 
that aspects of human experience are unique and unrepeatable. Nevertheless, there 
remains a degree of shared experience which we believe can, to an extent, transfer 
from one context to another.‟391 So despite a small, self-selecting sample 
(numerically, geographically and denominationally) real knowledge can be gained 
about the wider world of faith and belief. What we learn from a small group of 
Congregationalists about how Christians understand LAD will have relevance to 
other Christian contexts. 
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In Young and Cullen‟s research on terminally ill patients and their carers, 
Young provides a stunning reflexive „Personal Note‟, where he relates the death 
of his own wife Sasha during the project. In particular, his continuing experience 
of Sasha and visions of the dead, are related movingly – „The dead are dead and 
not dead. Sasha may have died, but she is certainly not dead, and with this 
testament I declare to the readers what will already be obvious – that I am very far 
from being a dispassionate student of dying and of death.‟392 While this is an 
extreme situation of reflexive awareness, there is also a real sense in which we are 
all far from dispassionate concerning the contemplation of death and LAD. It 
touches a core existential nerve, and challenges the religious beliefs and practices 
of ordinary Christians. I, too, am far from dispassionate about death.  
For Swinton and Mowat, qualitative research takes place within an 
interpretive paradigm. The key point is that  
for qualitative research the idea of value-free, objective truth becomes at 
best questionable and perhaps unsustainable. All reality is interpreted and 
formulated via an interpretive process within which the researcher is 
inevitably enmeshed. This is not necessarily a bad thing ... Indeed, the 
involvement of the researcher is a necessary and constructive dimension of 
the interpretive process.‟393 [emphasis added]  
Swinton and Mowat suggest that reflexivity „is perhaps the most crucial 
dimension of the qualitative research process.‟ It is „not simply a tool of 
qualitative research, but part of what it actually is‟. They continue, „Reflexivity is 
a mode of knowing which accepts the impossibility of the researcher standing 
outside of the research field and seeks to incorporate that knowledge creatively 
and effectively.‟394 Reflexivity should be personal (all research is to an extent 
autobiographical, about me and my biases, etc.) and epistemological (limits of the 
methodology). „Rather than seeking after tools and methods that will distance her 
from the research process, the researcher becomes the primary tool that is used to 
access the meanings of the situations being explored‟[emphasis added].395 
It is vitally important, therefore, to understand the nature of this key tool; 
where and how it has been formed, what are its key characteristics and 
capabilities. I have already stated that I am a Christian minister and researcher 
who is not dispassionate about death. I am also a male, white, middle-aged, 
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formally-trained minister who places great emphasis on theological 
understanding. I have always sought to explain the great elements of Christian 
faith, to myself and others, and have regarded the „teaching‟ aspect of my 
ministry as very important. This is not to say that I disregard the ritual and non-
cerebral aspects of faith, but rather that my personal predisposition has been 
toward the systematic analysis of doctrine and belief. I have also been aware of 
the gulf, though, between academic theology and the reality of understanding in 
the pews, and the richness and depth of such non-systematic understanding. In 
recent years I have been pleased to see the argument gain ground that „ordinary‟ 
and „practical‟ theology are extremely important elements of the overall 
theological enterprise.  
Some members of my congregation may see me as „academic‟, the 
„theological expert‟, despite my efforts over the years to encourage them to value 
their own theological thinking. It is a most difficult step for older, non-university 
educated people, to believe they can be practical theologians.  
RATIONALE FOR INTERVIEWING MY OWN CONGREGATION  
This research has been conducted as a „native‟, an „insider‟. Most of these 
people at the time of the interviews have been known to me for twenty years, and 
none for less than three. I have been their minister but, I believe, also their friend 
and fellow-believer. This is not to say that I am simply one among other members 
of my church. I have been minister since April 1989, and have fulfilled the full 
range of pastoral and leadership duties expected of such a role (albeit in a part-
time and non-stipendiary capacity). However, my role has probably been less 
formal than comparative ministries in other denominations for the Congregational 
ethos stresses lay involvement. Although my primary research tool has been the 
semi-structured interview, I have in effect also been a „participant observer‟ (or 
perhaps better an „observing participant‟396) for many years, and continue to 
interact with these people in the general context of shared church life. I am not, 
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therefore, a „professional stranger‟397 but rather a „professional friend‟, and 
necessarily adopt an emic (insider) approach.
398
 
In order to create deep and rich insights, we need intense and rich 
conversation – hence in-depth interviews. They are „concentrated human 
encounters, … designed to enable the researcher to access and understand the 
unique meanings, interpretations and perspectives that the participant places on 
the chosen subject.‟399 Like conversations, they are open and dynamic with no 
clear end point, and they evolve, affecting all participants. However, Swinton and 
Mowat point to two big differences between interview and conversation. The first 
is a recognition that the interviewer is in a position of power, having control over 
the aims and purposes, and the content and conduct of the event.  
The interviewee is therefore in a position of vulnerability which the 
researcher needs to be constantly aware of. … The interview is a 
dangerous gift that people offer to the researcher, a gift that can be 
received, treasured and accepted, or abused, manipulated and implicitly or 
explicitly discarded. Reflexivity and the recognition of the subtle and 
hidden dynamics of the interviewer‟s relationship to the interviewee are 
crucial.
400
  
The second difference is that interviewing is not counselling. The interviewer 
should not confuse their role – the point is „that counselling is another role, one 
which the researcher has not been given permission to adopt even though they 
may be qualified to do so.‟401  
‘Power’ in the Interview 
Because of the way in which the reality of the social world is accessed, the 
nature of the interaction of interviewer and interviewee is critical. A fundamental 
characteristic of the research interview is that it should be conducted between the 
participants as equals. C. A. Davies suggests we can understand the interview at 
three levels: the discourse and text which results; the interaction of interviewer 
and interviewee which produces and interprets the text; and the social context, i.e. 
the social conditions that affect both interaction and text. These are inseparable. 
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„Any differences [between interviewer and interviewee] – such as those based in 
gender, class, age, status – which have implications for differential access to 
power in the wider society will affect interaction during the interview.‟402 We 
must therefore be acutely aware of such factors and note their potential effects 
and ways we may compensate. The interviewer-ethnographer has some control 
just because of choosing and introducing topics, but „a good interviewer needs to 
be open to the possibility that respondents will not be able to discuss the subject 
in terms that they suggest.‟403 In my context, this is a caution against assuming 
theological understanding and articulation on the part of my interviewees.  
Peter Collins points to Ann Oakley‟s claim that interviewing is a „masculine 
paradigm‟ where interviewees are subordinate to the aims and needs of the 
interviewer.
404
 However, he argues that while this may have some credence with 
respect to a type of interview where an aggressive interrogator extracts 
information from the captive interviewee, there are other views of what an 
interview can and should be. Paul Oliver asks the question whether the 
interviewee gains anything from the interview process.  
Many people enjoy being interviewed. It is a process which places 
interviewees at the centre of considerations. It is their views that matter; 
their thoughts on issues being recorded, and a research report will be 
constructed around the data which they provide. It is also a process which 
enables and encourages interviewees to think out their own positions on 
complex issues. It is an opportunity to reflect on their values and opinions. 
There are no real distractions, and for a short period of time, it is their 
views which really matter.
405
  
The power balance, then, may not be so obvious or clear. In Hopewell‟s 
experience, interviews can be extremely productive and satisfying for both 
interviewee and interviewer, including when the latter is the pastor. „So 
accustomed are members to being told what they should believe that to be asked 
what they in fact do believe may prompt unprecedented communication.‟406 
Should the Interviewer undertake Different roles? 
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Young and Cullen came to know their subjects personally and intimately and 
this seems to have helped them understand and empathise. However, they provide 
a telling comment in relation to a group of carers who (following the death of 
those they cared for) „were more ready, even keener, than others to unburden 
themselves to us.‟407 This raises an interesting ethical consideration. To what 
extent should I be the minister of my interviewees during the interviews, and to 
what extent are my interviewees happy to take part because they think it may help 
them deal with bereavement issues? Collins seeks to show that „interviews are 
social interactions in which meaning is necessarily negotiated between a number 
of selves (and in which power may be more or less shared). The interviewer need 
be neither “objective” nor “detached”, but should rather be “engaged”.‟ The 
interviewee may create a narrative thread not directly relevant to the subject under 
discussion which can provide them „with a ready means of countering and 
undermining the unequal relations of power which are said to typify all 
interviews.‟ 408 For Collins, interviews produce narratives rather than facts, and 
these narratives are stories of lives lived. So a real dialogue should develop where 
stories are shared. It may be particularly important for people suffering „disrupted 
lives‟ to create meaning through story-telling.409 This is an important insight for 
me given the topic of my research. Collins concludes from his experience of 
interviews that it is pointless and unhelpful not to play the various roles which 
may be asked of the interviewer – co-performer, confessor, counsellor, 
sympathetic ear, etc. The interviewee will relate to us in complex ways, no matter 
how structured or unstructured the interviewer tries to make it.  
Hopewell suggests there are benefits to be had from my particular situation.  
Though [church] members can never achieve the detachment of an 
ethnographer who comes from the outside, they can become their own best 
informants, because they already participate in the structures that an 
outsider has to learn. The trick is that members must learn to function and 
observe as if they were outsiders so that they see afresh the myriad matters 
about the congregation that they now take for granted.
410
  
There are positive benefits to having a close prior relationship with research 
subjects. Already, trust is established, the context and culture known, a part of the 
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„journey‟ of life shared, and personal communication and understanding 
established. De Laine points out how it can also help any power imbalance, but at 
a potential cost: „The formation of friendships with subjects functions to balance 
the power differential between the researcher and subjects, but the more equal 
relations create a potential for ethical or moral dilemma.‟411 This is to do with 
emotional involvement and boundary violations of roles (minster and interviewer, 
friend and researcher, etc.). Multiple overlapping roles can give mixed messages 
to the interviewee. Marlene De Laine also warns that potential harm can arise to 
both interviewee and interviewer.  
There may be a need to remind subjects which role is currently the master 
and controlling one and which is to have a subsidiary and supportive 
function. Self-disclosures are ways of establishing equal relations between 
researchers and researched. The ethnographers may share personal 
information with subjects and open windows to their shared interests and 
expectations, but caution is needed to ensure the participants are not too 
„open‟ and the researcher is not subsequently cast in the role of „exploiter‟ 
or „betrayer‟ of trust.412  
Finally, De Laine points to the importance of how the researcher leaves the 
field, and suggests that continuing relations are some help in guarding against 
exploitation during the interview process. Russell Bernard points to the 
responsibility of the interviewer to ensure that by discussing certain issues the 
interviewee does not later suffer emotional distress for having done so.
 413
  
In my own research, therefore, potential problems were identified in 
advance. Some participants might find it difficult to talk about LAD without re-
experiencing the emotional trauma of bereavement. In such situations the pastoral 
needs of my interviewee will take precedence. It was therefore explained that they 
can stop the interview at any point, as can I. While recognising that the role of 
interviewer and counsellor cannot be simultaneous or simply „mixed‟ within the 
interview, nevertheless I was well placed to fulfil both roles and did so as 
necessary to prevent harm to my subjects (and myself).
414
 There is also a clear 
reminder here that my responsibilities continue beyond the research process. 
Again, I believe this is actually a benefit of my situation rather than a problem, 
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because I will continue to be the friend and minister of these people and therefore 
can „close‟ the process in an ethically sensitive and correct way (for example, by 
not saying things in future sermons or study groups which could in any way 
betray confidences or imply criticism of privately expressed views).  
Should Interviewing be Active or Passive? 
Charlotte Davies reminds us that it is important to be clear about the way in 
which reality is being represented and accessed in interviews. The traditional 
assumption is „that those being interviewed have access to knowledge which they 
can share with the researcher when they are asked to do so in ways that help them 
remember and organise the presentation of their knowledge. In this view, what the 
respondent says is a representation of social and cultural realities.‟415 So the 
interviewer is mining existing knowledge, and in doing so should remain neutral 
so as not to influence the responses. The main issues would be whether the 
interviewee has complete and/or correct knowledge, and whether they are 
deceiving the interviewer in any way. But Davies points out that this approach 
may work against open and free-flowing discussion (as the interviewer is not 
participating), and also raises a major theoretical problem – „individuals are not 
able simply to provide uncontested knowledge about their social world. Much 
more commonly, interviews contain apparent contradictions, gropings, 
suggestions.‟416 Hence many now argue that interviewing „is better understood as 
a process in which interviewer and interviewee are both involved in developing 
understanding, that is in constructing their knowledge of the social world.‟417 
(This might suggest that the only knowledge available is about the interview 
itself, rather than any objective knowledge about the world as such, which of 
course is resolved by Davies‟ critical realist approach.)  
To what extent can and should the interviewer express opinions and enter 
into dialogue? The traditional view is „not at all‟, or only as a strategy to get the 
interviewee to open up. However, this has been challenged. Davies points to the 
influential feminist argument of Oakley that „both for ethical reasons and for the 
efficacy of the interview, an interviewer must be prepared to share their own 
knowledge‟. Oakley suggests that the interviewing process can only develop 
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effectively „when the interviewer is prepared to invest his or her personal identity 
in the relationship‟.418 I am not convinced by this argument in the context of my 
own research. While recognising the joint meaning-making endeavour of a semi-
structured interview, nevertheless I wanted to avoid some of my interviewees 
hoping that I could and should simply give them „the answer‟. The Oakley 
position goes too far; I adopted an „engaged‟ but basically neutral and passive 
position in order to ensure that it was the views of the interviewees which 
emerged and not my own, or what they thought were my views.  
The Interview 
For Russell Bernard, „The key to successful interviewing is learning how to 
probe effectively – that is, to stimulate an informant to produce more information, 
without injecting yourself so much into the interaction that you only get a 
reflection of yourself in the data.‟ The most difficult probing technique is the 
silent probe, „which consists of just remaining quiet and waiting for an informant 
to continue.‟419 According to Hopewell, „The interviewer attempts, of course, to 
keep the discussion focused on the ideas of the informant and avoids personal 
responses that disclose the inquirer‟s own views.‟420 He suggests that „the 
interviewer treats the member‟s answer as a disclosure of meaning important 
within itself, a symbolic construction that the interviewer must try to 
understand.‟421  
Interviewees had advance notice of the four broad areas of discussion rather 
than the detailed questions themselves (or my probes and reminders). I sought to 
avoid loaded and leading questions, and tried to ask open-ended questions. I 
began with a „grand tour‟ question, 422 encouraging a verbal tour of their general 
experience of the deaths of people known to them. The physical context was also 
important: the choice was given as to whether they would prefer to meet in their 
own home rather than mine. I asked permission to record the interviews 
electronically and, as Oliver suggests, made it clear that participants were able to 
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withdraw at any point.
423
 Because the interviewer is „implicitly or explicitly, a co-
creator of the narrative that is the product of the research encounter‟,424 sensitivity 
to body language, gestures, pauses etc. was also needed. The researcher also 
needs to be very aware of the present moment – „to be fully aware that the 
creation of meanings around the issues being discussed may be contradictory, 
emotionally charged and quite at odds with what the researcher initially thought 
was going on.‟425  
 ETHICS 
The three central ethical principles involved when undertaking a research 
project such as this are the need: to avoid harm to participants; to obtain the 
specific consent of the participants (which means providing adequate information 
concerning all aspects of the project); and to protect the confidentiality of the 
participants (which means adhering to Data Protection legislation). The code of 
ethics of the American Association of Anthropology makes it clear that ethical 
obligations must take precedence over any other interests of the researcher. The 
key emphasis is that „researchers must do everything in their power to ensure that 
their research does not harm the safety, dignity, or privacy of the people with 
whom they work.‟426  
However, interviews can also be beneficial. According to Oliver, „It is 
arguably an ethical issue for the researcher to try to ensure that interviewees 
maximise the opportunity inherent in this situation, and gain something personally 
from this opportunity for reflection.‟ So, „the research interview is not merely a 
one-sided process, designed to help the researcher complete a research exercise, 
but rather a process of mutual help where the interviewee achieves a certain level 
of fulfilment through the exercise of reason and reflection.‟427  
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APPENDIX F – PROJECT DOCUMENTATION 
A TYPICAL INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
INTRODUCTION: Rehearse the purpose of the research project, and stress again the 
importance of their views and opinions. No right answers, just their answers. Explain 
how the interview is going to be recorded, and that they may stop the interview at any 
time.  
 
[NOTE – these are additions/clarifications resulting from early interview experience] 
 
 
1. Your experience of death, and your views of an afterlife: 
1.1. Begin with a „grand tour‟ question: „I wonder if you remember the death of 
Princess Diana. Can you tell me what you remember most clearly about the 
events surrounding her death and funeral?‟ [Not really relevant or useful in 
most interviews – no problem in starting with 1.2] 
1.2.  „Most of us don‟t know people like Diana. Can you tell me now please about 
some people who have died who have been known to you personally.‟ [Idea is 
simply to get them to list at least a few close/known people who have died – 
but not to go into reactions/emotions around the death etc.] 
1.3.  „Are these people whom you have known and who have died in any way still 
alive?‟ [Belief in life after death. Soul at sleep awaiting resurrection?] 
1.4. „If not, what do you think happens to people when they die?‟ 
 
2. The nature of the afterlife: 
2.1.  „I want to talk now about the way in which these people are still alive. Could 
you tell me first where you think they are? [Heaven, hell, purgatory, other]  
2.2. „Do they go to this place immediately after death?‟ 
2.3. „Are they alive in a physical way, perhaps with a new kind of body, or with 
their body re-made? If so, what age do you think they are?‟ 
2.4.  „Or are they alive in a more spiritual way? If so, what do you understand by 
this?‟  
2.5. „Do you think we have a part of us, some people call it a soul, which survives 
physical death? If so, can you tell me what you think the soul is?‟ 
2.6.  „Do you favour burial or cremation? Can you say why?' [Any link to soul 
belief?] 
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2.7.  „Are they with other people in the afterlife?‟  
2.8. „Are they with people whom they knew in their earthly lives? If so, who do 
you think you will meet in the afterlife?‟ [People whom you did not like?] 
2.9. „If so, how do you think we meet such people in the afterlife? Do we meet all 
the people we knew in our earthly lives?‟ 
2.10. „Will the people you meet be in the same relationship to you in the afterlife – 
friend, cousin, uncle, mum, husband, etc?‟ 
2.11. „Will you meet God and/or Jesus in the afterlife?‟ 
2.12. „Do people living in the afterlife remember their earthly life? If so, do they 
remember all of their earthly experience, or just as we remember it at the point 
of death?‟ [Suffering, things left undone/incomplete – and also whether 
memory is complete, or just partial as we experience it now.] 
2.13. „Are people in the afterlife aware of those still living their earthly lives?‟ 
[Continuing lives of relatives/friends etc. Blessing or curse?] 
2.14. „How are they aware of those still living? Do they have any awareness of 
what is happening to people in their earthly lives?‟ [Do they actually see 
people here, etc., or are they just aware that others are not with them in the 
afterlife?] 
2.15. „Have you had any direct experience of the continuing life of someone who 
has died?‟ [Sightings/feelings/sounds. Ghosts.] 
2.16. „Have you observed any remarkable experience with people near to the point 
of death?‟ [Or have you yourself had any such experience?] [NDEs etc.] 
2.17. „Have you ever attended a Spiritualist Church or been to see a medium?‟ [Do 
you know anyone who has? What do you think of them?] 
2.18. „Does the afterlife last forever? Do we change at all in the afterlife?  
2.19. „What do we do in the afterlife? Music, worship, literature, golf, or other 
kinds of things which people may have enjoyed in their earthly lives?‟ [Grow, 
learn, develop, boredom?] 
 
3. The afterlife and suffering: 
3.1. „Does your belief in life after death help you cope with or better understand 
the death of someone close to you? If so, can you tell me how it helps?‟  
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3.2. „Do you think that belief in life after death could help other people to cope 
with or better understand the death of someone close to them? If so, can you 
tell me why?‟  
3.3. „Does your belief in life after death make a difference when thinking about 
your own mortality?‟ [i.e. when thinking about your own inevitable death]? 
3.4.  „Can you give me an example of what you have said in the past, or might say 
in the future, to a friend or relative who has just lost a loved one?‟  
3.5.  „Does your belief in life after death help you cope better with or understand 
bad things (e.g. suffering) which have happened to you? Can you explain to 
me how?‟  
3.6. „Do you think that belief in life after death could help other people to cope 
with or better understand bad things (suffering) which have happened to them? 
If so, why?‟ 
3.7. „Can you give me an example of what you have said in the past, or might say 
in the future, to a friend or relative who experiences bad things (suffering)?‟ 
3.8.  „Will people who endured bad things in their earthly lives have their suffering 
somehow „put right‟ in the afterlife? Does this need to happen? If so, why?‟ 
[Theodicy. Probe how they think this works? Evil?][Clarify distinction 
between those IN the afterlife who have suffered, and those in this life who are 
suffering, and those in this life who are caring for those suffering. Also issue 
of fairness is raised here. ] 
3.9. „Can you tell me how this might work, for example, for a person who died 
very young of a painful and debilitating disease?‟ [Fairness, justice etc.] 
3.10.  „Why do we all have to die?‟ 
3.11. „Is there any suffering or wrongdoing in the afterlife?‟ 
 
4. Church doctrine, the Bible, and your views of the afterlife: 
4.1.  „Does everyone experience life after death? Is it the same 
destination/experience for everyone?‟ [Judgement. Punishment. Election. Non-
believers. Explore purgatory idea, – a second chance, or delayed judgement. 
Links to 2.2 potentially] 
4.2. „What do you think is the function or purpose of the afterlife?‟  
4.3. „Do you think there is any element of judgement or punishment in the 
afterlife? If so, how does this work?‟  
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4.4. „What does the resurrection of Jesus mean for us?‟ [Empty tomb?]  
4.5.  „What do you think are the main things the Bible says about an 
afterlife?‟[Paul – Romans and Corinthians? Jesus?] 
4.6.  „What do you think is the „official‟ view of the church about an afterlife?‟ 
[Resurrection? Purgatory? „Life after life after death‟? ] 
4.7. „If your views differ from what you think is the view of the Church and/or 
Bible, does it matter?‟ [Comparison with other doctrines? – life after death 
clearer, or less clear?]  
 
5. Other things which have helped form your views of the afterlife: 
5.1. „What other sources/information has helped form your views about an 
afterlife?‟ 
5.2. „Have your beliefs about the afterlife changed over time?‟ [Why, how? 
Influence of crises?] 
5.3.  „What ideas/beliefs/prayers/sayings/images have helped and/or comforted you 
after the death of someone? What has not helped?‟ [Theodicy again? God 
taking people into heaven? Use of „heavenly‟ language and images?] 
5.4. And, finally, is there anything else you want to say regarding any of the topics 
we have discussed? 
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RESEARCH PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
[Approved by University of Durham Theology and Religion Departmental Ethics Committee, May 2009] 
Research Project Title: „Lay Christian views of life after death: the reflections of some 
Congregational Christians‟ 
You are being invited to take part in this research project. Before you decide it is important for 
you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. This information 
sheet is designed to provide you with all the information you might need. Please take time to 
read it carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Please ask if there is anything that is 
not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to 
take part. 
What is the purpose of this project? 
The project is seeking to gain the views of ordinary Christian people concerning life after 
death, and to compare this with various academic/doctrinal views. If there are significant 
differences between the two, then why should this be so? What does it say about how doctrine 
and academic theology is undertaken and communicated to the church in general? 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
You are part of the Coast Congregational Church, and your minister is conducting this research 
with Christian people of his own congregation. It is hoped that most people in the church will 
take part. 
Do I have to take part? 
No. The research is entirely voluntary and you may decline to take part without any 
repercussions or consequences whatsoever. If you decide to take part and then change your 
mind, you should also know that you are free to withdraw from the project at any time and 
again with no repercussions or consequences.  
What will I have to do if I decide to take part? 
Everyone who takes part in the project will spend about an hour and a half talking with 
Michael Armstrong about the issue of life after death. The technical term for this is a semi-
structured interview, which is really like an in-depth conversation on specific topics, in this 
case concerning life after death. But this is not an exam! The object of the interview is not to 
see if you have the „right‟ answer, but rather to explore with you in depth whatever views you 
hold on this issue. Your views are very important. There are no right or wrong answers, just 
your answers.  
These meetings will be held in your own home, or other place of your choosing where you feel 
entirely comfortable. They will be recorded so that an accurate record is produced. An 
electronic recorder will be used, and notes will then be transcribed from this.  
In some circumstances it may be desirable to have a follow-up interview/conversation, but for 
the majority of participants it should involve only one meeting. The meetings will take place 
during the summer of 2009, but the overall project will not conclude until June 2011 
(publication date for D.Min thesis at Durham University).  
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What will you be asked to talk about during the interview? 
You will be invited to discuss five broad areas relating to life after death: 
a) Your experience of death, and your views of an afterlife 
b) The nature of the afterlife 
c) The afterlife and suffering 
d) Church doctrine, the Bible, and your views of the afterlife 
e) Other things which have helped form your views of the afterlife 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
Life after death is a very emotional subject, and you may be faced with memories and feelings 
which you find uncomfortable. During the meetings you may stop the process at any time. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
You may also find it very interesting and helpful to think deeply about this matter. It is not 
often that we have the opportunity and motivation to think through an important part of our 
Christian belief. It is also hoped that the results of this project will be of assistance to others in 
better understanding how the subject of life after death can, and should, be dealt with in the 
church.  
 
What if something goes wrong? 
This research study is being conducted under the auspices of the Department of Theology and 
Religion at Durham University. Should you wish to complain about your experience of this 
project you can contact the Chair of the University of Durham Theology and Religion 
Departmental Ethics Committee, Abbey House, Palace Green, Durham DH1 3RS (tel. 0191 
3343940). 
Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential? 
All information which is collected about you and from you during the course of the research 
will be kept strictly confidential. Any information about you which is eventually published or 
otherwise disseminated will be anonymised, either by having your name removed or changed 
to a fictitious name. The only other people who will on occasion have access to the data 
(recordings, transcripts etc.) will be relevant supervising academic staff of the Department of 
Theology and Religion at Durham University and external examiners for the D.Min 
programme. Following publication of the D.Min thesis, which is placed in the library of 
Durham University, all tapes and transcripts will be destroyed. Should you withdraw from the 
project at any time, you may request that any data concerning you be destroyed. 
The requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 will be met in full. This document 
comprises a „fair processing statement‟ as required by the Act. Any data collected will be used 
only for the research purposes indicated above, and will be stored securely until being 
destroyed at the end of the project.  
 
 
 206 
 
What will happen to the results of the research project? 
The results of the project will be published in the form of a D.Min thesis in Durham University 
library. 
Who is organising and supervising the research? 
This research project is being conducted by a Doctoral student in the Department of Theology 
and Religion at Durham University. Professor Douglas Davies is the supervising academic. 
The project has been approved by the research ethics committee of the Department of 
Theology and Religion.  
Contact for further information 
Revd Michael Armstrong, 21 Kenilworth Road, Whitley Bay NE25 8BE (tel. 0191 2913267) 
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RESEARCH PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
TITLE OF PROJECT: „Lay Christian views of life after death: the reflections of 
some Congregational Christians‟ 
[A research investigation conducted by Revd Michael Armstrong as part of the Doctor 
of Ministry programme of the University of Durham] 
(The participant should read thoroughly this sheet and sign below if satisfied with and 
happy to confirm all the points stated below) 
 
 I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet, and have 
received a copy for future reference. 
 
 I have had an opportunity to ask questions and to discuss the study and have 
received satisfactory answers to any queries. 
 
 I have received enough information about the study. 
 
 I consent to participate in the study and for information provided by me 
during the study to be used as indicated in the Participant Information Sheet. 
 
 I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time and without 
having to give a reason for withdrawing. 
 
 
Signed .............................................………................  Date ..................................... 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS)  
 
......................................................………........................ 
 
- Many thanks for taking part in the project. Please keep your signed copy of this consent form 
and the Research Participant Information Sheet. Please return the other signed copy of the 
consent form to Michael Armstrong. - 
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SUPPLEMENTARY RESEARCH PARTICIPANT INFORMATION 
SHEET: DEALING WITH DATA 
Research Project Title: „Lay Christian views of life after death: the reflections of some 
Congregational Christians‟ [A research investigation conducted by Revd Michael Armstrong 
as part of the Doctor of Ministry programme of the University of Durham] 
In 2009, prior to your taking part in the project, you received the original Research 
Participant Information Sheet which clarified many issues, including how data from 
the project would be handled. It was stated that: 
All information which is collected about you and from you during the course of the 
research will be kept strictly confidential. Any information about you which is 
eventually published or otherwise disseminated will be anonymised, either by having 
your name removed or changed to a fictitious name. The only other people who will 
on occasion have access to the data (recordings, transcripts etc.) will be relevant 
supervising academic staff of the Department of Theology and Religion at Durham 
University and external examiners for the D.Min programme. Following publication of 
the D.Min thesis, which is placed in the library of Durham University, all tapes and 
transcripts will be destroyed. Should you withdraw from the project at any time, you 
may request that any data concerning you be destroyed. 
The requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998 will be met in full. This document 
comprises a „fair processing statement‟ as required by the Act. Any data collected will 
be used only for the research purposes indicated above, and will be stored securely 
until being destroyed at the end of the project.  
I am contacting you now because I wish to seek your permission to retain the data 
(recordings and transcripts) produced during this project for potential use in future 
academic research. It is my view and the view of my supervisors that information 
which you have provided during this project could be valuable for future research. All 
such data would be stored securely, in strict confidence, and would be anonymised if 
used in the future (as per the above paragraphs).  
If you agree to this request then please complete the attached Supplementary Research 
Participant Consent Form and return it to me.  
However, you should not feel obliged in any way to agree to this request. If you feel 
uncomfortable with the retention of this data then please ignore this request. If I have 
not received a consent form from you by the end of October then I will assume you 
wish for all data relating to you to be destroyed following the completion of this 
project (as per the original participant agreement).  
Many thanks, 
Michael. [September 2010]  
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SUPPLEMENTARY RESEARCH PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM  
 
TITLE OF PROJECT: „Lay Christian views of life after death: the reflections of some 
Congregational Christians‟ 
[A research investigation conducted by Revd Michael Armstrong as part of the Doctor of 
Ministry programme of the University of Durham] 
  
I have read and understood the Supplementary Participant Information Sheet 
(September 2010), and have received a copy for future reference.  
 
I consent to information provided by me during the study to be retained by Revd 
Michael Armstrong for use in future academic research as indicated in the 
Supplementary Participant Information Sheet. 
 
 
 
Signed .............................................………................  Date ..................................... 
 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS)  
 
......................................................………........................ 
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APPENDIX G – EXCURSUS IN DEFENCE OF THE 
SUBSTANTIAL SOUL 
THE INFLUENCE OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY  
I suggest that the bogeyman of Greek influence in this area has been over 
exaggerated. James Barr
428
 argues that recent scholarship has been wrong in so 
easily discarding thoughts of an immortal soul as a foreign Greek influence on the 
New Testament.
429
 He questions the way Hebrew „totality thinking‟ has been 
portrayed as the correct, biblical, anti-Greek alternative, arguing that there is no 
unitary „nephesh concept‟ (the word can mean „life‟ in some contexts and „soul‟ 
in others), and that Hebrew totality thinking is just too (suspiciously) good to be 
true.  
Is it even remotely plausible that ancient Hebrews, at the very earliest 
stage of their tradition, already had a picture of humanity which agreed so 
well with the modern esteem for psychosomatic unity? How did they 
manage to get it all so perfectly right, when the Greeks, apparently, so 
thoroughly misunderstood everything?
430
  
Barr also makes the telling point that if the Hebrew concept was already so 
complete and perfect, then why did Greek thought have any influence at all? He 
argues that Hebrew thought used the bits it needed from Greek thought. Greek 
ideas were not accepted in total: for example, the Socratic-Platonic idea of eternal 
(i.e. pre-existing) souls, and the idea of transmigration of the soul, were not 
accepted. Furthermore, the acceptance of some concepts was not a consequence 
of the approval of an elite, but rather emerged from the faith community; it was 
what actually worked in practice. Why else, Barr asks, does the „soul‟ idea persist 
so strongly today?  
A similar point emerges when considering the Maccabean origin of the idea 
of resurrection. Barr suggests that Maccabean martyrdom was new in that it was 
to enforce conformity (rather than attacking alien foreigners or enemies), so 
                                                     
428
James Barr, The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality: The Read-Tuckwell lectures for 1990 
(London: SCM, 1992).  
429
The vanguard representatives of this view are Oscar Cullmann, Immortality of the Soul or 
Resurrection of the Dead? The Witness of the New Testament (London: Epworth Press, 1958), and 
Krister Stendahl, „Immortality is Too Much and Too Little‟, in K. Stendahl, Meanings: the Bible as 
Document and as Guide (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 193-202. A more recent example is 
Richard Bauckham, and Trevor Hart, Hope against Hope: Christian Eschatology in Contemporary 
Context (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1999), 126-30.  
430
 Barr, Garden of Eden, 36-7. 
 211 
 
gruesome torture and death could be avoided simply by saying certain words or 
undertaking simple acts. Totality of the person was of little use when faced with 
the literal destruction of the physical body. Those suffering sought to hold the 
religious loyalties of the soul even as the body was being destroyed. Immortality 
of the soul actually made it more essential for the persecuted to remain steadfast, 
because they would not die and „they‟ would be judged after death. „In this 
situation, then, immortality of the soul and resurrection of the body worked 
together.‟ And this sort of symbiosis of the two concepts also operated in 
traditional Christianity.
431
 In other words, while the final justice of God was to be 
visibly proven by resurrection of the persecuted martyr (as per Stendahl), it is 
surely also the case that the personal integrity and survival of a martyr is not a 
„little‟ matter for either the person concerned or his maker. Stendahl comments 
that his essay „caused some stir, and I received more angry mail about it than any 
other speech or article.‟432 This is not surprising, because he is effectively 
devaluing the worth of human life and contradicting the centuries of Christian 
tradition and history where immortality of the soul was held as a central tenet. 
Stendahl says that immortality of the soul was flawed because it was too personal 
and too small a concept, immortality for the individual. By contrast, he argues, 
resurrection answers the „big‟ question of theodicy, the question of a moral 
universe. But surely resurrection is also of importance and interest to „little me‟?  
Barr reminds us that traditional Christianity „had invested far more heavily in 
the idealist, immaterialist, side of Greek philosophy than people now wanted to 
admit.‟433 He points to the Westminster Confession as a clear example of this (see 
Appendix B).
434
 David Brown points to the influence here of the Greek idea that 
like can only be known by like, so if we are able to know the immaterial divine 
there must be something of the same in us. He suggests it is no small thing that 
the immortal soul became established both in Roman and Presbyterian 
(Westminster) confessions.
435
  
There is also, I suggest, a mistaken focus in the contemporary debate on the 
„immortality‟ of the soul. The distinction between what God must do and will do 
is not as great as it at first seems, and in their haste to deny that we have an 
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absolute (human) right to anything from God, many theologians seem to overstate 
this difference. Oscar Cullman famously set the Greek intrusion of immortality of 
the soul against the biblical/Hebraic view of bodily resurrection,
436
 but in so 
doing, claims Carole Zaleski, not only has he distorted how we can read the 
Church fathers, the monastic tradition, the Anglican divines, and indeed most of 
the spiritual classics of the Christian heritage; but also the living have been cut off 
from the dead. Zaleski points out that the immense public interest in NDEs
437
 
shows that such communion is a basic desire of most people, including Christians. 
She is surely correct in suggesting that such a discrepancy shows „the possibility 
that something has been missing from contemporary theology; that a fundamental 
and legitimate need has been going unmet.‟438 
Barr reminds us that only in the last century has our tradition doubted an 
immortal soul. For nearly two thousand years before that „it was held as clear that 
immortality of the human soul was central to religion. ... Anyone who doubted ... 
was likely to be considered as a dangerous heretic, if not a total denier of 
religion.‟439 But immortality has now come to be seen as opposed to resurrection 
(Cullmann), and as a Greek infiltration. Yet Barr states that immortality of the 
soul is „something that was built into the entire tradition of classical 
Protestantism.‟ He believes that the supposed contradiction or problematic 
between resurrection and immortality of the soul does not exist in Christian 
tradition or Scripture. Ideas about immortality of the soul increased dramatically 
in the tradition once people began to realise that the world was not going to end, 
and therefore the question of where dead people were now became more 
important.
 440
 The soul answered the question of how someone resurrected with a 
new body was the same person as before death. Simon Tugwell points out that it 
was not until 1513, at the fifth Lateran Council, that the immortality of the soul 
was formally declared to be a Catholic doctrine; but the previous dispute was 
philosophical (the correct interpretation of Aristotle) rather than doctrinal. Denial 
of immortality of the soul was seen as being at odds with the crucial doctrines of 
resurrection and judgement, so philosophers were called upon to defend this view. 
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This reflects the widespread belief by then that the immortality of the soul was 
crucial.
441
  
Maurice Wiles asks whether the perceived difference between resurrection of 
the body and immortal soul is actually significant. A key argument for the 
superiority of resurrection is that it stresses God‟s action in re-creating us, rather 
than eternal life being viewed as a property or a right of human beings. But, as 
Wiles points out, surely God is equally the source of life if we possess something 
immortal, it just shifts the point of God‟s giving. „If man has an immortal soul, he 
has it only because God has so created him. It is not a matter of his own 
achievement.‟ Also, according to the Apologists, the soul was potentially 
immortal, „it lives by partaking in the life of God only because and so long as God 
wills.‟442 Murray Harris is clear that resurrection and immortality are inseparable 
and complementary ideas, „since it is only by means of a resurrection 
transformation that the believer gains immortality, and the receipt of immortality 
is the invariable result of experiencing a resurrection transformation.‟443 
THE INFLUENCE OF SCIENCE 
The influence of recent advances in neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and 
other related areas has also, I suggest, been overstated. Many seem to have too 
easily accepted that science has dealt a fatal blow to any dualist conception of 
human being as body plus soul, and have produced various forms of monist view 
in response. Such views are attempts to accept the force of the scientific argument 
against a soul, but to reject a reductive physicalist approach that would claim that 
higher human capacities such as rationality, morality, and religious experience 
can be explained only by brain function.  
Variations of Monism 
Nancey Murphy sees three key challenges from science: (1) How does the 
mind-body interaction work? (2) Darwinism shows how close we are to other 
animals, so how do we have souls? (3) Neuroscience shows that many things 
previously attributed to a soul are in fact functions of the brain. However, this 
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does not mean we have to accept reductive physicalism.
444
 Murphy has produced 
a theory of non-reductive physicalism, which argues that „if there is no soul then 
these higher human capacities might be explained in a different manner. In part 
they are explainable as brain functions, but their full explanation requires attention 
to human social relations, to cultural factors, and, most importantly, to our 
relationship with God.‟445 Human distinctiveness, for Murphy, is not to be found 
in a soul, „but rather in special capabilities, enabled by our more complex neural 
systems, language and culture.‟ Theology says what is distinct about us is what is 
important to God: morality, and a capacity for relationship with God and others. 
So, „in addition to all that science can tell us about ourselves, we need a religious 
point of view in order to know the significance of the scientific findings.‟446 
Murphy claims that the issue of how God influences us if we don‟t have a soul is 
actually solved by science with top-down causality. She also points out that 
science can never prove reductive physicalism, because „it will always be possible 
for the dualist to claim that ... mental events are merely correlated with events in 
particular regions of the brain.‟447 However, she does accept that „science has 
provided a massive amount of evidence suggesting that we need not postulate the 
existence of an entity such as a soul or mind in order to explain life and 
consciousness.‟448  
Warren Brown also favours non-reductive physicalism, but accepts that 
recent research in neurological science means „there seems to be a rapidly 
diminishing pool of human capacities and experiences that have not yet been 
found to be influenced by neural activity and that might be reserved for the 
activity of an ontologically distinct and immaterial soul.‟449 Brown also appeals to 
top-down causality: „conscious decisions and will are real phenomena that are 
effective in exerting a top-down (or whole-part) causal influence on the 
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neurophysiological processes of the brain.‟ However, the new element which 
Brown adds is emergence. „Our thinking, deciding, and experiencing involve new 
causal properties that emerge from the topology of the complex interactive 
operations of the entire brain. These higher-level emergent properties cannot be 
entirely accounted for by describing the operation of various contributing neural 
subsystems.‟ He realises that his emergent monism faces the big philosophical 
issue of how the immaterial can emerge from the material, but argues that what is 
emergent is not entities or new physical forces, but rather „levels of causal 
efficacy‟. So „soul‟ is an aspect of physical existence, not an additional immaterial 
essence.
450
 Brown also argues that those things which used to be attributed to the 
substantial soul are „human soulishness‟, which is about personal relatedness 
(intra-personal, between individuals, and between an individual and God). We 
become persons and souls „as we experience ourselves within a relational network 
of God and other human beings. Our soulishness is, thus, established and enriched 
by our deepest and most significant relationships.‟451 For Brown, „Humans 
become persons with particular value in the cosmos not by the presence of a 
unique additional substance (an immaterial soul), but by a unique relationship to 
God.‟452 His emergence idea is that as cognitive capacities develop (such as 
language, episodic memory, self-awareness, awareness of the future) so the ability 
for relatedness develops; and as this flourishes so we acquire „soulishness‟.  
John Polkinghorne uses his scientific understanding to re-conceive the soul 
as an immensely complex „information-bearing pattern‟ rather than a physical 
component or substance. The soul „is modified as we acquire new experiences, 
insights and memories, in accordance with the dynamic of our living history.‟ On 
this understanding the soul is not intrinsically immortal: the information-bearing 
pattern will dissolve after death by the decay (or cremation) of our bodies. 
However, Polkinghorne claims that „it is a perfectly coherent hope that the pattern 
that is a human being could be held in the divine memory after a person‟s death.‟ 
He admits that „such a disembodied existence, even if located within the divine 
remembrance, would be less than fully human.‟ The „souls‟ would be restored to 
full life by bodily resurrection.
453
 This has echoes of the „objective immortality‟ 
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of process theology,
454
 of which Polkinghorne is so critical (although the key 
difference of re-embodiment remains). During the (presumably very long) time in 
which the souls are held in the mind of God, something remarkable apparently 
takes place. God will be at work 
purifying and transforming the souls awaiting resurrection in ways that 
respect their integrity. Ultimately, what has been lost will be restored and 
what of good was never gained will be bestowed.
455
  
This seems to raise more questions than it resolves. How is such intervention 
to happen? Will we be in any sense aware (conscious, without a body?) of these 
proceedings? How would the experience of being able to run be restored to a child 
crippled from birth, or the ability to think conceptually to the child brain-damaged 
at birth? Polkinghorne confuses the issue later on when he also introduces the idea 
of a re-vamped purgatory for the time immediately following re-embodiment in 
the transformed new creation, a necessary purification following self-judgement 
after being confronted with the reality of one‟s own life and God‟s life. „This 
purgative process will be an indispensable preparation for the more profound 
engagements with the life of the holy God that lie beyond it.‟456 I suggest that we 
see here an example of the application of science not being of any great help.  
A New Kind of (Emergent) Dualism 
William Hasker also uses the concept of emergence, but to produce a new 
form of dualism. He argues that the findings of modern science mean that we 
must reject Cartesian dualism, that is, the idea of „the soul as an entity of a 
completely different nature than the physical, an entity with no essential or 
internal relationship to the body, which must be added to the body ad extra by a 
special divine act of creation.‟ By contrast, Hasker argues that „the human mind is 
produced by the human brain and is not a separate element “added to” the brain 
from outside.‟ Mental properties are emergent. „A conscious experience simply is 
a unity, and to decompose it into a collection of separate parts is to falsify it.‟  457 
Hasker rejects the materialism of Murphy. She is mistaken in her claim that 
downward causation is the answer to causal reductionism, because the „upper 
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levels‟ are not things. „A person‟s being aware of a complex fact does not consist 
of parts of the person being aware of parts of the fact. Once we grasp this, 
materialism is seen to be in deep trouble.‟458 So Hasker proposes emergent 
dualism. „The central idea is that when elements are organised into certain 
complex wholes, something genuinely new comes into being, something that is 
not reducible to or explainable in terms of the elements.‟459 His view is dualist „in 
that it posits a continuing, unitary, psychic individual that is distinct from the 
biological organism. But it is an emergent dualism, because the mental individual 
emerges from the organism and is sustained by it; it is not (as in traditional 
dualism) a separate element added to the organism from outside by divine fiat.‟460 
Like Swinburne, Hasker argues that because the conscious self is a distinct 
individual which is not identical with the physical organism, „it is capable of 
existing, if sustained by divine power, in the absence of the organism.‟461  
Keith Ward also develops a form of emergence in support of traditional 
dualism, but does not use that term. He argues that, properly understood, biology 
has not caused any real problems for the Christian view of soul, which „can easily 
be seen as developing continuously from lower, non-rational or non-cognitive, 
forms of life. In modern terminology, we might say that, when the brain reaches a 
certain stage of complexity, the power of conceptual thought, of reasoning and 
thinking, begins to exist; and that is when a rational soul begins to be.‟462  
One of the interviewees indicated a form of emergence. James believes that 
from the point of conception you produce a soul, and it is shaped and influenced 
by your life. The soul is given „in so far as, yes, you have a soul.‟ But, really, „you 
produce it by your actions.‟ For James, a newborn child has a soul, but it is a 
fairly blank thing which is then formed and patterned during life.  
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Traditional Dualism Defended 
Richard Swinburne makes the very important claim that scientific 
discoveries and progress in neurology are irrelevant to the main dualist 
contentions.  
The dualist is not claiming merely to provide a theory which explains very 
well the physical phenomena. ... No, the dualist claims that dualism is 
involved in the phenomena, the experienced data, themselves – we have 
pains as well as brain states, and we continue to be conscious as well as 
our bodies continuing to function. That there are continuing subjects of 
experience who are conscious is a datum, itself in need of explanation.
463
  
Science is also severely limited in what it can do because „brain events are such 
different things qualitatively from pains, smells, and tastes that a natural 
connection between them seems almost impossible.‟464 Swinburne argues that we 
must be honest in admitting that we do not understand everything: but, why 
should we be able to? We should not worry that dualists cannot explain what 
exactly the substance of the soul is and how it (and not the brain) supports 
subjective mental states; „there just are some things we cannot understand – while 
that fact gives no reason for supposing that they do not occur.‟465  
For Swinburne, conscious experience has two important elements: continuity 
(we remember the experiences of yesterday), and conscious experience as 
causally efficacious (they cause other thoughts and feelings and brain events, and 
make a difference to the agent‟s behaviour). A succession of thoughts is not 
produced by brain processes alone; brain processes are necessary for this, but not 
sufficient. Swinburne argues that there really are mental events and states 
different from brain processes and observable public behaviour, and „that we can 
only make sense of the continuity of this conscious life by supposing that there 
are two parts to a man (and to many another animal) – a body and a soul (or 
mind).‟466 His often repeated point is that „Knowledge of what happens to bodies 
and their parts will not show you for certain what happens to persons.‟467 
Swinburne adopts a „soft dualism‟ by which he means that, unlike Plato and 
Descartes, he does not hold the extreme dualist view that the soul is naturally 
immortal. But he is still a substance dualist. A person comprises a body and a 
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soul. „A man‟s body is that to which his physical properties belong. [For example, 
weight] ... A man‟s soul is that to which the (pure) mental properties of a man 
belong.‟468 Swinburne rejects Descartes who seems sometimes to say that the real 
person is the soul, with the body just attached to enable its operation. Rather, a 
man is both body and soul: but, the soul is the essential part, the part which can 
logically survive the body and maintain personal identity. Disembodied existence, 
for Swinburne, is a coherent idea. The soul can exist, but will not function, 
without a functioning brain; but there is no reason why God cannot facilitate its 
functioning without the physical brain, or indeed with a different brain.  
„Souls are immaterial subjects of mental properties. They have sensations 
and thoughts, desires and beliefs, and perform intentional actions. Souls are the 
essential parts of human beings, and humans have sensations, etc., and perform 
intentional actions in virtue of their souls doing so.‟469Swinburne denies that the 
soul is emergent, or is a process of natural evolution. Rather, the soul comes from 
God, a power behind nature who „brings it about that there is linked to the brain 
of an animal or man a soul which interacts with it in a regular and predictable 
way.‟470 Swinburne adopts the orthodox Catholic view of Creationism (God 
creates anew each individual soul and gives it to each embryo able to receive it) 
but extends this to include animal souls also. Animals have some sort of mental 
life (although we do not fully know the nature of this), and therefore an inferior 
sort of soul; therefore Descartes was wrong in seeing animals as unconscious 
automata. 
Other defences of the traditional dualist position focus on biblical evidence. 
John Cooper argues that the biblical teaching of a disembodied interim period 
between death and resurrection confirms a traditional dualist view. He terms this 
holistic dualism, to emphasise that the final destiny of a human being is to be re-
embodied. Stephen T. Davis also argues that there is a post-mortem state of 
„temporary disembodiment‟ which is not the sleep of the soul but a conscious 
state in the presence of God („today you will be in Paradise with me‟, Lk. 23:43). 
However, being without a body is abnormal; re-embodiment at the general 
resurrection is the final afterlife state. But this final, „spiritual‟ body does not 
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require physical continuity with the human earthly body to ensure personal 
identity; this is provided by the soul.
471
  
Cooper accuses Hasker of producing a „substance dualism in disguise‟ and 
argues that his theory is counter-intuitive and at least as problematic as more 
traditional dualist views.
472
 Cooper argues that the Bible does not teach 
philosophical anthropology, but rather presents „a non-theoretical, 
“commonsense” vision of the afterlife which nevertheless has ontological 
presuppositions and implications.‟ These include the requirement for „some sort 
of ontic duality or dualism.‟473 Cooper challenges the notion that brain states can 
simply be mapped onto specific states of mind, and points out that philosophers 
still take holistic dualism seriously, for example, Richard Swinburne, John Paul 
II, John Cobb, and Herman Dooyerweerd. For Cooper, holistic dualism is not just 
defensible, but is actually the correct position. „It is the best reading of Scripture, 
both in its ability to account for all the biblical data and in its conceptual 
adequacy with respect to the afterlife.‟474  
Carole Zaleski (who is not a substance dualist) makes some interesting, 
„ordinary‟ points from human experience.  
Multiplicity and disunity are as strong a feature of our existence as 
psychosomatic unity. We are legion, as the demons say. It is a marvel that 
all our different parts work together. ... Why should it surprise us if at 
death the soul separates from the body? Separating is the order of our lives 
as we tend toward death. If a man‟s jowls can sink down while his brow 
stays up, why can‟t his soul rise up when his body sinks down?  
No matter what science can tell us, our „self‟ can tell something more. The 
common witness of humanity is that some sort of soul-talk „is necessary to 
capture the full range of human experience‟. Science cannot provide a necessary 
level of explanation. „There remains an irreducible quality to our experience 
which tells us that we are not perishing with it, that we are also made in the image 
and likeness of Another, whose [genetic] code is transcendent.‟475 
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APPENDIX H - EXCURSUS ON APPROACHES TO BIBLICAL 
INTERPRETATION 
N. T. Wright believes that ordinary theologians should simply try to 
understand, or in any case just accept, the „correct‟ biblical interpretation offered 
by experts in this academic practice. But is this the only or indeed the appropriate 
approach to biblical interpretation? Jaime Clark-Soles is clear that „There is no 
systematic theology in the NT regarding death and afterlife. ... In other words, the 
NT texts say a variety of things that cannot be construed as a single view.‟476 He 
contrasts his non-doctrinal, non-dogmatic agenda with the apologetic purpose of 
Wright‟s work in this area. I suggest that the real question to ask of Wright is not 
so much whether his biblical (historical-critical) scholarship is correct, but rather 
how the conclusions of this scholarship should relate to Christians today. How 
can it, and why should it, inform the living faith of contemporary Christian people 
with regard to their belief in LAD?  
THE TEXT IN PAST AND PRESENT 
For Johannes van der Ven, hermeneutics is based on an historical problem – 
revealing the meaning of texts produced in the past, which production was itself 
subject to many historical factors (speaker and writer, social/cultural context, 
linguistic). This creates the „time-bridging‟ problem. „Hermeneutic work always 
implies the construction of a bridge between the past in which the text was created 
and the present. The result of this work is a new text representing a new reading 
of the old texts.‟ We need a new reading because „when we look at the old text 
from the perspective of the present, we see it in a particular light that was not 
even conceivable at the time when the old text was produced.‟ Of course, one can 
never be neutral in the reading of a text. „An aspect that forms part of the present 
out of which the old text is interpreted is the meaning of the text for one‟s own 
existence in the present, ... The bridging of the time gap separating the old text 
from the present moment does not take place completely without personal interest 
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or involvement.‟ The old text does not have a predetermined definitive meaning 
that can simply be applied to the current situation.
477
  
Hans-Georg Gadamer provided the classic „horizons‟ view of hermeneutics 
to illustrate this same point. The key thing is that our present horizon is in fact the 
only way to approach the horizon of a text, and only if we realise this can we gain 
real insight.
478
 For Anthony Thiselton, „the goal of biblical hermeneutics is to 
bring about an active and meaningful engagement between the interpreter and 
text, in such a way that the interpreter‟s own horizon is re-shaped and 
enlarged.‟479 Gadamer allows no „final answer‟ to any question. „Like a work of 
art, questions are inexhaustible. ... Certainly there would not be conformity with 
the original author. Life moves on, and for Gadamer hermeneutics is never 
replication. ... We can never put the clock back before Truth and Method. 
Everything is hermeneutical; everything requires interpretation.‟480  
Andrew Village shows how historical criticism has itself been criticised as 
being incapable of giving an objective and univocal meaning to a text; scholars 
have then gone „behind‟ the text to the horizon of the author, while still not 
connecting with the reader‟s horizon. Literary criticism sought to bring together 
text and reader, but started from a detailed analysis of the text which therefore 
required an ideal reader. Cultural studies, on the other hand, makes the reader 
dominant, but at the expense of not connecting with text or author. Village argues 
that scholarly biblical study avoids any real application of interpretation to the life 
of the reader. „To a large extent, academic exploration of the Bible remains wary 
of the notion that the text might speak with an authority to readers that lies 
beyond the text or its human author.‟481  
J. Todd Billings believes that reading the Bible is to enter an ongoing drama, 
a journey of faith seeking understanding, guided by a map of „the rule of faith‟. 
But we also always bring our own map to Scripture, our own theological 
predispositions. There is no neutral reader. The call to Sola Scriptura is often 
misunderstood as an appeal to ignore everything except Scripture: in fact, it was 
rather to say that the rule of faith must finally be biblical in character. But this 
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„rule‟ is not as clear as it sounds. It sets wide boundaries and limits which allows 
for (and indeed can facilitate) multiple interpretations.
482
 Following Gadamer, 
Billings argues that whether we realise it or not, we all read with the lens of 
tradition because we are not the only readers to read a particular text. In fact, 
traditions „open up deeper, more penetrating possibilities for textual 
understanding than we could have on our own. In addition, in terms of reading 
Scripture, traditions join us together with the “cloud of witness” (Heb. 12:1) and 
the work of the Spirit through the centuries.‟483 The key question for Christian 
readers of Scripture, according to Billings, is therefore to realise which 
tradition(s) are operative. 
Nicholas Lash (against Krister Stendahl
484
) argues that there is no method to 
determine the original meaning of a text which does not entail interpretation. He 
also questions Stendhahl‟s imprecise concept of „meaning‟. What does the 
„original meaning‟ of the text refer to? Is it what Luke or Paul actually wrote, or 
what they were in their own minds trying to express, or what the original audience 
of the text perceived it to be? Lash also accuses Stendahl of using a false „relay 
race‟ analogy of the relationship between the biblical scholar and the systematic 
theologian: the baton of pure historical information is handed over to the 
systematic theologian to be made use of in the next stage of the interpretive 
enterprise. Lash argues that an understanding of our past is important, but so too 
is a critical understanding of our present. „We do not first understand the past and 
then proceed to understand the present. The relationship between these two 
dimensions of our quest for meaning and truth is dialectical; they mutually 
inform, enable, correct and enlighten each other‟. Lash believes that the NT 
authors sought to respond to fundamental questions of life and death, innocence 
and freedom, hope and suffering, in terms available to them within their cultural 
horizons; and if they are to be „heard‟ with something like their original force they 
have to be „heard‟ as questions that challenge us.  
And if they are to be thus heard, they must first be articulated in terms 
available to us within our cultural horizons. There is thus a sense in which 
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the articulation of what the text might „mean‟ today is a necessary 
condition of hearing what that text „originally meant‟.485  
So the interpretation of a text must involve some consideration of more than 
simply what the author might, or might not, have originally intended. What the 
text „actually meant then‟ is not a simple, nor perhaps even a meaningful question 
to ask. Perhaps the real question is „what does it mean now‟, and in getting to this 
we must involve a wider set of considerations than the text itself. Even if we 
could be sure what the text actually meant in its original setting, this does not 
mean that it is necessarily correct or intelligible to simply transpose this meaning 
to today. What was written in and for the world view of the author must be 
reconsidered in light of the world view of the reader. I suggest that this can be 
seen most clearly with regard to how the „physical‟ is seen by Wright and two 
scientist theologians who support his view. 
AUTHORIAL WORLD VIEWS AND CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE 
The eschatological approach of Wright, Wilkinson
486
 and Polkinghorne
487
 is 
based on the physical resurrection of Jesus and the commitment of a faithful God 
to his physical creation; both of which mean that the physical cosmos will be 
renewed and restored as the new heavens and the new earth. Several key passages 
(including Romans 8:18-30, 1 Cor. 15, 2 Cor. 5:1-10, Col. 1:15-20, 1 Thess. 4:13-
5:11, 2 Peter 3:10-13 and Revelation 21) are interpreted in support of this view. 
However, the authors of these key passages of Scripture were dependent on a 
world view vastly different from that provided by modern science. As Badham 
points out, the difficulty is that „the apocalyptic imagination of the first century is 
the only basis for such an expectation, and key elements in that understanding of 
reality are utterly different from our own.‟488  
Badham is not unusual in claiming that Paul expected the eschaton in his 
lifetime. For Paul, this was a reasonable view given that he thought the existing 
(three-decker) universe had been created by God in its current state only several 
thousand years before. „What could be more natural than that God who had 
created this cosmos in the relatively recent past should also destroy and remake it 
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in the relatively near future?‟489 This is, of course, a quite different assumption to 
make in light of modern scientific knowledge about an immense space-time 
universe which has evolved and expanded in an extraordinary fashion from a 
completely alien initial state some 14 billion years ago. There are two related 
issues here. First, to what extent can the original authorial intention still be 
considered as meaningful or „true‟ for us today, given the very different (even 
mistaken) world view that obtained then? Second, is the assumption of a recreated 
physical cosmos still reasonable given contemporary cosmology? This is an issue 
which I believe the scientist-theologians
490
 actually misconstrue by an over-
reliance on a scientific world view.  
Wilkinson states that his work „shares with Wright‟s Surprised by Hope a 
passion for the importance and centrality of bodily resurrection to Christian hope, 
but wants to push further for what this means for the physical universe. What 
begins to emerge is a re-discovery of one of the central biblical narratives, that of 
new creation.‟491 He claims, following Polkinghorne, that Christian theology faces 
a serious challenge from the scientific fact of the final futility of the cosmos (by 
slow heat death). For Polkinghorne, there is a clear ultimate question. „Does the 
universe make complete sense, not just now but always, or is it in the end, “a tale 
told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing”?‟492 Elsewhere, he 
remarks that „eschatology is the keystone of the edifice of theological thinking, 
holding the whole building together.‟493 Polkinghorne believes that Christian 
belief provides the essential resource for answering this fundamental question, 
with hope of a destiny beyond death resting ultimately on the faithfulness of God 
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as Creator. This is a key point because it is only the case that the ultimate death of 
the physical cosmos is problematic if one assumes that God must redeem and 
restore the whole physical creation in order to remain faithful.  
I find this to be an interesting assumption for scientist-theologians to 
make,
494
 for, as Wilkinson points out very clearly, „without a future of futility the 
Universe would not have had the balances in law and circumstances necessary for 
intelligent life to develop. Here is an important insight that life brings with it 
death.‟495 In other words, modern science shows us that the scale, age and 
wastefulness of the universe are necessary preconditions for the development of 
intelligent life in at least one place. The wastefulness of the universe can be seen 
in our evolutionary understanding both of the physical cosmos (generations of 
stars dying and seeding the next, creating heavier elements and solar systems) and 
of organic life (the vast majority of all species that have ever lived are extinct, and 
the animal suffering involved in evolution).
 496
 Furthermore, modern science also 
emphasises the fragility and temporality of human life on this planet: a home base 
which will eventually be completely destroyed by an expanding sun, but is 
threatened in the much shorter (immediate) term by everything from asteroid 
strike, through super-volcanoes and magnetic pole-shifts, to environmental or 
nuclear disaster.  
As a person not formally trained as a scientist,
497
 it is quite remarkable to me 
that a perfectly reasonable interpretation of modern cosmology seems to be 
overlooked by the scientist-theologians themselves: that God actually values 
above all else the emergence of human life, to which end he has expended in an 
extraordinarily abundant and generous way the vast physical resources of the 
created cosmos. Perhaps God sees the physical creation as basically a means to 
the end of intelligent life, and the cosmos is therefore of immense value only in 
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that sense. The huge time spans, and the necessary physical and organic 
evolutionary processes, are perhaps the (necessary) way God has enabled the 
eventual creation of human beings (and possibly other intelligent life).
498
 Of the 
immense life-span of this universe before its heat-death as a sea of photons, 
perhaps it is this time that is the point, the focus. This era of the universe (the 
„star‟ era) is the one which is compatible with life emerging, but it is only a tiny 
fraction of the predicted life of the physical cosmos. Physicists too easily convey 
a very linear impression of the value of time, where equal amounts of time are 
assumed to be equally important. But perhaps the universe in its entirety could be 
thought of as a „soul nursery‟, analogous to the nebula „star nurseries‟ which 
science currently observes?  
Of course this can sound anthropocentric and humanly arrogant, but those 
who claim that the whole cosmos must be redeemed and transformed by God also 
sound cosmocentric and cosmologically arrogant. Science constantly tells us of 
the wonder and beauty of the immense physical cosmos; but it is also a hugely 
violent, empty, alien environment about which we still actually know very little 
(dark matter and energy for example). What is really being added to the 
theological discussion of human destiny beyond death by such a perspective? Is it 
simply a projection of scientific importance by committed scientists? Keith Ward 
reminds us that „the real world is the world of sights, sounds, thoughts, feelings, 
people and animals; not the world of quarks and gluons or of molecules and 
amino acids.‟ Such things are, of course, part of the real world; but they have been 
„artificially separated off by special, technical concepts, in the attempt to enable 
us to understand how it works. The world of the laws of physics is an abstract, 
other-things-being-equal world.‟499  
Paul was not a modern cosmologist. What he points to in Romans 8 is not a 
clear commitment by God ultimately to transform and redeem this vast physical 
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cosmos (of which he was not aware),
500
 but rather that God would ultimately 
transform and redeem human life as lived in the (to him) small and young 
physical world.
 
This clear human scale has perhaps been lost in our eager embrace 
of modern scientific insight, where billions of years and millions of light years 
roll from tongues very easily. Wilkinson claims that theologians generally have 
not taken seriously the end of the universe, typically showing „a shallow 
interaction with the scriptural material referring to the future of the physical 
universe and an overemphasis on the future of the person compared to the future 
of the Universe itself.‟501 He comments that one of the reasons for this is that it is 
hard for people to see what relevance it has for them if the universe ends in 100 
billion years. Yes, exactly. Wilkinson and Polkinghorne fail to appreciate the 
force of this observation for non-scientists.
502
  
An important way that Polkinghorne conceives of the new creation is in 
terms of continuity and discontinuity between it and this present creation. „The 
nature of the discontinuities will be the province of theology, but the nature and 
degree of the continuities, required by consistency if the eschatological world is to 
be truly a resurrected world, are things on which science may hope to comment to 
some degree, and even contribute some modest insight into the form of coherent 
possibility.‟503 This is a significant claim. The assumption is that if the new 
creation is to be physical, made of the transformed stuff of this cosmos, then the 
current insights of science should allow us to make reasonable comments about 
its nature. Nancey Murphy, in complete contrast, says the laws of nature of the 
current creation are actually „fallen creatures‟ of God (they are our masters rather 
than servants, and prevent us from living a genuinely free and loving life) so they 
must be radically transformed to permit the fullness of life which God intends. So 
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the ability of science to extrapolate our current laws of nature into the afterlife is 
severely limited.
504
 
This optimistic and promising assumption of Polkinghorne soon runs into 
difficulty. Key aspects of continuity for Polkinghorne are embodiment, 
temporality, process and personhood.
505
 For a human being to be the same human 
being after death, a body living in time and subject to change (perfection is not 
static) is essential. Apparently the afterlife will involve music (Polkinghorne 
argues that such human achievement could not simply be lost), which requires 
time. However, if we have change then what stops evil and suffering from 
happening again? The answer is that „In the clear light of the divine presence, 
shining in the new creation, such disastrous errors will no longer be possible. We 
shall see the good, and freely and totally consent to it. Our wills and desires will 
be turned by love.‟506 Similarly with the potential problems of physical decay and 
ageing: „the world to come must be so constituted that its processes are temporal 
without generating transience, their outcomes fruitful without pain and suffering 
being their shadow side.‟ Polkinghorne admits that „It is beyond our powers to 
imagine the details of such a world, but it clearly seems to me to be a coherent 
possibility.‟507 What this amounts to is fantastic science-based speculation on a 
new state of physical existence. It is at least as fantastic as the views of John Hick, 
Paul Badham, or H. H. Price, as well as some of the ordinary theologians who 
contributed to this study. 
Polkinghorne claims that „While there is a necessary tentativity about the 
details of much Christian eschatological thinking, there is also a theological 
indispensability about the quest for as coherent and credible an articulation of the 
Ends of God as we can manage to achieve.‟508 I agree with this. However, 
scientist-theologians may not be adding as much to our theological understanding 
as they claim. There is a danger that scientific conjecture may distort our 
eschatological eyesight if we wear only the spectacles of modern science. From 
the perspective of an „ordinary scientist‟, one of the clearest things I take from the 
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modern state of cosmology is just how fast it is changing and how many new and 
competing theories are emerging. The classic „Big Bang‟ view is now being 
challenged even by its original supporters such as Roger Penrose, and we have not 
only the huge „gaps‟ of dark matter and energy, but also serious proponents of 
such varied cosmological models as „Big Bounce‟, „String‟ theory, colliding 
„membranes‟ , eternal inflation from „Swiss cheese‟, and an evolutionary 
„multiverse‟ based on black holes. Perhaps we need to be humble and realise that 
we are glimpsing another partial vision of the whole, as we do with our 
interpretation of Scripture.  
CONTRASTING AND COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS 
Key biblical texts concerning LAD are interpreted in quite different ways by 
different scholars. This is no surprise to those of us academically trained in 
theology, or, as we have seen, to these ordinary theologians. However, the point I 
wish to explore further is the basis upon which such differing interpretations are 
made. What is striking about the literature is that arguments from the texts 
themselves are (of course) very quickly supplemented, or even replaced by wider 
considerations: of context and historical background; of the overall theological 
position of Paul, or a Gospel writer, or indeed the whole New Testament; or of 
arguments that are necessary to support other related theological principles and 
conclusions. There is remarkably little consensus on such interpretation. In other 
words, the different prejudices which different scholars bring to the same text 
contribute to different interpretations. As we have seen above, how could this be 
otherwise?  
There is actually relatively little information in the NT concerning the state 
of Christians immediately following death. Murray Harris argues that this results 
from a focus on the eventual end point of resurrection rather than the expectation 
of an imminent parousia. „Their main attention was focused on the ultimate, not 
the penultimate, stage of the divine plan.‟ 509 Nevertheless, scholars speculate at 
great length about 1 Corinthians 15 and 2 Corinthians 5. Paul‟s view of „body‟ is 
a classic example. 1 Cor. 15:44 contrasts „soma pneumatikon‟ and „soma 
psychikon‟, which are often translated as „physical‟ and „spiritual‟ bodies. Wright, 
among others, believes this translation to be deficient. He makes the point by 
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suggesting that the term should be a „soulish‟ rather than a physical body, 
reflecting its origin from psyche.
510
 The contrast is between two bodies, the 
present mortal and corruptible one which decays at death, and the one which we 
will receive at the future resurrection.
511
 Wright is clear that this later body is 
„spiritual‟ in the sense of it being animated by God‟s Spirit, suitable for the era of 
the Spirit, rather than for the present. It does not mean a wispy, non-corporeal 
state: flesh and blood will not be abolished. The contrast is „between corruptible 
physicality on the one hand and non-corruptible physicality on the other.‟512 
However, resurrection also involves transformation from bodies which die and 
decompose, to bodies which are not subject to decay. C. K. Barrett, like Wright, is 
clear that 1 Cor. 15:50 shows that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of 
God, because as we are, without transformation, we are incapable of living in the 
new (spiritual) age of the kingdom. This does not mean that physicality per se 
plays no part in the final age, but that we need a new body for this age, a 
„spiritual‟ body.513  
But this still does not tell us much about what the (correctly understood) 
„spiritual body‟ is actually like. Assuming that the only form of this body that has 
existed so far is the resurrected body of Jesus, then we face the issue of the 
notoriously „strange‟ nature of the recorded perceptions of this body (Jesus 
appearing and disappearing, and not being easily recognised), and whether Paul 
saw the same thing (compare James Dunn
514
). Wright does not help by 
overextending his argument in the enthusiasm of emphasising the bodiliness of 
the soma psychikon. This new mode of physicality (post-resurrection) „will be as 
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much more real, more firmed up, more bodily, than our present body as our 
present body is more substantial, more touchable, than a disembodied spirit.‟515 
Or again, „The new world will be more real, more physically solid, than the 
present one.‟516 But why should it be more like this physicality if it really is a 
complete transformation of the current cosmos? Surely there is a great range of 
possible new forms of existence that are not just like „more of the same‟. Perhaps 
continuity here is being emphasised at the expense of discontinuity.  
Peter Lampe believes that the new bodily state of the resurrected is 
„unnatural‟, that is, „something beyond the possibilities inherent in the present 
creation.‟ 517 But if this is the case, then surely Wright overemphasises the „more 
of the same‟ view. The grain analogy also points to this conclusion: the 
flower/plant is continuous with the seed, but can be vastly different. 1 Cor. 15:42-
44 show how big such differences are: for instance, mortal compared to immortal. 
According to Lampe, all that Paul wants to convey with his term „spiritual body‟ 
is that „God‟s Spirit is the only force that creates the new body. The creation of 
this new body is totally beyond all the possibilities of the present nature and 
creation.‟ For Lampe this means that he therefore cannot see (unlike 
Polkinghorne) „how the natural sciences could help us to understand the totally 
different nature of this future body – unless natural science were able to transcend 
the nature of this universe.‟518 Paul says our spiritual body will be very similar 
(conformed to) that of the resurrected Christ (Phil. 3:21), but gives no further 
details. Lampe believes Luke only pretends to know details such as that the 
resurrected body of Christ can consume fish (Lk. 24:43).  
Murray Harris is clear that whatever the state of the person in the interim 
period (disembodied or not), „the ultimate destiny of the Christian is not 
emancipation from all corporeality but the acquisition of a superior form of 
embodiment that will perfectly mediate consciousness of the presence of the 
Lord.‟519 He believes this to be undoubtedly the majority position among biblical 
scholars, with few seriously questioning that the New Testament sees a final 
resurrected and embodied destiny as the future of humankind. However, as we 
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have already seen, there is a subsequent question that must be asked: even if such 
a view were true for the authors of the New Testament, is this still the appropriate 
view for today? To what extent does our current and very different world view 
make possible a different understanding of embodiment? 
The „two visions‟ publication by Marcus Borg and Tom Wright provides a 
direct comparison of their two biblical interpretations. They could not be more 
different. Borg, for example, argues that Paul thinks of the resurrection 
appearances of Jesus as apparitions, and considers the threefold narration of the 
Damascus Road experience in Acts as definitive, showing the nature of this 
experience to be a vision. With regard to the spiritual body, Borg agrees with 
Wright that the Greek means literally a body animated by soul or spirit, „Yet the 
context suggests to me that the contrast “physical body” and “spiritual body” does 
express what Paul means.‟ Paul makes it clear that the „soulish body‟ is flesh and 
blood and perishable: in other words, what we understand by a physical body. The 
other body is none of these things, it is completely different. Borg believes the 
seed analogy of Paul emphasises this point. „The physical body is to the 
resurrection body as a seed is to a full-grown plant. Continuity: the seed becomes 
plant. Discontinuity: a full-grown plant looks radically different from the seed.‟ 
So, „Whether Paul‟s language points to a new mode of physicality (as Tom 
suggests) is indeterminate, it seems to me. Perhaps we need to take seriously that 
Paul thought there are spiritual bodies that are not physical [emphasis added].‟520 
What these contrasting visions show, of course, is that there is no single 
correct answer that can simply be read from the text, if only we had the right tools 
or understanding to unlock the original, definitive meaning. As I show above, we 
cannot come „neutral‟ to the text. Our interpretation, whether consciously 
acknowledged or not, is at least as much determined by our own theological 
predispositions as by anything that the text „really‟ says. It is perfectly obvious 
that Borg and Wright bring very different prejudices to the same text. Borg 
interprets 1 Cor. 15 from the perspective of already believing, on other complex 
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and extra-textual grounds, that Jesus‟ resurrection was not physical. Wright, of 
course, does the opposite. 
Another remarkable set of contrasting interpretations of key biblical texts is 
clearly seen in the debate between Joel Green and John Cooper, which focuses on 
philosophical questions regarding disembodied existence and the soul. Joel Green 
is clear that contemporary neuroscience calls into question the concept of the soul 
as a separate ontological entity, but he also believes that modern biblical studies 
are leading us in the same way: that is, away from any form of body-soul dualism 
and toward monism. He claims that Cooper‟s use of the NT to claim a 
disembodied intermediate state „would represent at best a minority report among 
biblical scholars of the last century or so.‟521 However, both Lampe and Cullmann 
emphasise that the key thing about the interim period is that the „me‟ is actually 
with Christ, not just in his memory; it is relational.
522
 That is, the intermediate 
state is a conscious disembodied existence. In fact, Christ is our only relationship 
at this time, and Paul describes this „reduced relational existence‟ as „sleeping‟ 
(peace and rest from his apostolic struggles?). David Brown, of course (see 
„Continuing Revelation‟ on page 26) argues that because social existence is such a 
key factor of human being, then the interim period must also include a 
communion of saints.
523
 Lampe believes it was important for Paul to believe that 
if he died before the resurrection, he would still be with Christ. The disembodied 
state is a „naked‟ state, without the new spiritual body. Those who are still alive 
when the parousia happens will not be in a naked state, which is what Paul had 
been hoping for. These people will have their new spiritual body put on over their 
old (1 Thess. 4:17).
524
 Lampe believes that Paul refused to enter into speculation 
about post-mortem life (despite Hellenistic concepts abounding); he is happy just 
to say that „I‟ will survive with Christ. Paul practices „theological asceticism‟.525  
With regard to 2 Cor. 5, Green gives a quite different interpretation. Paul is 
arguing that the new form of bodily existence is not to be traded for the old, but is 
to subsume the old. We have put on Christ in baptism, the transformation has 
already begun, and we do not want to be found „naked‟ (that is without evidence 
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of this transformation) at death when we are judged. „Paul‟s language is dualistic 
in an eschatological, not an anthropological, sense. ... Paul‟s concern is not with 
thanatology per se, but with resurrection hope.‟ For Paul, transformation and 
immortality are the consequence of, rather than the preparation for, resurrection. 
Nothing in the human person is intrinsically immortal.
526
 Green also points to the 
relational importance of Paul talking of our being „with Christ‟ or „in Christ‟. Paul 
does not use words like spirit or soul to express personal identity. When we die, 
we really do die, not just biologically, it is „the conclusion of embodied life, the 
severance of all relationships, and the fading of personal narrative.‟ So nothing 
about us is capable of traversing death; it is God‟s doing, and Paul hints that it is 
something relational with Christ. „This suggests that the relationality and 
narrativity that constitute who I am are able to exist apart from neural correlates 
and embodiment only insofar as they are preserved in God‟s own being, in 
anticipation of new creation.‟527  
This implies that we are only „alive‟ in a subjective sense after death, as 
remembered by (continuing to relate to) the living Christ. Physical resurrection in 
the new glorified body is the next living moment of the Christian dead. Charles 
Gutenson argues, however, that such an interim time may not be necessary if on 
death we experience time as God does (which is in a Trinitarian eternalist way – 
the Father transcends all time, while the Son and Spirit enter temporal location to 
bring about salvation). So for the dead, taken up into this divine eternity, their 
resurrection would be just as present to them as their death. There would be no 
need for an interim period or intermediate state.
528
 Elsewhere, Green argues 
(against Cooper) that Luke 16:9-31 (Lazarus in Hades) is not about a disembodied 
interim state, but actually shows a form of corporeal and social existence.
529
  
In stark contrast to Green, John Cooper
530
 argues that the Bible indicates that 
we do not cease to exist between death and resurrection, and there is neither „soul 
sleep‟ nor immediate resurrection. Cooper claims, rather, that we can exist at least 
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temporarily without our bodies, although we are meant for bodies, and physical 
resurrection is the Christian hope. His view is therefore „holistic dualism‟. Cooper 
says the Pauline metaphor of sleep means a conscious intermediate state, and the 
use of „sleep‟ in 1Thess. 4:13-18 and 1Cor. 15:18, 20, 51 refers to such a state. 
There are those (Green) who claim that historical Christianity mistakenly reads 
anthropological dualism into Scripture, but Cooper claims that „The scholarly 
community has become highly suspicious – almost paranoid – of the presence of 
Platonic dualism in the traditional interpretation of Scripture.‟531 Cooper is clear 
that an intermediate state must entail dualism, and he argues that many who hold 
a traditional view of the afterlife are unwilling to admit this. I suggest Wright is in 
this category. Of course, we need to be clear what we mean by dualism.  
Cooper argues that the New Testament says little about LAD. However, it 
does say that we will still be with Christ, as we are now; and from this modest 
biblical teaching certain other things necessarily follow, „for they are contained in 
or entailed by its truth [emphasis added]‟. For example, „if I am with Christ, then 
I – my essential selfhood or core personality – must survive physical death. ... I 
must somehow be aware of myself as the same person who formerly lived on 
earth‟. This is not philosophical speculation, „It is merely unpacking the content of 
biblical teaching [emphasis added]. ... Personal existence apart from earthly-
bodily existence is possible. ... We are constituted in such a way that we can 
survive “coming apart” at death, unnatural as this may be. This is all that I mean 
by “dualism”.‟532  
What drives these hugely contrasting biblical interpretations is the 
theological presuppositions which these scholars bring, in this case differing 
philosophical conceptions of the human person (rather than differing views of the 
physicality of Jesus‟ resurrection, as for Wright and Borg). Paul Badham claims 
that „there is a very intimate relationship between a man‟s interpretation of the 
New Testament, and what he believes essential to personal identity, and necessary 
for personal existence beyond the grave‟. The way one interprets Jesus‟ 
resurrection „depends, to a great extent, on the conclusions one comes to on other 
grounds about the likelihood of a bodily resurrection, and the validity of the 
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concept of the soul‟.533 This is seen clearly in Badham‟s own biblical approach. 
He accepts that the Easter faith is historically real, but questions the physicality of 
the resurrection of Jesus, seeing the New Testament reports of the sightings of 
Jesus as „veridical hallucinations‟ rather than sightings of a physical person. He 
points to the nature of the reports themselves for evidence of this: the fact that 
Jesus was not recognised at first (Emmaus being a good example); that „some 
doubted‟ (Mt. 28:17); that Jesus appeared and disappeared from locked rooms; the 
Pauline conversion stories and the fact that Paul himself lists his own experience 
of Jesus alongside all the others, which (contra Wright) „suggests that Paul 
regarded the appearances of Jesus as visionary experiences rather than objective 
seeings.‟534 Badham rejects the empty tomb tradition and the evidence of Jesus 
eating and drinking, as being a later tradition. He also suggests that we should 
take at face value the claim of Paul that flesh and blood cannot inherit the 
kingdom of God (1 Cor. 15:50), and claims that 2 Cor. 5:6-8 is language which 
„seems quite explicitly to identify the person with the soul.‟535 Further, 1 Peter 
3:18, 4:6 is clear evidence of our spiritual (non-physical) future.  
It is clear that Badham‟s interpretation of these key passages depends on his 
overall theological position and pre-determined views, as it does for all 
interpreters. But the point which Badham makes by his interpretive approach is, 
in effect, to ask „what does it mean for today?‟ Consequently, Badham sets out to 
show that the traditional belief in resurrection of the flesh is based on premises 
which have now been shown (by modern scientific knowledge) to be mistaken. 
For example, the early Fathers believed that a full bodily/physical continuity was 
the only way to ensure personal survival. Modern scientific knowledge calls this 
into question: we now know that our „particles‟ constantly renew and change.  
Nancey Murphy asks how, and what, can we know about resurrection life?
536
 
But, of course, her personal preconceptions become immediately apparent. In her 
view, the philosophical case for mind-body dualism is hopeless, despite the best 
efforts of Richard Swinburne and three hundred years of post-Cartesian 
philosophers. The problem of mind-body interaction is essentially insoluble. On 
the other hand, though, science „provides as much evidence as could be desired‟ 
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to show that there is no need for things such as substantial souls or minds. The 
(non-reductive) physicalist thesis is true.
537
 With regard to interpreting biblical 
evidence, Murphy believes that this must be done in the context of Christian faith 
and practice (ordinary theology?). She claims that our best (and perhaps only 
reliable) knowledge of LAD is this interpretive context for the eschatological 
„word pictures‟ of the Bible. We must read these eschatological pictures from 
within the context of the whole gospel, which means that we need „to take a stand 
on the highly contested issue of what Christianity is basically all about, and work 
from there to a reading of the resurrection pictures.‟ She argues that if we start 
from what is of ultimate importance to Christians in the present, we can gain real 
insights into what must ultimately be important. In other words, Murphy is 
applying a kind of „continuity‟ argument: those things that we experience now as 
of great importance in earthly Christian life must also be found in the afterlife in 
order for that life is to make sense and have meaning. So we can know that 
„resurrection bodies must provide all that is necessary to carry forward the moral 
and social relations that constitute the kingdom of God‟, because the kingdom is 
the heart of Jesus‟ message. Resurrection bodies, for Murphy, must therefore be 
physical; because a body is the only way a soul can communicate with another 
soul (but see „Disembodied Existence‟ on page 56).  
CONCLUSION 
It is simply not possible to arrive at a definitive position on biblical 
interpretation from the text alone. A decision cannot be made between competing 
interpretations on the basis of one having a better grasp of the original meaning 
and context of the text than another: for not only is there no such pure textual 
core, but a neutral interpretation of any text is impossible. All interpreters come 
with their prejudices and preconceptions, although they vary in the extent to 
which this is openly recognised. So it is at least as important to understand their 
wider theological perspective, as it is to appraise their textual scholarship. 
Furthermore, the current world view of interpreters is so different from that of the 
biblical authors that any pretence at simple extrapolation is surely rendered 
meaningless.   
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